59
4 Social Justice in the Context of Fisheries – A Governability Challenge
within the fi shing industry. Thus, the agreed upon ladder is intended to last, with the
possibility of variation in allocation rules from one fi sh stock to the other.
The question that remains is how the idea of historical rights and the pattern of
resource distribution among vessel groups can be related to various concepts of
justice. Walzer’s ( 1983 ) argument is that we should distinguish between different
spheres of justice since society has no single principle of justice. The Norwegian
experience with quota ladders suggests that it is dif fi cult to draw straight lines
between spheres, as actors within the industry base their activity on one principle
(desert) that is perceived as dubious, if not totally illegitimate, by other stakeholders
who are kept outside the management ‘loop’. The latter attitude is common among
small-scale fi shers who do not belong to the Association. Fisheries governance,
therefore, seems deemed to work according to several principles of justice, which
the governing system must somehow attempt to reconcile.
Hernes et al. ( 2005 ) argue that the calibration of different justice principles
necessitates a management process that is inclusive; one that allows for a broader
group of stakeholders to be involved in the decision-making process. In this sense,
democracy may be considered a crucial precondition for social justice. In Norway,
the co-governance approach certainly allows for participatory democracy, but as
mentioned above, it may still be criticized for being less than optimal from a
democratic perspective as it poses limitations on participation. Still, the existence of
such an organization speaking on behalf of a majority of fi shers has made the
Norwegian fi shery more governable than it would have been without it. This holds
true as well in comparison to fi sheries of many other countries. The government
knows who to talk to and is able to rely on the internal governance structure of the
Association. On the other hand, individual members are secured representation in
the governance process to an extent that they would not have been otherwise.
The quota ladder would still qualify as a “social contract” between different
groups of fi shers, and also between the fi shing sector and the government. First
of all, it is based on the principle that distributional issues like quota allocations
to fl eet groups should be delegated to the Association, and that the government –
within limits – accepts what the Association decides. This is also a governability
issue, because the Association is better positioned to produce the required commitment among members. In governance terms, this increases the governability
of the governing interactions. Secondly, since TAC allocation is a zero-sum game
with clear con fl icts of interest, compromise is always dif fi cult to obtain. If user
groups can agree on some allocation rule that re fl ects their sense of justice and
fairness, and then, with the support of the Association’s authority, commit to
them over a period of time until they are re-negotiated, the in-between period
would be a peaceful one with high governability. If con fl ict cannot be avoided, it
is better to limit fi shers fi ghting each other to when the allocation is renegotiated
rather than having them fi ghting each other all the time. There is no doubt that
the quota ladder system helps to reduce the interaction costs of fi sheries governance in Norway, and hence improves the governability of both the system-to-be
governed and the governing system.
4 Social Justice in the Context of Fisheries – A Governability Challenge
within the fi shing industry. Thus, the agreed upon ladder is intended to last, with the
possibility of variation in allocation rules from one fi sh stock to the other.
The question that remains is how the idea of historical rights and the pattern of
resource distribution among vessel groups can be related to various concepts of
justice. Walzer’s ( 1983 ) argument is that we should distinguish between different
spheres of justice since society has no single principle of justice. The Norwegian
experience with quota ladders suggests that it is dif fi cult to draw straight lines
between spheres, as actors within the industry base their activity on one principle
(desert) that is perceived as dubious, if not totally illegitimate, by other stakeholders
who are kept outside the management ‘loop’. The latter attitude is common among
small-scale fi shers who do not belong to the Association. Fisheries governance,
therefore, seems deemed to work according to several principles of justice, which
the governing system must somehow attempt to reconcile.
Hernes et al. ( 2005 ) argue that the calibration of different justice principles
necessitates a management process that is inclusive; one that allows for a broader
group of stakeholders to be involved in the decision-making process. In this sense,
democracy may be considered a crucial precondition for social justice. In Norway,
the co-governance approach certainly allows for participatory democracy, but as
mentioned above, it may still be criticized for being less than optimal from a
democratic perspective as it poses limitations on participation. Still, the existence of
such an organization speaking on behalf of a majority of fi shers has made the
Norwegian fi shery more governable than it would have been without it. This holds
true as well in comparison to fi sheries of many other countries. The government
knows who to talk to and is able to rely on the internal governance structure of the
Association. On the other hand, individual members are secured representation in
the governance process to an extent that they would not have been otherwise.
The quota ladder would still qualify as a “social contract” between different
groups of fi shers, and also between the fi shing sector and the government. First
of all, it is based on the principle that distributional issues like quota allocations
to fl eet groups should be delegated to the Association, and that the government –
within limits – accepts what the Association decides. This is also a governability
issue, because the Association is better positioned to produce the required commitment among members. In governance terms, this increases the governability
of the governing interactions. Secondly, since TAC allocation is a zero-sum game
with clear con fl icts of interest, compromise is always dif fi cult to obtain. If user
groups can agree on some allocation rule that re fl ects their sense of justice and
fairness, and then, with the support of the Association’s authority, commit to
them over a period of time until they are re-negotiated, the in-between period
would be a peaceful one with high governability. If con fl ict cannot be avoided, it
is better to limit fi shers fi ghting each other to when the allocation is renegotiated
rather than having them fi ghting each other all the time. There is no doubt that
the quota ladder system helps to reduce the interaction costs of fi sheries governance in Norway, and hence improves the governability of both the system-to-be
governed and the governing system.