338
R. Chuenpagdee and S. Jentoft
Step 1: Identifying Problem Wickedness
The persistence and re-occurrence of certain fi sheries and aquaculture governance
problems suggest that there may be features related to aquatic ecosystems,
social systems and governing systems, as well as their interactions, which make
management particularly challenging. Deconstructing these challenges is therefore an essential starting point.
Fisheries governance typically follows a conventional planning paradigm. The
process begins with the de fi nition of the problem, the setting of goals, seeking and
analysing information, outlining possible solutions, calculating their relative merits,
making a decision, and fi nally evaluating outcomes (cf. Gilmore and Camilius
1996 ) . Following Rittel and Webber ( 1973 ) , the interactive governance theory questions the overly simplistic and unrealistic assumption of this paradigm, arguing that
the planning process for some problems is not linear. They purport that such a linear
approach would work for what they term “tame” (or benign) problems, but not for
“wicked” problems. We hold that fi sheries and aquaculture problems resemble the
latter more than the former, and thus cannot be addressed by a methodology typical
of, for instance, engineering or scienti fi c inquiry.
In this assessment framework, we focus on some key features of wicked problems.
First, fi sheries and aquaculture problems are wicked in the sense that they can be
looked at from several perspectives; there is no single way, right or wrong, to de fi ne
them. Involved parties, decision-makers and stakeholders may disagree about what
these problems are and what causes them (see for example, De la Cruz Modino and
Pascual-Fernandez, Chap. 12 , this volume). We therefore need to assess the extent
to which images diverge or overlap in the way stakeholders rationalize, communicate and deliberate the problems (see also Jentoft et al. 2012 ). It is for this reason
that Rittel and Webber ( 1973 ) argue that de fi ning the problems is , in and of itself, a
wicked problem. As Schön ( 1983 ) argues, it follows that a problem must fi rst be set,
which can only happen through an interactive process involving stakeholders, before
it can be solved. In fi sheries and aquaculture, this process is particularly challenging,
because stakeholders often do not agree on basic values and principles; they frame
the problem differently and in accordance with their own individual images and
interests (Jentoft et al. 2010 ) . For this reason, it may be dif fi cult to achieve full
consensus about problem de fi nitions on, for instance, what activities should be promoted (Liu et al., Chap. 11 , this volume), what constitutes distributional justice
(Jentoft, Chap. 4 , this volume) or what actually makes livelihoods more sustainable
(Johnson, Chap. 5 , this volume). By the same token, solutions that will make
everyone satis fi ed are hard to reach.
Second, Rittel and Webber ( 1973 , 162) note that wicked problems “have no
stopping rule” that informs us exactly when they are solved. It is therefore hard to
recognize when stated goals are accomplished. They tend to reappear and must
therefore be re solved, as is illustrated in this volume. Ecosystem health, for instance,
is not determined by a single measure, assessed at a particular point in time (Pascual
and Chuenpagdee, Chap. 7 , this volume). Marine protected areas may help address
R. Chuenpagdee and S. Jentoft
Step 1: Identifying Problem Wickedness
The persistence and re-occurrence of certain fi sheries and aquaculture governance
problems suggest that there may be features related to aquatic ecosystems,
social systems and governing systems, as well as their interactions, which make
management particularly challenging. Deconstructing these challenges is therefore an essential starting point.
Fisheries governance typically follows a conventional planning paradigm. The
process begins with the de fi nition of the problem, the setting of goals, seeking and
analysing information, outlining possible solutions, calculating their relative merits,
making a decision, and fi nally evaluating outcomes (cf. Gilmore and Camilius
1996 ) . Following Rittel and Webber ( 1973 ) , the interactive governance theory questions the overly simplistic and unrealistic assumption of this paradigm, arguing that
the planning process for some problems is not linear. They purport that such a linear
approach would work for what they term “tame” (or benign) problems, but not for
“wicked” problems. We hold that fi sheries and aquaculture problems resemble the
latter more than the former, and thus cannot be addressed by a methodology typical
of, for instance, engineering or scienti fi c inquiry.
In this assessment framework, we focus on some key features of wicked problems.
First, fi sheries and aquaculture problems are wicked in the sense that they can be
looked at from several perspectives; there is no single way, right or wrong, to de fi ne
them. Involved parties, decision-makers and stakeholders may disagree about what
these problems are and what causes them (see for example, De la Cruz Modino and
Pascual-Fernandez, Chap. 12 , this volume). We therefore need to assess the extent
to which images diverge or overlap in the way stakeholders rationalize, communicate and deliberate the problems (see also Jentoft et al. 2012 ). It is for this reason
that Rittel and Webber ( 1973 ) argue that de fi ning the problems is , in and of itself, a
wicked problem. As Schön ( 1983 ) argues, it follows that a problem must fi rst be set,
which can only happen through an interactive process involving stakeholders, before
it can be solved. In fi sheries and aquaculture, this process is particularly challenging,
because stakeholders often do not agree on basic values and principles; they frame
the problem differently and in accordance with their own individual images and
interests (Jentoft et al. 2010 ) . For this reason, it may be dif fi cult to achieve full
consensus about problem de fi nitions on, for instance, what activities should be promoted (Liu et al., Chap. 11 , this volume), what constitutes distributional justice
(Jentoft, Chap. 4 , this volume) or what actually makes livelihoods more sustainable
(Johnson, Chap. 5 , this volume). By the same token, solutions that will make
everyone satis fi ed are hard to reach.
Second, Rittel and Webber ( 1973 , 162) note that wicked problems “have no
stopping rule” that informs us exactly when they are solved. It is therefore hard to
recognize when stated goals are accomplished. They tend to reappear and must
therefore be re solved, as is illustrated in this volume. Ecosystem health, for instance,
is not determined by a single measure, assessed at a particular point in time (Pascual
and Chuenpagdee, Chap. 7 , this volume). Marine protected areas may help address