78
D. Johnson
of wicked problems that fi sheries problems are embedded within broader scales,
including inter-sectoral economic relationships. That different groups may disagree on the advantages of cross-scale connections, as in the case of the tourism
example, illustrates the fi rst dimension of wicked problems that problems are complicated by varying perceptions.
On one level, dynamics in interactive governance theory is just the recognition
that change is a signi fi cant consideration for governability. Without paying attention
to regular changes over the daily or seasonal cycle and to the prevalence of unpredictable change in fi sheries, fi sheries governance is ill equipped to understand fi sher
behaviors. This observation is one of the key insights that livelihoods approaches
have drawn from international development with their demonstration that adaptation to trends, shocks and associated uncertainty is an important feature of household livelihoods strategies in fi sheries (Allison and Ellis 2001 ) . As both livelihoods
approaches and interactive governance theory recognize, dynamics in fi sheries are
discontinuous; change takes place in fi ts and starts (Kooiman 2002 , 200–203). In
this sense of dynamics, livelihoods and interactive governance are linked to complex adaptive systems thinking and resilience (Gunderson and Holling 2002 ) .
Fishing households, or fi sheries as a whole, that are better able to bounce back from
unexpected changes are more resilient.
The strategies that fi shers develop to cope with dynamics in fi sheries are part of
the landscape of governability that must be considered when developing governance interventions. Likewise, the forces that drive dynamics must be also considered. On the one hand, research has shown that livelihood diversi fi cation at the
household level is extremely important as the basis for evolving strategies to adapt
to seasonal changes and unexpected shocks (Marschke and Berkes 2006 ) . On the
other hand, adaptive strategies for sustaining livelihoods can also contain paradoxes
for governability. Class relationships in fi sheries can be highly unequal and have
historically often come under attack as unjust. Yet, the cyclical, recurrent debt relationships reinforced by the social norms on which they are often based are also an
adaptive system that responds to the uncertainty and risk of fi shing (Ommer 1989 ;
Platteau 1995 ) . Indeed, these kinds of debt relationships are a strategy to sustain
fi sheries livelihoods that is equivalent to livelihood diversi fi cation in that both provide insurance against risk. In the case of debt relationships, it is a knotty governability problem to ascertain when they are functional or perverse (Johnson 2010 ) .
Fisher strategies to sustain livelihoods over time can also break down and their
inability to adapt can be a constraint on governability. The previously mentioned
Pulicat Lake case (Coulthard 2008, 2011 ) illustrates the ossi fi cation of a once successful adaptive strategy. Coulthard ( 2008, 2011 ) shows how the historical system
of property rights in stake net fi sheries failed to adapt to changing cross-scale social,
economic and ecological conditions with serious consequences for the livelihoods
viability of the Pattinavar caste. Dynamics are thus of considerable importance for
fi sheries governability; they direct the attention of governors to the features of
speci fi c fi sheries that build or limit resilience. The Pulicat Lake example also
shows the link between dynamics and the fi fth type of wicked problem; solutions
to fi sheries problems create their own legacies that can result in perverse path
D. Johnson
of wicked problems that fi sheries problems are embedded within broader scales,
including inter-sectoral economic relationships. That different groups may disagree on the advantages of cross-scale connections, as in the case of the tourism
example, illustrates the fi rst dimension of wicked problems that problems are complicated by varying perceptions.
On one level, dynamics in interactive governance theory is just the recognition
that change is a signi fi cant consideration for governability. Without paying attention
to regular changes over the daily or seasonal cycle and to the prevalence of unpredictable change in fi sheries, fi sheries governance is ill equipped to understand fi sher
behaviors. This observation is one of the key insights that livelihoods approaches
have drawn from international development with their demonstration that adaptation to trends, shocks and associated uncertainty is an important feature of household livelihoods strategies in fi sheries (Allison and Ellis 2001 ) . As both livelihoods
approaches and interactive governance theory recognize, dynamics in fi sheries are
discontinuous; change takes place in fi ts and starts (Kooiman 2002 , 200–203). In
this sense of dynamics, livelihoods and interactive governance are linked to complex adaptive systems thinking and resilience (Gunderson and Holling 2002 ) .
Fishing households, or fi sheries as a whole, that are better able to bounce back from
unexpected changes are more resilient.
The strategies that fi shers develop to cope with dynamics in fi sheries are part of
the landscape of governability that must be considered when developing governance interventions. Likewise, the forces that drive dynamics must be also considered. On the one hand, research has shown that livelihood diversi fi cation at the
household level is extremely important as the basis for evolving strategies to adapt
to seasonal changes and unexpected shocks (Marschke and Berkes 2006 ) . On the
other hand, adaptive strategies for sustaining livelihoods can also contain paradoxes
for governability. Class relationships in fi sheries can be highly unequal and have
historically often come under attack as unjust. Yet, the cyclical, recurrent debt relationships reinforced by the social norms on which they are often based are also an
adaptive system that responds to the uncertainty and risk of fi shing (Ommer 1989 ;
Platteau 1995 ) . Indeed, these kinds of debt relationships are a strategy to sustain
fi sheries livelihoods that is equivalent to livelihood diversi fi cation in that both provide insurance against risk. In the case of debt relationships, it is a knotty governability problem to ascertain when they are functional or perverse (Johnson 2010 ) .
Fisher strategies to sustain livelihoods over time can also break down and their
inability to adapt can be a constraint on governability. The previously mentioned
Pulicat Lake case (Coulthard 2008, 2011 ) illustrates the ossi fi cation of a once successful adaptive strategy. Coulthard ( 2008, 2011 ) shows how the historical system
of property rights in stake net fi sheries failed to adapt to changing cross-scale social,
economic and ecological conditions with serious consequences for the livelihoods
viability of the Pattinavar caste. Dynamics are thus of considerable importance for
fi sheries governability; they direct the attention of governors to the features of
speci fi c fi sheries that build or limit resilience. The Pulicat Lake example also
shows the link between dynamics and the fi fth type of wicked problem; solutions
to fi sheries problems create their own legacies that can result in perverse path