77
5 Livelihoods in the Context of Fisheries – A Governability Challenge
livelihoods in fi sheries and aquaculture are complex for many reasons, of which I
single out three here. First, the diversity of options that constitute livelihoods
result in numerous combinations that make the outcomes of governance interventions unpredictable. Second, livelihoods are formed in the context of relationships
and in reference to value systems that create additional layers of complexity in
understanding choices and actions. Third, fi sheries and aquaculture livelihoods
are cross-scale in nature: ecological, market, migration and other linkages make
de fi ning the system itself complex, not to speak of the isolating pathways of causality in decision-making around livelihoods choices.
Complexity often creates unexpected or paradoxical effects that challenge
fi sheries governability. In relation to the fi rst type of complexity that I raised in the
previous paragraph, a paradox of governance in fi sheries is that attempts to reduce
capacity often fail. This is true of boat buyback schemes, where the total number of
boats may be reduced while fi shing capacity is maintained, because the remaining
fi shers in the fl eet develop ingenious means to expand capacity. They accomplish
this by, for example, building bigger boats or increasing the power of their engines
or the effectiveness of their gears. In this case, fi shers use their intimate understanding of the possibilities for intensi fi cation afforded by their livelihoods to increase
their effort.
With reference to the second form of complexity, fi shers may also fail to respond
in predictable ways to attempts to encourage their livelihood diversi fi cation to
reduce fi shing pressure. Research by Pollnac et al. ( 2001 ) has shown that fi shers
often fail to behave predictably when offered relatively lucrative alternative livelihoods (Pollnac et al. 2001 ; Sievanen et al. 2005 ) . In some instances they may reorient to other activities like seaweed farming; in other cases new income sources may
just facilitate intensi fi cation of fi shing effort. Cases like these illustrate that simplifying assumptions about fi shers’ rational economic behavior, while convenient as a
basis for management, are a poor guide to fi shers’ actual behavior. Fishers often
value their work and are loath to leave it (Pollnac and Poggie 2008 ) .
The work by Pollnac et al. ( 2001 ) also links to the third form of complexity,
namely the unpredictability of cross-scale and cross-sector linkages. As the cases
above attest, fi sheries are often highly diversi fi ed. Fishers, however, have limits to
their fl exibility. Tourism development, for example, may be seen as a development
strategy that is relatively benign for fi sheries, while potentially providing important possibilities for livelihoods diversi fi cation. In some instances such interventions create new complementary opportunities for fi shers (Pascual 2004 ) , while in
others they threaten fi shers’ very access to the sea (Boissevain 2004 ) . The promotion of new coastal development related to tourism or any other new economic
activity that intends to bene fi t fi sheries should fi rst be based on a thorough governability assessment that considers particular social, demographic and cultural factors. Social justice concerns need to be considered, as elite groups within a fi shery
may be well placed to bene fi t from new developments that disadvantage less powerful groups. The cross-sectoral linkages in fi sheries reinforce the livelihoods’
approach insight that fi sheries governance and development cannot be considered
a sector-speci fi c problem alone. This is a clear connection to the third dimension
5 Livelihoods in the Context of Fisheries – A Governability Challenge
livelihoods in fi sheries and aquaculture are complex for many reasons, of which I
single out three here. First, the diversity of options that constitute livelihoods
result in numerous combinations that make the outcomes of governance interventions unpredictable. Second, livelihoods are formed in the context of relationships
and in reference to value systems that create additional layers of complexity in
understanding choices and actions. Third, fi sheries and aquaculture livelihoods
are cross-scale in nature: ecological, market, migration and other linkages make
de fi ning the system itself complex, not to speak of the isolating pathways of causality in decision-making around livelihoods choices.
Complexity often creates unexpected or paradoxical effects that challenge
fi sheries governability. In relation to the fi rst type of complexity that I raised in the
previous paragraph, a paradox of governance in fi sheries is that attempts to reduce
capacity often fail. This is true of boat buyback schemes, where the total number of
boats may be reduced while fi shing capacity is maintained, because the remaining
fi shers in the fl eet develop ingenious means to expand capacity. They accomplish
this by, for example, building bigger boats or increasing the power of their engines
or the effectiveness of their gears. In this case, fi shers use their intimate understanding of the possibilities for intensi fi cation afforded by their livelihoods to increase
their effort.
With reference to the second form of complexity, fi shers may also fail to respond
in predictable ways to attempts to encourage their livelihood diversi fi cation to
reduce fi shing pressure. Research by Pollnac et al. ( 2001 ) has shown that fi shers
often fail to behave predictably when offered relatively lucrative alternative livelihoods (Pollnac et al. 2001 ; Sievanen et al. 2005 ) . In some instances they may reorient to other activities like seaweed farming; in other cases new income sources may
just facilitate intensi fi cation of fi shing effort. Cases like these illustrate that simplifying assumptions about fi shers’ rational economic behavior, while convenient as a
basis for management, are a poor guide to fi shers’ actual behavior. Fishers often
value their work and are loath to leave it (Pollnac and Poggie 2008 ) .
The work by Pollnac et al. ( 2001 ) also links to the third form of complexity,
namely the unpredictability of cross-scale and cross-sector linkages. As the cases
above attest, fi sheries are often highly diversi fi ed. Fishers, however, have limits to
their fl exibility. Tourism development, for example, may be seen as a development
strategy that is relatively benign for fi sheries, while potentially providing important possibilities for livelihoods diversi fi cation. In some instances such interventions create new complementary opportunities for fi shers (Pascual 2004 ) , while in
others they threaten fi shers’ very access to the sea (Boissevain 2004 ) . The promotion of new coastal development related to tourism or any other new economic
activity that intends to bene fi t fi sheries should fi rst be based on a thorough governability assessment that considers particular social, demographic and cultural factors. Social justice concerns need to be considered, as elite groups within a fi shery
may be well placed to bene fi t from new developments that disadvantage less powerful groups. The cross-sectoral linkages in fi sheries reinforce the livelihoods’
approach insight that fi sheries governance and development cannot be considered
a sector-speci fi c problem alone. This is a clear connection to the third dimension