58
S. Jentoft
increase the level of control and instill stricter penalties, fi shers would interpret it as
an even greater injustice to which they are likely to respond in kind, leading the
fi shery compliance problem into a vicious cycle.
Hauck argues that in order to understand the compliance problem and to fi nd
ways to address it, a broader perspective on fi sheries systems and governing mechanisms is required. Enforcement may well be part of the solution, but it is not all that
is needed. Drawing on sociological and criminological literature, she states that
fi sheries management violations must also be understood from a normative perspective. Breaking the law is a moral problem and we need to raise the sociologically
more interesting question of why people adhere to norms and regulations in the fi rst
place (Song and Chuenpagdee 2011 ; Jagers et al. 2012 ) . Hauck ( 2008 ) even seeks
to move beyond this to address the basic question of social justice, the way fi sheries
laws come into being and whose interests they serve. Thus, she concludes that,
“while the monitoring and enforcement of rules have been identi fi ed as important
for enhancing compliance, they need to be implemented through legitimate, socially
valued institutions that are accepted and supported” (Hauck 2008 , 215). From this
follows a range of policies and management reforms that should be instigated in
South Africa – and in other situations where compliance appears to be a problem.
Social Contract
In Norway, “quota ladders” were fi rst introduced in the early 1990s as a response to
a distribution con fl ict that followed the unexpected Barents Sea cod stock collapse,
which led to the lowest TAC ever (Jentoft 1993 ) . Since then, the ladder has been
re fi ned and made more comprehensive; it currently includes other species in
addition to cod. Quota ladders are pre-negotiated allocation rules between fl eet
groups that take into consideration the changes in the TAC from year to year. Thus,
when the TAC is low, the coastal fl eet will get a larger share than the industrial,
trawler fl eet. When the TAC is less than 100,000 t, the coastal fl eet gets 80%, with
a gradual reduction of that share with an increasing TAC. When it exceeds 300,000 t,
the share is 65%. There are also similar allocation formulas for coastal vessel groups.
The overall goal for the formulation of long-term allocation rules has been to create stability and predictability for the fi shing industry, especially for full-time fi shers.
The demand for such allocation formulas has been raised by and negotiated within
the Norwegian Fishers’ Association. The Fisheries Ministry has largely accepted the
outcome of those negotiations. Despite the growing prominence of long-term quota
allocations in Norwegian fi sheries management, a principled debate on what constitutes just distribution and participation among those affected has largely been missing. The argument has favored ‘ historical rights ’ or entitlements, which implies that
the ladder would not cause radical changes to the existing pattern of fi shing rights
and quota shares. Using historical catch as a basis for initial allocations promotes
the desired stability, and continuing established practices is the least controversial
S. Jentoft
increase the level of control and instill stricter penalties, fi shers would interpret it as
an even greater injustice to which they are likely to respond in kind, leading the
fi shery compliance problem into a vicious cycle.
Hauck argues that in order to understand the compliance problem and to fi nd
ways to address it, a broader perspective on fi sheries systems and governing mechanisms is required. Enforcement may well be part of the solution, but it is not all that
is needed. Drawing on sociological and criminological literature, she states that
fi sheries management violations must also be understood from a normative perspective. Breaking the law is a moral problem and we need to raise the sociologically
more interesting question of why people adhere to norms and regulations in the fi rst
place (Song and Chuenpagdee 2011 ; Jagers et al. 2012 ) . Hauck ( 2008 ) even seeks
to move beyond this to address the basic question of social justice, the way fi sheries
laws come into being and whose interests they serve. Thus, she concludes that,
“while the monitoring and enforcement of rules have been identi fi ed as important
for enhancing compliance, they need to be implemented through legitimate, socially
valued institutions that are accepted and supported” (Hauck 2008 , 215). From this
follows a range of policies and management reforms that should be instigated in
South Africa – and in other situations where compliance appears to be a problem.
Social Contract
In Norway, “quota ladders” were fi rst introduced in the early 1990s as a response to
a distribution con fl ict that followed the unexpected Barents Sea cod stock collapse,
which led to the lowest TAC ever (Jentoft 1993 ) . Since then, the ladder has been
re fi ned and made more comprehensive; it currently includes other species in
addition to cod. Quota ladders are pre-negotiated allocation rules between fl eet
groups that take into consideration the changes in the TAC from year to year. Thus,
when the TAC is low, the coastal fl eet will get a larger share than the industrial,
trawler fl eet. When the TAC is less than 100,000 t, the coastal fl eet gets 80%, with
a gradual reduction of that share with an increasing TAC. When it exceeds 300,000 t,
the share is 65%. There are also similar allocation formulas for coastal vessel groups.
The overall goal for the formulation of long-term allocation rules has been to create stability and predictability for the fi shing industry, especially for full-time fi shers.
The demand for such allocation formulas has been raised by and negotiated within
the Norwegian Fishers’ Association. The Fisheries Ministry has largely accepted the
outcome of those negotiations. Despite the growing prominence of long-term quota
allocations in Norwegian fi sheries management, a principled debate on what constitutes just distribution and participation among those affected has largely been missing. The argument has favored ‘ historical rights ’ or entitlements, which implies that
the ladder would not cause radical changes to the existing pattern of fi shing rights
and quota shares. Using historical catch as a basis for initial allocations promotes
the desired stability, and continuing established practices is the least controversial