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R. Chuenpagdee and S. Jentoft
wickedness of governance. We therefore consider an industrialized aquaculture
system, such as that described by Liu et al. (Chap. 11 , this volume), to be more
governable than, for instance, the more “chaotic” system of small-scale fi sheries in
Lake Victoria (Onyango and Jentoft, Chap. 9 , this volume).
Here natural system-to-be-governed refers to the aquatic environment, including
fl ora, fauna and other organisms contained within the system, the habitats in which
they reside (including the water column), and oceanographic currents such as
upwelling and storm surges. Coastal ecosystems connected to the aquatic environment are likewise considered part of the natural system-to-be-governed. The social
system-to-be-governed is comprised of direct and indirect stakeholders such as
small-scale and large-scale fi shers, recreational fi shers, shell fi sh gatherers, fi sh
farmers, divers, tourists, developers, and oil and gas explorers. The governing system refers to the institutions and steering instruments and mechanisms that are
established to deal with governability issues arising as wicked problems within the
system-to-be-governed.
In the examination of system properties, we fi rst look for diversity as it relates to
resource units and relevant stakeholders. That is, we explore the heterogeneity and
quantity of system elements. Investigations into this characteristic focus on system
components ; the elements that comprise the system; their characteristics and numbers. We need to ask what and who they are, how similar or different they are from
each other, and how many of each exists. The hypothesis would be that the greater
the diversity among system components, the lower the governability. For instance,
diversity implies a broader range of knowledge, including “vertical knowledge” that
enables a deep understanding of ecosystems (Kenyon et al. 2006 ) , and “high resolution” data regarding, for example, particular habitats such as spawning grounds and
biotopes (Degnbol 2004 ) . With respect to social systems, there is a similar need to
determine who bene fi ts directly or indirectly from ecosystem services. Is the group
heterogeneous or homogenous? How do the bene fi ciaries extract from the resource
base, and with what kind of technology? What are their situations, capacities, powers
and rationalities?
As for the governing system, the assessment focuses on the number and types of
institutions established to address fi sheries challenges. We ask questions like, which
are they? What mandates do they have? How rule intensive are they? Here, we
expect an inverse relationship between the diversity of the governing system and
governability. As clearly illustrated by Onyango and Jentoft (Chap. 9 , this volume),
the higher the number of institutions, the more likely the overlap in mandates. In
turn, there is a lack of clarity with regard to the responsibility of addressing the
emergence of particular problems. Similarly, an increase in rule intensity, as in the
case of legal pluralism (Jentoft et al. 2009 ) , results in an increased likelihood of
non-compliance. As shown in the case of Lake Malawi fi sheries (Song and
Chuenpagdee, Chap. 15 , this volume), this is due to con fl icting norms and principles, and confusion about what rules apply in particular situations.
The second property regards system complexity . In Table 18.1 , it is operationalized in terms of relationships . Complexity refers to the ways in which system
components connect to and condition each other. Like species and organisms form
R. Chuenpagdee and S. Jentoft
wickedness of governance. We therefore consider an industrialized aquaculture
system, such as that described by Liu et al. (Chap. 11 , this volume), to be more
governable than, for instance, the more “chaotic” system of small-scale fi sheries in
Lake Victoria (Onyango and Jentoft, Chap. 9 , this volume).
Here natural system-to-be-governed refers to the aquatic environment, including
fl ora, fauna and other organisms contained within the system, the habitats in which
they reside (including the water column), and oceanographic currents such as
upwelling and storm surges. Coastal ecosystems connected to the aquatic environment are likewise considered part of the natural system-to-be-governed. The social
system-to-be-governed is comprised of direct and indirect stakeholders such as
small-scale and large-scale fi shers, recreational fi shers, shell fi sh gatherers, fi sh
farmers, divers, tourists, developers, and oil and gas explorers. The governing system refers to the institutions and steering instruments and mechanisms that are
established to deal with governability issues arising as wicked problems within the
system-to-be-governed.
In the examination of system properties, we fi rst look for diversity as it relates to
resource units and relevant stakeholders. That is, we explore the heterogeneity and
quantity of system elements. Investigations into this characteristic focus on system
components ; the elements that comprise the system; their characteristics and numbers. We need to ask what and who they are, how similar or different they are from
each other, and how many of each exists. The hypothesis would be that the greater
the diversity among system components, the lower the governability. For instance,
diversity implies a broader range of knowledge, including “vertical knowledge” that
enables a deep understanding of ecosystems (Kenyon et al. 2006 ) , and “high resolution” data regarding, for example, particular habitats such as spawning grounds and
biotopes (Degnbol 2004 ) . With respect to social systems, there is a similar need to
determine who bene fi ts directly or indirectly from ecosystem services. Is the group
heterogeneous or homogenous? How do the bene fi ciaries extract from the resource
base, and with what kind of technology? What are their situations, capacities, powers
and rationalities?
As for the governing system, the assessment focuses on the number and types of
institutions established to address fi sheries challenges. We ask questions like, which
are they? What mandates do they have? How rule intensive are they? Here, we
expect an inverse relationship between the diversity of the governing system and
governability. As clearly illustrated by Onyango and Jentoft (Chap. 9 , this volume),
the higher the number of institutions, the more likely the overlap in mandates. In
turn, there is a lack of clarity with regard to the responsibility of addressing the
emergence of particular problems. Similarly, an increase in rule intensity, as in the
case of legal pluralism (Jentoft et al. 2009 ) , results in an increased likelihood of
non-compliance. As shown in the case of Lake Malawi fi sheries (Song and
Chuenpagdee, Chap. 15 , this volume), this is due to con fl icting norms and principles, and confusion about what rules apply in particular situations.
The second property regards system complexity . In Table 18.1 , it is operationalized in terms of relationships . Complexity refers to the ways in which system
components connect to and condition each other. Like species and organisms form