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16. Management of the Commons
1992). The resource-economics literature commonly treats the two terms as
synonyms, but this is not so.
Bromley (992) defines four basic ideal types of property rights in which
marine resources can be held. These are :
• Open access
• Private property
• State property
• Communal property
Open access, is the absence of property rights , there are no regulations
that guide the use of the fishery-its use is open to all.
Under private property, resource rights are held by individuals who manage the fishery as they wish.
Under state property, the government regulates access to and utilization of
the fishery.
Under communal property, resource rights are assigned to an identified
group of users who may exclude others from using the property. These
identified users manage the resource among themselves, frequently using
a complex system of norms and conventions. The use of communal
property rights was common among traditional artisan fishing communities and is found in a number of contemporary coastal fisheries throughout the world such as in the United States, Canada and Indonesia (Bromley 1992) .
Motivated by the apparent discrepancy between the the oretical and empirical evidence regarding the use of resources managed as communal resources , the model of this chapter is intended to demonstrate how a fishery
can be managed as a communal property by the use of social norms. Using
a model developed by Sethi and Somanathan (993), we explore how the
social structure of a fishing community-measured in the number of fishermen who adhere to a social norm, or defect from it-may evolve over time .
We also explore which factors may destabilize the cooperation among
members of the community.
The next section presents three case studies that describe fishery resources
that are managed as communal property. These case studies illustrate the abstract-yet quantified-concepts of the model. The following three sections
describe the model, show model results, and present conclusion.
16.2. Three Case Studies
of Communal Resource Management
Numerous case studies exist that describe how different resources can successfully be managed as common-property resources using social norms
(see e.g. McCay and Acheson 1987; Bromley 1992; Western et al. 1994).
16. Management of the Commons
1992). The resource-economics literature commonly treats the two terms as
synonyms, but this is not so.
Bromley (992) defines four basic ideal types of property rights in which
marine resources can be held. These are :
• Open access
• Private property
• State property
• Communal property
Open access, is the absence of property rights , there are no regulations
that guide the use of the fishery-its use is open to all.
Under private property, resource rights are held by individuals who manage the fishery as they wish.
Under state property, the government regulates access to and utilization of
the fishery.
Under communal property, resource rights are assigned to an identified
group of users who may exclude others from using the property. These
identified users manage the resource among themselves, frequently using
a complex system of norms and conventions. The use of communal
property rights was common among traditional artisan fishing communities and is found in a number of contemporary coastal fisheries throughout the world such as in the United States, Canada and Indonesia (Bromley 1992) .
Motivated by the apparent discrepancy between the the oretical and empirical evidence regarding the use of resources managed as communal resources , the model of this chapter is intended to demonstrate how a fishery
can be managed as a communal property by the use of social norms. Using
a model developed by Sethi and Somanathan (993), we explore how the
social structure of a fishing community-measured in the number of fishermen who adhere to a social norm, or defect from it-may evolve over time .
We also explore which factors may destabilize the cooperation among
members of the community.
The next section presents three case studies that describe fishery resources
that are managed as communal property. These case studies illustrate the abstract-yet quantified-concepts of the model. The following three sections
describe the model, show model results, and present conclusion.
16.2. Three Case Studies
of Communal Resource Management
Numerous case studies exist that describe how different resources can successfully be managed as common-property resources using social norms
(see e.g. McCay and Acheson 1987; Bromley 1992; Western et al. 1994).