76
D. Johnson
understand fi sheries systems, and especially small-scale fi sheries systems, in the
wake of the failures of earlier simplifying models of fi sheries and fi sher rationality
(Berkes et al. 2001 ; Charles 2001 ; Andrew et al. 2007 ) . The foundations of the governability tool for analysing fi sheries systems is the threefold division into the
System-to-be-Governed, the Governing System, and Governing Interactions. Each
of these are characterized by diversity, complexity and dynamics and subject to
cross-scale interactions. Livelihoods are part of the System-to-be-Governed, but their
characteristics in fl uence the Governing System and Governing Interactions, just as
these latter systems shape the former. As with the System-to-be-Governed, more
generally, livelihoods in fi sheries and aquaculture are diverse, complex, dynamic,
and in fl uenced by factors at different scales. These governability characteristics have
consequences that make livelihoods governance a wicked problem.
Diversity refers to the qualitative differences among elements in a given system
(Kooiman 2002 , 232 and 194–196). In fi sheries and aquaculture, livelihoods diversity is evident both between and within different systems. Small-scale fi sheries are
suf fi ciently diverse that they challenge widely held assumptions about fi shing. Béné
( 2003 ) and Thorpe et al. ( 2007 ) have shown, for example, that the images of fi sheries
as poverty-ridden refuges of the last resort, although sometimes true, are often inaccurate. Coastal small-scale fi shers in the central region of Gujarat’s fi shing industry,
for example, are generally better off than their average agriculturalist counterparts
(Johnson and Sathyaplan 2006 ; Sathyapalan and Johnson 2008 ) . Similarly, fi shers
on the large lakes of south central Africa, while not rich, are generally better off than
their non- fi shing agricultural neighbors (Allison 2005 ) . In some cases, the poorest
rural dwellers do not have access to many forms of fi shing, which can be lucrative
(Béné 2003 ) . Fisheries are also frequently assumed to be a sector in which fi shers
are largely autonomous. Yet, as the livelihoods in fi sheries literature shows, the
norm is rather for fi sheries and aquaculture to be integrated with other sectors
(Allison and Ellis 2001 ; Allison and Horemans 2006 ) . In many parts of the world,
such as Goa for example, farmers may become aquaculturalists on their land in the
rainy season (Rubinoff 1999 ) . Historically in Atlantic Canada (Johnson 1999 ) , and
presently in many parts of Africa and Asia, fi shers and members of their households
are also farmers, foresters, gatherers and workers in industrial or service sectors.
Seasonal dependence on state transfer payments is also a standard element in
Canadian fi sher’s livelihood strategies. Fishers’ livelihoods may be buffered by
highly developed forms of community-based governance or these may be virtually
absent (Jentoft et al. 2009 ) . Diversities between and within fi sheries that affect livelihoods range across a host of these and other variables, such as technology, ecology,
mobility, gender relationships of work, knowledge, market relationships, degree of
subsistence, institutional development and so on. All of these factors reinforce the
fourth dimension of fi sheries as a wicked problem that each particular problem is
distinct, requiring governors to constantly re fi ne their knowledge and adapt their
responses.
Complexity measures the density and extent of relationships within a system.
The greater the density of relationships, and the wider the bounds of a system, the
greater is its complexity (Kooiman 2002 , 177–199). In terms of governability,
D. Johnson
understand fi sheries systems, and especially small-scale fi sheries systems, in the
wake of the failures of earlier simplifying models of fi sheries and fi sher rationality
(Berkes et al. 2001 ; Charles 2001 ; Andrew et al. 2007 ) . The foundations of the governability tool for analysing fi sheries systems is the threefold division into the
System-to-be-Governed, the Governing System, and Governing Interactions. Each
of these are characterized by diversity, complexity and dynamics and subject to
cross-scale interactions. Livelihoods are part of the System-to-be-Governed, but their
characteristics in fl uence the Governing System and Governing Interactions, just as
these latter systems shape the former. As with the System-to-be-Governed, more
generally, livelihoods in fi sheries and aquaculture are diverse, complex, dynamic,
and in fl uenced by factors at different scales. These governability characteristics have
consequences that make livelihoods governance a wicked problem.
Diversity refers to the qualitative differences among elements in a given system
(Kooiman 2002 , 232 and 194–196). In fi sheries and aquaculture, livelihoods diversity is evident both between and within different systems. Small-scale fi sheries are
suf fi ciently diverse that they challenge widely held assumptions about fi shing. Béné
( 2003 ) and Thorpe et al. ( 2007 ) have shown, for example, that the images of fi sheries
as poverty-ridden refuges of the last resort, although sometimes true, are often inaccurate. Coastal small-scale fi shers in the central region of Gujarat’s fi shing industry,
for example, are generally better off than their average agriculturalist counterparts
(Johnson and Sathyaplan 2006 ; Sathyapalan and Johnson 2008 ) . Similarly, fi shers
on the large lakes of south central Africa, while not rich, are generally better off than
their non- fi shing agricultural neighbors (Allison 2005 ) . In some cases, the poorest
rural dwellers do not have access to many forms of fi shing, which can be lucrative
(Béné 2003 ) . Fisheries are also frequently assumed to be a sector in which fi shers
are largely autonomous. Yet, as the livelihoods in fi sheries literature shows, the
norm is rather for fi sheries and aquaculture to be integrated with other sectors
(Allison and Ellis 2001 ; Allison and Horemans 2006 ) . In many parts of the world,
such as Goa for example, farmers may become aquaculturalists on their land in the
rainy season (Rubinoff 1999 ) . Historically in Atlantic Canada (Johnson 1999 ) , and
presently in many parts of Africa and Asia, fi shers and members of their households
are also farmers, foresters, gatherers and workers in industrial or service sectors.
Seasonal dependence on state transfer payments is also a standard element in
Canadian fi sher’s livelihood strategies. Fishers’ livelihoods may be buffered by
highly developed forms of community-based governance or these may be virtually
absent (Jentoft et al. 2009 ) . Diversities between and within fi sheries that affect livelihoods range across a host of these and other variables, such as technology, ecology,
mobility, gender relationships of work, knowledge, market relationships, degree of
subsistence, institutional development and so on. All of these factors reinforce the
fourth dimension of fi sheries as a wicked problem that each particular problem is
distinct, requiring governors to constantly re fi ne their knowledge and adapt their
responses.
Complexity measures the density and extent of relationships within a system.
The greater the density of relationships, and the wider the bounds of a system, the
greater is its complexity (Kooiman 2002 , 177–199). In terms of governability,