16.1 . Introduction
357
ity that describes the fact that fishing in one period reduces the stock available for reproduction in the next period.
Hardin, in his 1968 publication titled "The Tragedy of the Commons," argues that resources shared by a group of people, such as common grazing
lands or a fishery, are subject to overexploitation due to the self-interested
behavior of individuals. Hardin's example is for a cattle-grazing pasture that
is open to all. Each individual using the pasture is motivated to add additional cattle to the pasture because he receives the direct benefits of his own
cattle and bears only a share of the costs resulting from overgrazing. The result would be, according to Hardin, an overexploitation of the pasture.
The interpretation of those three articles is that, if everyone is allowed to
use a particular resource, it will be subject to overexploitation because
there is no incentive to take into account the externalities associated with
the use of the resource. Following this interpretation, the convention has
been in the resource-economics literature-and in the applied use of resource economics-to view all resources that are held in common to be
subject to an inevitable overexploitation and degradation (Feeny et al.
1996) . The proposed solutions to the "Tragedy of the Commons" are either
to transfer such resources to individual ownership, such as through identifying individual transferable quotas, or to subject them to government
control. In either case, the free access to the resource is eliminated and ,
consequently, the "Tragedy of the Commons" is prevented (for further
references on different resource management options see e.g. Hannesson
1991).
The "Tragedy of the Commons" hypothesis has proved to be a powerful
descriptor of human behavior. Nonetheless, recent literature on the problems of the commons presents a growing body of empirical evidence that
runs counter to the arguments that lie behind the conventional model of
the commons (e.g. Feeny et al. 1996, Hanna and Munasinghe 1995, Western et al. 1994 and McCay and Acheson 1987). Those studies demonstrate
that potentially renewable resources such as a fish population can be held
in common and managed in a sustainable manner using cultural norms,
ideology and value systems to ensure cooperation among the users of the
resource (e.g. Zerner 1994 and Acheson 1987) . Consequently, the resource
management prescription based on conventional economic analysis of the
commons ignores the vast evidence that shows that the use of resources
that are held in common is often guided by ethical or religious codes of
conduct that are more binding on individual behavior than any government
regulation (Sethi and Somanathan 1993).
The reason for the apparent failure of the "Tragedy of the Commons " hypothesis to capture a wide range of real-world marine resource issues
seems to result from the repeated failure of resource economists to distinguish between different forms of property rights (Bromley 1992). In particular, they fail to differentiate between resources defined either as "open access" (res nullius) or "communal resources " (res communes) (Bromley
357
ity that describes the fact that fishing in one period reduces the stock available for reproduction in the next period.
Hardin, in his 1968 publication titled "The Tragedy of the Commons," argues that resources shared by a group of people, such as common grazing
lands or a fishery, are subject to overexploitation due to the self-interested
behavior of individuals. Hardin's example is for a cattle-grazing pasture that
is open to all. Each individual using the pasture is motivated to add additional cattle to the pasture because he receives the direct benefits of his own
cattle and bears only a share of the costs resulting from overgrazing. The result would be, according to Hardin, an overexploitation of the pasture.
The interpretation of those three articles is that, if everyone is allowed to
use a particular resource, it will be subject to overexploitation because
there is no incentive to take into account the externalities associated with
the use of the resource. Following this interpretation, the convention has
been in the resource-economics literature-and in the applied use of resource economics-to view all resources that are held in common to be
subject to an inevitable overexploitation and degradation (Feeny et al.
1996) . The proposed solutions to the "Tragedy of the Commons" are either
to transfer such resources to individual ownership, such as through identifying individual transferable quotas, or to subject them to government
control. In either case, the free access to the resource is eliminated and ,
consequently, the "Tragedy of the Commons" is prevented (for further
references on different resource management options see e.g. Hannesson
1991).
The "Tragedy of the Commons" hypothesis has proved to be a powerful
descriptor of human behavior. Nonetheless, recent literature on the problems of the commons presents a growing body of empirical evidence that
runs counter to the arguments that lie behind the conventional model of
the commons (e.g. Feeny et al. 1996, Hanna and Munasinghe 1995, Western et al. 1994 and McCay and Acheson 1987). Those studies demonstrate
that potentially renewable resources such as a fish population can be held
in common and managed in a sustainable manner using cultural norms,
ideology and value systems to ensure cooperation among the users of the
resource (e.g. Zerner 1994 and Acheson 1987) . Consequently, the resource
management prescription based on conventional economic analysis of the
commons ignores the vast evidence that shows that the use of resources
that are held in common is often guided by ethical or religious codes of
conduct that are more binding on individual behavior than any government
regulation (Sethi and Somanathan 1993).
The reason for the apparent failure of the "Tragedy of the Commons " hypothesis to capture a wide range of real-world marine resource issues
seems to result from the repeated failure of resource economists to distinguish between different forms of property rights (Bromley 1992). In particular, they fail to differentiate between resources defined either as "open access" (res nullius) or "communal resources " (res communes) (Bromley