57
4 Social Justice in the Context of Fisheries – A Governability Challenge
Hersoug ( 2006 ) argues that we therefore need to ask if fi shing rights are empowering
the right people, i.e. those that have legitimate justice claims. Property rights can
certainly lead to unfairness, but they can also be employed for correcting inequities,
as with securing tenure rights. Such rights can obviously be employed as a mechanism of positive discrimination in order to protect those in need of it, i.e. the
marginalized and impoverished among fi shers. When Marx stated, “from each
according to his abilities, to each according to his need” ( http://libcom.org/library/
critique-of-the-gotha-program-karl.marx ), he was alluding to social justice along
such lines. In his case, they were the basic principles for societal governance.
Given that property rights are inherently inequitable due to their exclusivity and
the way they de fi ne the relationships that people have among themselves, how are
we to determine what property rights regime to embrace? Here, Rawls provides a
principle as part of his “justice as fairness” concept that can serve as a Litmus test:
“Social and economic inequalities should be arranged so that they are to the greatest
bene fi t of the least advantaged persons” (Rawls 1971 , 330). Accordingly, there are
legitimate reasons to resist a particular property rights regime, unless it can be demonstrated in both theory and practice that the regime will increase the welfare of
those most in need.
Functions of Justice
As mentioned above, a key governability issue in fi sheries, or indeed in any form of
societal governance, is how to make sure that those who are affected by rules and
regulations also comply with them. The extent to which resource users do so will
decide the outcome of fi sheries governance, whether or not stated goals will be
accomplished and natural resources and ecosystem services will be sustained. It is
commonly assumed that poor governance performance in this situation can only be
improved by stricter enforcement, investing more in surveillance and control of
fi shing operations, be it an increase in the frequency of inspections at sea or when
catches are landed, or in the form of satellite sensing.
However, in a study of the abalone and rock lobster fi shery in South Africa,
Hauck ( 2008 ) observes that the compliance problem is more complex than this and
that solutions are not as obvious as commonly thought. She argues that we also need
to focus on the reasons that fi shers give for non-compliance and that the solution to
the compliance problem must (also) be sought in alternatives to stricter enforcement. We also need to assess the rules and regulations themselves, the laws from
where these rules and regulations are derived, and the social and political processes
that produced them. Hence, Hauck states that violations of rules in South Africa
are not just a criminal justice issue, but also one of social justice. If the law favors
some groups at the expense of others, there is little reason to expect that compliance
will be high. Instead, people in this situation will insist that breaking the rules is
morally justi fi able, a form of civil protest, especially when fi shers are poor and have
no alternative sources of food or income to fi shing. Should government decide to
4 Social Justice in the Context of Fisheries – A Governability Challenge
Hersoug ( 2006 ) argues that we therefore need to ask if fi shing rights are empowering
the right people, i.e. those that have legitimate justice claims. Property rights can
certainly lead to unfairness, but they can also be employed for correcting inequities,
as with securing tenure rights. Such rights can obviously be employed as a mechanism of positive discrimination in order to protect those in need of it, i.e. the
marginalized and impoverished among fi shers. When Marx stated, “from each
according to his abilities, to each according to his need” ( http://libcom.org/library/
critique-of-the-gotha-program-karl.marx ), he was alluding to social justice along
such lines. In his case, they were the basic principles for societal governance.
Given that property rights are inherently inequitable due to their exclusivity and
the way they de fi ne the relationships that people have among themselves, how are
we to determine what property rights regime to embrace? Here, Rawls provides a
principle as part of his “justice as fairness” concept that can serve as a Litmus test:
“Social and economic inequalities should be arranged so that they are to the greatest
bene fi t of the least advantaged persons” (Rawls 1971 , 330). Accordingly, there are
legitimate reasons to resist a particular property rights regime, unless it can be demonstrated in both theory and practice that the regime will increase the welfare of
those most in need.
Functions of Justice
As mentioned above, a key governability issue in fi sheries, or indeed in any form of
societal governance, is how to make sure that those who are affected by rules and
regulations also comply with them. The extent to which resource users do so will
decide the outcome of fi sheries governance, whether or not stated goals will be
accomplished and natural resources and ecosystem services will be sustained. It is
commonly assumed that poor governance performance in this situation can only be
improved by stricter enforcement, investing more in surveillance and control of
fi shing operations, be it an increase in the frequency of inspections at sea or when
catches are landed, or in the form of satellite sensing.
However, in a study of the abalone and rock lobster fi shery in South Africa,
Hauck ( 2008 ) observes that the compliance problem is more complex than this and
that solutions are not as obvious as commonly thought. She argues that we also need
to focus on the reasons that fi shers give for non-compliance and that the solution to
the compliance problem must (also) be sought in alternatives to stricter enforcement. We also need to assess the rules and regulations themselves, the laws from
where these rules and regulations are derived, and the social and political processes
that produced them. Hence, Hauck states that violations of rules in South Africa
are not just a criminal justice issue, but also one of social justice. If the law favors
some groups at the expense of others, there is little reason to expect that compliance
will be high. Instead, people in this situation will insist that breaking the rules is
morally justi fi able, a form of civil protest, especially when fi shers are poor and have
no alternative sources of food or income to fi shing. Should government decide to