56
S. Jentoft
involves governors who are armed with tools and techniques that, at their surface,
may be considered neutral from a justice perspective. The supposition here is that if
the goals are good, so too are their means. In reality, however, tools and techniques
are as “political” as the goals and outcomes. In fi sheries resource governance, property rights are among such tools. In fact they are often regarded as both the problem
and the solution to sustainable fi sheries. The problem of over fi shing is perceived as
a consequence of poorly de fi ned property rights, whereas the solution is seen as a
matter of getting the rights right – most commonly as private property. Thus property rights are embraced by institutions such as the FAO.
However, despite their presumed advantages, property rights invoke issues of
social justice that pertain to “need, desert and equality.” In fi sheries, property rights
are frequently contested when they are instigated, but over time they become something that is taken for granted. For people living under an open-access regime, property rights are often perceived as an alien and inappropriate concept. How can
somebody acquire privileged ownership of a resource that is free for all to share?
A person who is dependent on access to the resource in order to feed his family or
keep his business a fl oat would experience this as an infringement on his ability to
ful fi ll this need. He may even perceive it as a violation of his human right. That is
not to say that open access systems are necessarily just. The “Freedom in a commons” that Garrett Hardin ( 1968 ) talked about sounds like justice and fairness, but
may well lead to competition among users whereby the stronger fi sher thrives at the
expense of the weaker. There is, however, empirical evidence that under such
circumstances local communities have often developed arrangements that keep
competition among members in check, while granting them equal access and a fair
share of the resources. In many instances, justice concerns are a more important
driver than those of conservation (Jentoft 2004 ) .
Justice problems are not only related to the outcomes of property rights, but also
to their nature. We therefore need to ask what property rights are in the fi rst place.
The essential thing about a property right is not the relationship it establishes
between a person who is the owner and the item that is owned, but the relationship
it forms between people: the haves and the have-nots. Property rights can basically
be understood as social relationships, and any change in property rights intervenes
in existing social relations by differentiating categories of people. When one person
bene fi ts from acquiring a property right, others necessarily lose, because the owner
is in a rightful position to deny others from enjoying the stream of bene fi ts derived
from that which is owned. It could therefore be argued that property rights are inherently inequitable. Also, justice issues typically emerge long before property rights
are implemented, as people can anticipate their social and economic impacts, or at
least how they themselves will be affected.
It is not for nothing that social scientists have long been concerned with the
empowering and disempowering effects of property rights. Proudhon famously
captured the quintessence of this problem in his classic treatise, “What is Property”
( 1840 ), with the statement: “Property is theft!” Fishing rights are often opposed by
similar language. That is perhaps going too far, since property rights can also serve
good purposes. They are often introduced in a democratic manner that is also just.
S. Jentoft
involves governors who are armed with tools and techniques that, at their surface,
may be considered neutral from a justice perspective. The supposition here is that if
the goals are good, so too are their means. In reality, however, tools and techniques
are as “political” as the goals and outcomes. In fi sheries resource governance, property rights are among such tools. In fact they are often regarded as both the problem
and the solution to sustainable fi sheries. The problem of over fi shing is perceived as
a consequence of poorly de fi ned property rights, whereas the solution is seen as a
matter of getting the rights right – most commonly as private property. Thus property rights are embraced by institutions such as the FAO.
However, despite their presumed advantages, property rights invoke issues of
social justice that pertain to “need, desert and equality.” In fi sheries, property rights
are frequently contested when they are instigated, but over time they become something that is taken for granted. For people living under an open-access regime, property rights are often perceived as an alien and inappropriate concept. How can
somebody acquire privileged ownership of a resource that is free for all to share?
A person who is dependent on access to the resource in order to feed his family or
keep his business a fl oat would experience this as an infringement on his ability to
ful fi ll this need. He may even perceive it as a violation of his human right. That is
not to say that open access systems are necessarily just. The “Freedom in a commons” that Garrett Hardin ( 1968 ) talked about sounds like justice and fairness, but
may well lead to competition among users whereby the stronger fi sher thrives at the
expense of the weaker. There is, however, empirical evidence that under such
circumstances local communities have often developed arrangements that keep
competition among members in check, while granting them equal access and a fair
share of the resources. In many instances, justice concerns are a more important
driver than those of conservation (Jentoft 2004 ) .
Justice problems are not only related to the outcomes of property rights, but also
to their nature. We therefore need to ask what property rights are in the fi rst place.
The essential thing about a property right is not the relationship it establishes
between a person who is the owner and the item that is owned, but the relationship
it forms between people: the haves and the have-nots. Property rights can basically
be understood as social relationships, and any change in property rights intervenes
in existing social relations by differentiating categories of people. When one person
bene fi ts from acquiring a property right, others necessarily lose, because the owner
is in a rightful position to deny others from enjoying the stream of bene fi ts derived
from that which is owned. It could therefore be argued that property rights are inherently inequitable. Also, justice issues typically emerge long before property rights
are implemented, as people can anticipate their social and economic impacts, or at
least how they themselves will be affected.
It is not for nothing that social scientists have long been concerned with the
empowering and disempowering effects of property rights. Proudhon famously
captured the quintessence of this problem in his classic treatise, “What is Property”
( 1840 ), with the statement: “Property is theft!” Fishing rights are often opposed by
similar language. That is perhaps going too far, since property rights can also serve
good purposes. They are often introduced in a democratic manner that is also just.