339
18 Assessing Governability – What’s Next
ecosystem health, but they must be continuously monitored (De la Cruz Modino
and Pascual-Fernandez, Chap. 12 , this volume). The food supply of a particular
region may be under ongoing threat (Pullin, Chap. 6 , this volume). Similarly, gender
inequality (Frangoudes et al., Chap. 13 , this volume) and poverty (Onyango and
Jentoft, Chap. 9 , this volume) have yet to be solved once-and-for all. The wickedness
of the latter problem is further illustrated by the fact that poverty in fi sheries is
not only pervasive, but it has also expanded from a predominantly income issue to
a capability and entitlement issue (Jentoft and Eide 2011 ).
Third, Rittel and Webber argue that wicked problems are problems within problems. In the context of fi sheries, this means that not all fi sheries problems are contained within the fi sheries sector. Some are instead embedded in problems that relate
to societal concerns at a larger scale. Frangoudes et al.’s (Chap. 13 , this volume)
discussion of gender inequality and Johnson’s (Chap. 5 , this volume) elaboration of
the wickedness associated with sustaining livelihoods in coastal communities illustrate this point well. Finally, solutions to wicked problems tend to leave traces, and
mistakes are costly and irreversible. There is little room for experimentation because
solutions create path dependency that may eventually lead to tipping points. For
instance, Chuenpagdee and Jentoft ( 2007 ) demonstrate that mistakes made in the
initial phase of co-management implementation have consequences that may inhibit
the progression of this management scheme at later stages. The privatization of
common pool resources through mechanisms such as individual transferable quotas
(ITQs) is another example of irreversibility. Once established, it is practically
impossible to revert, even when substantial costs to communities are likely to occur
(see discussion in Archeson 2006 ; Sabau 2011 ). Another example is the management decision leading to the industrialization of fi shing fl eets at the national scale
(as in India, Scholtens and Bavinck, Chap. 10 , this volume), as well as globally
(Bavinck 2011 ) . These decisions affect the viability of small-scale fi shing sector
(Chuenpagdee 2011 ) . Even if replacing small-scale fi sheries with large-scale industries is regarded, in hindsight, as a mistake for reasons of food security, poverty
alleviation, and ecosystem health, it may already be too late. Rebuilding small-scale
fi sheries by reallocating resources to them and reinstituting their rights from a justice perspective (Jentoft, Chap. 4 , this volume) require interventions that, for political and other reasons, may not be practical, feasible or popular.
Step 2: Examining System Properties
The second step of the assessment deals with the properties of the natural and social
systems-to-be-governed. At this step of analysis, the governing system is also seen
as an entity that needs to be governed. The assessment involves an examination of
the diversity, complexity, dynamics and scales associated with each of these systems. The hypothesis would be that the more diverse, complex, dynamic and scale
extensive the system-to-be-governed and the governing system are, the lower their
governability. This is due in part to the fact that these features give rise to the
18 Assessing Governability – What’s Next
ecosystem health, but they must be continuously monitored (De la Cruz Modino
and Pascual-Fernandez, Chap. 12 , this volume). The food supply of a particular
region may be under ongoing threat (Pullin, Chap. 6 , this volume). Similarly, gender
inequality (Frangoudes et al., Chap. 13 , this volume) and poverty (Onyango and
Jentoft, Chap. 9 , this volume) have yet to be solved once-and-for all. The wickedness
of the latter problem is further illustrated by the fact that poverty in fi sheries is
not only pervasive, but it has also expanded from a predominantly income issue to
a capability and entitlement issue (Jentoft and Eide 2011 ).
Third, Rittel and Webber argue that wicked problems are problems within problems. In the context of fi sheries, this means that not all fi sheries problems are contained within the fi sheries sector. Some are instead embedded in problems that relate
to societal concerns at a larger scale. Frangoudes et al.’s (Chap. 13 , this volume)
discussion of gender inequality and Johnson’s (Chap. 5 , this volume) elaboration of
the wickedness associated with sustaining livelihoods in coastal communities illustrate this point well. Finally, solutions to wicked problems tend to leave traces, and
mistakes are costly and irreversible. There is little room for experimentation because
solutions create path dependency that may eventually lead to tipping points. For
instance, Chuenpagdee and Jentoft ( 2007 ) demonstrate that mistakes made in the
initial phase of co-management implementation have consequences that may inhibit
the progression of this management scheme at later stages. The privatization of
common pool resources through mechanisms such as individual transferable quotas
(ITQs) is another example of irreversibility. Once established, it is practically
impossible to revert, even when substantial costs to communities are likely to occur
(see discussion in Archeson 2006 ; Sabau 2011 ). Another example is the management decision leading to the industrialization of fi shing fl eets at the national scale
(as in India, Scholtens and Bavinck, Chap. 10 , this volume), as well as globally
(Bavinck 2011 ) . These decisions affect the viability of small-scale fi shing sector
(Chuenpagdee 2011 ) . Even if replacing small-scale fi sheries with large-scale industries is regarded, in hindsight, as a mistake for reasons of food security, poverty
alleviation, and ecosystem health, it may already be too late. Rebuilding small-scale
fi sheries by reallocating resources to them and reinstituting their rights from a justice perspective (Jentoft, Chap. 4 , this volume) require interventions that, for political and other reasons, may not be practical, feasible or popular.
Step 2: Examining System Properties
The second step of the assessment deals with the properties of the natural and social
systems-to-be-governed. At this step of analysis, the governing system is also seen
as an entity that needs to be governed. The assessment involves an examination of
the diversity, complexity, dynamics and scales associated with each of these systems. The hypothesis would be that the more diverse, complex, dynamic and scale
extensive the system-to-be-governed and the governing system are, the lower their
governability. This is due in part to the fact that these features give rise to the