16
Management of the Commons:
Social Behavior and Resource Extraction
Brynhildur Davidsdottir
Ruin is the destination toward which all men rush each pursuing
his own best interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the
commons.
Garret Hardin
In this chapter you will:
• Learn to distinguish between common property and open-access resources, and investigate the implications of this distinction for resource
management;
• See how to develop an economic model of resource use that accounts
for social norms;
• Identify long-run stable management strategies based on social norms; and
• Investigate how social structures change over time in response to
changes in economic factors.
16.1. Introduction
In resource economics, the conventional view for several decades has been
that the lack of clearly defined property rights will lead to overexploitation, or possibly to a complete extinction of a commercially viable resource.
This view originates in three seminal publications by Scott Gordon (954),
Anthony Scott (955) and Garret Hardin (968), who together established
the core of the standard approach to the analysis of common-property resources (Dasgupta and Heal 1979).
Gordon's (954) analysis demonstrates the divergence between individual and collective behavior in the exploitation of fishery resources whose
use is open to all. Gordon focuses on the crowding externality that results
from the fact that one fishermen 's catch lowers the returns to fishing effort
for others who are using the resource.
Scott (955) extends Gordon's analysis by taking into account the dynamic behavior of the resource. He identifies the so-called stock extemal356
M. Ruth et al. (Eds.), Dynamic Modeling for Marine Conservation
© Springer-Verlag New York, Inc. 2002
Management of the Commons:
Social Behavior and Resource Extraction
Brynhildur Davidsdottir
Ruin is the destination toward which all men rush each pursuing
his own best interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the
commons.
Garret Hardin
In this chapter you will:
• Learn to distinguish between common property and open-access resources, and investigate the implications of this distinction for resource
management;
• See how to develop an economic model of resource use that accounts
for social norms;
• Identify long-run stable management strategies based on social norms; and
• Investigate how social structures change over time in response to
changes in economic factors.
16.1. Introduction
In resource economics, the conventional view for several decades has been
that the lack of clearly defined property rights will lead to overexploitation, or possibly to a complete extinction of a commercially viable resource.
This view originates in three seminal publications by Scott Gordon (954),
Anthony Scott (955) and Garret Hardin (968), who together established
the core of the standard approach to the analysis of common-property resources (Dasgupta and Heal 1979).
Gordon's (954) analysis demonstrates the divergence between individual and collective behavior in the exploitation of fishery resources whose
use is open to all. Gordon focuses on the crowding externality that results
from the fact that one fishermen 's catch lowers the returns to fishing effort
for others who are using the resource.
Scott (955) extends Gordon's analysis by taking into account the dynamic behavior of the resource. He identifies the so-called stock extemal356
M. Ruth et al. (Eds.), Dynamic Modeling for Marine Conservation
© Springer-Verlag New York, Inc. 2002