360
16. Management of the Commons
Canada. The Cree have defined a territory where the Cree of Chisasibi have
exclusive rights to fish-however, the methods and entry to the fishery are
guided by social norms . Everyone in the Cree tribe is allowed to fish, but
before doing so each person must notify the fishing boss of the Cree village. The boss has the power to deny entry to the fishery. In addition , there
are strict rules that apply to fishing methods and wasteful fishing. The fishing boss, the community, or "animal spirits" enforce entry and user rules.
Based on who is enforcing the rules, violators may face social sanction such
as cultural isolation, or they may loose their favors from the animal spirits.
Such a loss is believed to result in a greatly reduced luck in fishing. In the
Cree fishery, cultural and ethical codes exist that guide the behavior of the
fishermen-providing respect for the fish and other fishermen .
The three scenarios described in the case studies have at least four characteristics in common. First, all three fisheries have clearly defined geographical boundaries. It is likely that without boundaries the users of the resource would not be willing to cooperate to the user rules, since the
benefits of doing so would most likely be lost to outsiders . Second, all three
have clearly defined and flexible user rules that restrict entry, use and technology . Third, all cases involve someone from the community that monitors
and enforces user rules. Fourth, all include some form of social sanctions .
Those four factors seem to be a prescription to a successful communal resource management regime, as Ostrom (995) describes. However, management systems based on communal property rights and guided by ethics
or social norms are likely to be vulnerable to changes within (and outside)
the system in question. Such changes can be increased population growth
and/or economic development. The model described in the next section
addresses those issues. Specifically, the model provides answers to the following questions:
• How does social structure evolve in a fishing community that is managed as a communal property? (For purposes of the model, the structure
of a fishing community is defined by the relative number of individuals
who cooperate with, enforce, or defect from, communal user rules.)
• How vulnerable are management systems to changes in the social structure of the fishing community?
• What economic forces may lead fishermen to stop adhering to the communal user rules of the resource?
16.3. The Model
As mentioned, we use a slightly modified version of a model developed by
Sethi and Somanathan (993). The model describes a hypothetical inshore
fishery. The fishery is sustained by one particular fish species whose population size in period t is represented by Sm. The initial population size is
16. Management of the Commons
Canada. The Cree have defined a territory where the Cree of Chisasibi have
exclusive rights to fish-however, the methods and entry to the fishery are
guided by social norms . Everyone in the Cree tribe is allowed to fish, but
before doing so each person must notify the fishing boss of the Cree village. The boss has the power to deny entry to the fishery. In addition , there
are strict rules that apply to fishing methods and wasteful fishing. The fishing boss, the community, or "animal spirits" enforce entry and user rules.
Based on who is enforcing the rules, violators may face social sanction such
as cultural isolation, or they may loose their favors from the animal spirits.
Such a loss is believed to result in a greatly reduced luck in fishing. In the
Cree fishery, cultural and ethical codes exist that guide the behavior of the
fishermen-providing respect for the fish and other fishermen .
The three scenarios described in the case studies have at least four characteristics in common. First, all three fisheries have clearly defined geographical boundaries. It is likely that without boundaries the users of the resource would not be willing to cooperate to the user rules, since the
benefits of doing so would most likely be lost to outsiders . Second, all three
have clearly defined and flexible user rules that restrict entry, use and technology . Third, all cases involve someone from the community that monitors
and enforces user rules. Fourth, all include some form of social sanctions .
Those four factors seem to be a prescription to a successful communal resource management regime, as Ostrom (995) describes. However, management systems based on communal property rights and guided by ethics
or social norms are likely to be vulnerable to changes within (and outside)
the system in question. Such changes can be increased population growth
and/or economic development. The model described in the next section
addresses those issues. Specifically, the model provides answers to the following questions:
• How does social structure evolve in a fishing community that is managed as a communal property? (For purposes of the model, the structure
of a fishing community is defined by the relative number of individuals
who cooperate with, enforce, or defect from, communal user rules.)
• How vulnerable are management systems to changes in the social structure of the fishing community?
• What economic forces may lead fishermen to stop adhering to the communal user rules of the resource?
16.3. The Model
As mentioned, we use a slightly modified version of a model developed by
Sethi and Somanathan (993). The model describes a hypothetical inshore
fishery. The fishery is sustained by one particular fish species whose population size in period t is represented by Sm. The initial population size is