341
18 Assessing Governability – What’s Next
communities and trophic chains (Pascual-Fernandez and Chuenpagdee, Chap. 7 ,
this volume), people are organized into networks, groups, communities and institutions for the purpose of managing their interactions and relationships with
respect to, for instance, resource uses and conservation (Mahon and McConney,
Chap. 16 , this volume). These natural and social systems-to-be-governed and the
governing system are characterized by mutuality and interdependence that condition what the individual units, as well as the system as a whole, can possibly be,
do or become. The hypothesis would be that the more relationships exist in the
systems, the more complex they are, and thus the lower the overall governability.
One should not assume equilibrium, linearity or complete order in any of these
systems. Neither should one expect internal compatibility, coherence or symmetry.
Rather, systems may show signs of con fl ict and disarray, as is the case when stakeholders have diverse interests or when species intrusion occurs. The governing system
is then likely to have problems understanding and controlling internal as well as
external interconnectedness. Much time and effort thus needs to be concentrated
on con fl ict resolution and the balancing of incongruent demands reactively rather
than proactively.
Thirdly, we examine the dynamics of the systems. Dynamics relates to the fact
that these systems are likely not inert, but they may be unstable and change over time.
In particular, the assessment targets interactions ; how system components actively
in fl uence each other, provide inputs and feedback to each other, and how they make
the systems change either gradually or in leaps and bounds. In other words, we focus
on the systems in vivo . The hypothesis is that the more active and dynamic the system is, the lower the governability. We do not assume, however, that fi sheries and
coastal systems are always proactive or adaptive. In fact, it is often the rigidity and
irreversibility that creates governability problems (see Johnson, Chap. 5 , this volume).
This is the case when fi shers defy governing interventions or when governments turn
a blind eye to small-scale fi sheries issues and concerns (Chuenpagdee 2011 ) . Inertia
may stem from the interest and power of some stakeholders that prevents the system
from changing. One feature of dynamics is, however, interactive learning, which may
over time lead to adaptation and change (Chua et al. 2006 ; Armitage et al. 2008 ) . The
advantage of co-governance and partnership arrangements as governing modes is
that they widen the source of knowledge, including local and traditional knowledge,
and provide opportunities for interactive learning (Wilson et al. 2006 ; Chuenpagdee
and Mahon, Chap. 14 , this volume) . It allows stakeholders to learn from each other
(see Almerigi et al., Chap. 17 , this volume).
Fisheries and aquaculture as natural systems, and the social and governance systems
related to them, come in varying spatial and temporal scales . Scale is therefore the last
system property in this second step of governability assessment. More speci fi cally,
the focus is on system boundaries, how they con fi ne relationships (like networks)
and interactions, and how they de fi ne what its components are. System boundaries
are actual and analytical, as well as natural and socially constructed. The boundaries
determine the scale of the systems, which could be small – like a lake for a natural
system or a local community for a social system – or large – like a large marine
ecosystem, coastal zone or an entire region (Mahon and McConney, Chap. 16 , this
18 Assessing Governability – What’s Next
communities and trophic chains (Pascual-Fernandez and Chuenpagdee, Chap. 7 ,
this volume), people are organized into networks, groups, communities and institutions for the purpose of managing their interactions and relationships with
respect to, for instance, resource uses and conservation (Mahon and McConney,
Chap. 16 , this volume). These natural and social systems-to-be-governed and the
governing system are characterized by mutuality and interdependence that condition what the individual units, as well as the system as a whole, can possibly be,
do or become. The hypothesis would be that the more relationships exist in the
systems, the more complex they are, and thus the lower the overall governability.
One should not assume equilibrium, linearity or complete order in any of these
systems. Neither should one expect internal compatibility, coherence or symmetry.
Rather, systems may show signs of con fl ict and disarray, as is the case when stakeholders have diverse interests or when species intrusion occurs. The governing system
is then likely to have problems understanding and controlling internal as well as
external interconnectedness. Much time and effort thus needs to be concentrated
on con fl ict resolution and the balancing of incongruent demands reactively rather
than proactively.
Thirdly, we examine the dynamics of the systems. Dynamics relates to the fact
that these systems are likely not inert, but they may be unstable and change over time.
In particular, the assessment targets interactions ; how system components actively
in fl uence each other, provide inputs and feedback to each other, and how they make
the systems change either gradually or in leaps and bounds. In other words, we focus
on the systems in vivo . The hypothesis is that the more active and dynamic the system is, the lower the governability. We do not assume, however, that fi sheries and
coastal systems are always proactive or adaptive. In fact, it is often the rigidity and
irreversibility that creates governability problems (see Johnson, Chap. 5 , this volume).
This is the case when fi shers defy governing interventions or when governments turn
a blind eye to small-scale fi sheries issues and concerns (Chuenpagdee 2011 ) . Inertia
may stem from the interest and power of some stakeholders that prevents the system
from changing. One feature of dynamics is, however, interactive learning, which may
over time lead to adaptation and change (Chua et al. 2006 ; Armitage et al. 2008 ) . The
advantage of co-governance and partnership arrangements as governing modes is
that they widen the source of knowledge, including local and traditional knowledge,
and provide opportunities for interactive learning (Wilson et al. 2006 ; Chuenpagdee
and Mahon, Chap. 14 , this volume) . It allows stakeholders to learn from each other
(see Almerigi et al., Chap. 17 , this volume).
Fisheries and aquaculture as natural systems, and the social and governance systems
related to them, come in varying spatial and temporal scales . Scale is therefore the last
system property in this second step of governability assessment. More speci fi cally,
the focus is on system boundaries, how they con fi ne relationships (like networks)
and interactions, and how they de fi ne what its components are. System boundaries
are actual and analytical, as well as natural and socially constructed. The boundaries
determine the scale of the systems, which could be small – like a lake for a natural
system or a local community for a social system – or large – like a large marine
ecosystem, coastal zone or an entire region (Mahon and McConney, Chap. 16 , this