16.2. Three Case Studies of Communal Resource Management
359
Here we only discuss three such case studies, each of which describes the
management of fishery resources. The first study describes fishery management in Indonesia, the second the management of the lobster fishery in
Maine, and the last the fishery management practices of the Cree Indians in
Chisasibi, James Bay, Canada.
The first example is the coastal management practices in the Maluku islands of Indonesia as described by Zemer (1994). The Maluku (Molucca) islands are located in eastern Indonesia and consist of over 1000 islands. Villages are located on many of the islands and each village controls a
well-defined marine territory. The fishing grounds are managed through the
use of so-called sasi. Sasi is a historic family of institutions and social norms
that regulate access to and the amount of catch from a broad range of resources. Sasiare enforced by the kewang (resource manager) of each village.
The kewang has the power to close off areas, prohibit use of a specific gear,
and use sasi to regulate access to nearby local coves, bays and estuaries .
Zerner (994) speculates that sasi practices initially may have been directed toward ancestral spirits believed to inhabit the Moluccan marine and
terrestrial landscape. Violations of sasi are dealt with by methods ranging
from public humiliation to nominal monetary punishments. One form of a
public humiliation is, for instance, to have to walk around the community
and shout "I have violated sasi," which may trigger social exclusion. Evidence shows that public shame that results from violating sasi seems to be
far more effective in preventing non-cooperation with the social norms
than monetary sanctions are .
The second example of a fishery that is managed as a communal property, where informal norms about ownership and use of a resource exist, are
parts of the lobster fishery in Maine (Acheson 1987). Despite the fact that according to Maine law everyone with a fishing permit may catch lobster, strict
entry barriers and fishing rules exist as cultural norms. To be allowed to
catch lobster one must be an acknowledged member of a "lobster gang"that is to belong to a group of fishermen that fish from a specific harbor. Access to each harbor is controlled through membership in gangs, and it is
quite difficult to qualify for such membership. Those that try to use a certain
harbor without being a member of a harbor gang are met initially with verbal sanctions. Confrontations may escalate into the destruction of fishing
gear that belongs to the interloper. Each harbor gang has its own territory
that is clearly identified by visible landmarks. User rules are set within each
territory such as rules regarding the number of lobster traps that may be
used at each time. If fishermen violate territorial boundaries or user rules of
an area they face severe sanctions that may result in the loss of their fishing
gear. Sanctioning is generally carried out by someone having user rights to
the territory being infringed, that is, by the fishermen themselves.
Berkes 0987, 1995) details another example of successful resource management whereby a fishery is managed as a communal resource. Those are
the management methods of the Cree Indians of Chisasibi in James Bay,
359
Here we only discuss three such case studies, each of which describes the
management of fishery resources. The first study describes fishery management in Indonesia, the second the management of the lobster fishery in
Maine, and the last the fishery management practices of the Cree Indians in
Chisasibi, James Bay, Canada.
The first example is the coastal management practices in the Maluku islands of Indonesia as described by Zemer (1994). The Maluku (Molucca) islands are located in eastern Indonesia and consist of over 1000 islands. Villages are located on many of the islands and each village controls a
well-defined marine territory. The fishing grounds are managed through the
use of so-called sasi. Sasi is a historic family of institutions and social norms
that regulate access to and the amount of catch from a broad range of resources. Sasiare enforced by the kewang (resource manager) of each village.
The kewang has the power to close off areas, prohibit use of a specific gear,
and use sasi to regulate access to nearby local coves, bays and estuaries .
Zerner (994) speculates that sasi practices initially may have been directed toward ancestral spirits believed to inhabit the Moluccan marine and
terrestrial landscape. Violations of sasi are dealt with by methods ranging
from public humiliation to nominal monetary punishments. One form of a
public humiliation is, for instance, to have to walk around the community
and shout "I have violated sasi," which may trigger social exclusion. Evidence shows that public shame that results from violating sasi seems to be
far more effective in preventing non-cooperation with the social norms
than monetary sanctions are .
The second example of a fishery that is managed as a communal property, where informal norms about ownership and use of a resource exist, are
parts of the lobster fishery in Maine (Acheson 1987). Despite the fact that according to Maine law everyone with a fishing permit may catch lobster, strict
entry barriers and fishing rules exist as cultural norms. To be allowed to
catch lobster one must be an acknowledged member of a "lobster gang"that is to belong to a group of fishermen that fish from a specific harbor. Access to each harbor is controlled through membership in gangs, and it is
quite difficult to qualify for such membership. Those that try to use a certain
harbor without being a member of a harbor gang are met initially with verbal sanctions. Confrontations may escalate into the destruction of fishing
gear that belongs to the interloper. Each harbor gang has its own territory
that is clearly identified by visible landmarks. User rules are set within each
territory such as rules regarding the number of lobster traps that may be
used at each time. If fishermen violate territorial boundaries or user rules of
an area they face severe sanctions that may result in the loss of their fishing
gear. Sanctioning is generally carried out by someone having user rights to
the territory being infringed, that is, by the fishermen themselves.
Berkes 0987, 1995) details another example of successful resource management whereby a fishery is managed as a communal resource. Those are
the management methods of the Cree Indians of Chisasibi in James Bay,