146
M. Bavinck and J. Kooiman
Institutional dynamics can affect governability in various ways. If the pace of
institutional change is too slow, it results in an accumulation of problems and unused
opportunities in the industry, thereby lowering the system’s governability. If, on the
other hand, the pace of institutional change is very high, it may surpass the systemto-be-governed’s capacity to adapt. Here again governability may suffer.
Governability and Governing Interactions
In previous sections we discussed the relations between units, or actors, in the
fi sh chain, as well as those between governing individuals and organizations.
All these relations are expressed through interactions, which involve the to-and-fro
movement of information, goods and services. As noted by Kooiman ( 2003 , 8):
“Interactions shape actors and actors shape interactions; they are ‘equal’ as basic
units of analysis and theory development.” Interactions between governors are often
purposive, as is their governing activity. The net effect of their activities, however,
may be at odds with original intentions. This is because it is rare to fi nd a single
governor in charge of a fi shery. Instead, there are often many governors involved,
and their manifold actions and interactions have numerous impacts, including those
not intended by any single actor. Just as a game of chess is never wholly determined
by one of the two players, however strong he or she may be, governing activities
have divergent and often unpredictable outcomes (Elias 1970 ) . It is therefore only
by taking a broad perspective – including the full range of governors and governing
activities – and coordinating activities that the possibility of steerage increases.
Interactions also characterize the relations between the governing system and
the system-to-be-governed. Whereas traditional governance theory viewed governing activity as ‘one-way traf fi c’ between the governing system and systemto-be-governed, contemporary analysts prefer a ‘two-way traf fi c’ model, with
streams of interaction moving and having impact in both directions (Kooiman 2008,
2010 ) . Interactive governance theory identi fi es three types, or modes, of interaction.
Each differs in terms of its distribution of power. These modes are: hierarchical
governance, co-governance, and self-governance. The fi rst hierarchical mode of
interaction takes place through ‘interventions’, or authoritative intrusions from
above. In this mode, relations are fundamentally unequal, with superiors (the governors) being distinguished from inferiors (those being governed). The second set,
involving ‘interplays’, aimed to reach goals by engaging actors in collective, rather
than independent action. Interplays connect people or organizations of relatively
equal status, and result in processes of co-governance. The third and most spontaneous
set of interactions coincides with acts of self-governance. In this mode, the people
or organizations directly involved in the fi sh chain steer their own activities. There
are no ‘outside’ governors present.
As diversity, complexity, dynamics, and scale are ubiquitous, they permeate the
realm of governing interactions too. We suggest that the diversity of governing
interactions is likely to be highest in the self-governing mode, because actors in the
M. Bavinck and J. Kooiman
Institutional dynamics can affect governability in various ways. If the pace of
institutional change is too slow, it results in an accumulation of problems and unused
opportunities in the industry, thereby lowering the system’s governability. If, on the
other hand, the pace of institutional change is very high, it may surpass the systemto-be-governed’s capacity to adapt. Here again governability may suffer.
Governability and Governing Interactions
In previous sections we discussed the relations between units, or actors, in the
fi sh chain, as well as those between governing individuals and organizations.
All these relations are expressed through interactions, which involve the to-and-fro
movement of information, goods and services. As noted by Kooiman ( 2003 , 8):
“Interactions shape actors and actors shape interactions; they are ‘equal’ as basic
units of analysis and theory development.” Interactions between governors are often
purposive, as is their governing activity. The net effect of their activities, however,
may be at odds with original intentions. This is because it is rare to fi nd a single
governor in charge of a fi shery. Instead, there are often many governors involved,
and their manifold actions and interactions have numerous impacts, including those
not intended by any single actor. Just as a game of chess is never wholly determined
by one of the two players, however strong he or she may be, governing activities
have divergent and often unpredictable outcomes (Elias 1970 ) . It is therefore only
by taking a broad perspective – including the full range of governors and governing
activities – and coordinating activities that the possibility of steerage increases.
Interactions also characterize the relations between the governing system and
the system-to-be-governed. Whereas traditional governance theory viewed governing activity as ‘one-way traf fi c’ between the governing system and systemto-be-governed, contemporary analysts prefer a ‘two-way traf fi c’ model, with
streams of interaction moving and having impact in both directions (Kooiman 2008,
2010 ) . Interactive governance theory identi fi es three types, or modes, of interaction.
Each differs in terms of its distribution of power. These modes are: hierarchical
governance, co-governance, and self-governance. The fi rst hierarchical mode of
interaction takes place through ‘interventions’, or authoritative intrusions from
above. In this mode, relations are fundamentally unequal, with superiors (the governors) being distinguished from inferiors (those being governed). The second set,
involving ‘interplays’, aimed to reach goals by engaging actors in collective, rather
than independent action. Interplays connect people or organizations of relatively
equal status, and result in processes of co-governance. The third and most spontaneous
set of interactions coincides with acts of self-governance. In this mode, the people
or organizations directly involved in the fi sh chain steer their own activities. There
are no ‘outside’ governors present.
As diversity, complexity, dynamics, and scale are ubiquitous, they permeate the
realm of governing interactions too. We suggest that the diversity of governing
interactions is likely to be highest in the self-governing mode, because actors in the