145
8 Applying the Governability Concept in Fisheries…
Governing arrangements for international food chains are currently in fl ux (Swinnen
and Maertens 2007 ) , and their movements, which largely originate in the demand
markets, reverberate at all levels. As a consequence, participants require vigilance as
well as adaptive capacity in order to endure. Although many of these new governance
efforts aim at improving, from one point of view or another, the governability of the
system-to-be-governed, the net results of varying and sometimes contradictory
arrangements are not easily evaluated.
Implications for Governability
In section “ Governability and Systems-to-Be-Governed ” above we considered the
challenges created by the diversity, complexity, dynamics and scale of a system-tobe-governed for a governing system, and the implications for the governability of
the societal system-as-a-whole. In this section we have attempted to do the reverse.
That is, investigate how the diversity, complexity, dynamics and scale of a governing
system can create impediments or opportunities for a system-to-be-governed. We
have noted fi rst of all that high institutional diversity (legal pluralism) can generate
conceptual confusion and opportunities for the contradictory interpretation of
situations and events. In the most extreme instance, such diversity can result in
institutional paralysis or social con fl ict.
Whether institutional diversity is a good or a bad thing depends, however, on
context and perspective. It also depends on one’s perception of the reverse phenomenon, namely institutional hegemony. Whereas institutional hegemony can
help to create a road map and promote governing effectiveness, it may also bury
dissent. In this vein, one could argue that legal pluralism is an expression of countervailing opinions, which different segments of the population hold to be more
relevant and fair.
Higher complexity (nestedness) makes for increased policy coherence. It would
also seem to offer opportunities for expanding the governing scope to multiple scale
levels. This is useful particularly when problems and opportunities are not localized,
but are instead cut across geographical, sectorial, social and administrative spaces.
This is frequently the case in fi sheries. Institutional complexity also correlates with
specialization and well-developed divisions of labor. As a result, governance capacities can reach new heights. The removal of many governing actors and their activities from the actual scene of fi sheries is, however, a possible disadvantage. It may – as
we shall see in the following section – be corrected through co-management.
Lower institutional complexity is best exempli fi ed by the fi sher-cum-governor: the
fi sher who, together with a group of compeers, creates and enforces his own fi shing
regulations. The people engaged in the system-to-be-governed here are also its
governors. The division of labor is limited, as is the scope of governing, except
through institutional replication along a coastline. The advantages of the fi shercum-governor, however, are multiple. Chief among them is the fact that the fi shercum-governor has an immediate, albeit localized, knowledge of the fi shery.
8 Applying the Governability Concept in Fisheries…
Governing arrangements for international food chains are currently in fl ux (Swinnen
and Maertens 2007 ) , and their movements, which largely originate in the demand
markets, reverberate at all levels. As a consequence, participants require vigilance as
well as adaptive capacity in order to endure. Although many of these new governance
efforts aim at improving, from one point of view or another, the governability of the
system-to-be-governed, the net results of varying and sometimes contradictory
arrangements are not easily evaluated.
Implications for Governability
In section “ Governability and Systems-to-Be-Governed ” above we considered the
challenges created by the diversity, complexity, dynamics and scale of a system-tobe-governed for a governing system, and the implications for the governability of
the societal system-as-a-whole. In this section we have attempted to do the reverse.
That is, investigate how the diversity, complexity, dynamics and scale of a governing
system can create impediments or opportunities for a system-to-be-governed. We
have noted fi rst of all that high institutional diversity (legal pluralism) can generate
conceptual confusion and opportunities for the contradictory interpretation of
situations and events. In the most extreme instance, such diversity can result in
institutional paralysis or social con fl ict.
Whether institutional diversity is a good or a bad thing depends, however, on
context and perspective. It also depends on one’s perception of the reverse phenomenon, namely institutional hegemony. Whereas institutional hegemony can
help to create a road map and promote governing effectiveness, it may also bury
dissent. In this vein, one could argue that legal pluralism is an expression of countervailing opinions, which different segments of the population hold to be more
relevant and fair.
Higher complexity (nestedness) makes for increased policy coherence. It would
also seem to offer opportunities for expanding the governing scope to multiple scale
levels. This is useful particularly when problems and opportunities are not localized,
but are instead cut across geographical, sectorial, social and administrative spaces.
This is frequently the case in fi sheries. Institutional complexity also correlates with
specialization and well-developed divisions of labor. As a result, governance capacities can reach new heights. The removal of many governing actors and their activities from the actual scene of fi sheries is, however, a possible disadvantage. It may – as
we shall see in the following section – be corrected through co-management.
Lower institutional complexity is best exempli fi ed by the fi sher-cum-governor: the
fi sher who, together with a group of compeers, creates and enforces his own fi shing
regulations. The people engaged in the system-to-be-governed here are also its
governors. The division of labor is limited, as is the scope of governing, except
through institutional replication along a coastline. The advantages of the fi shercum-governor, however, are multiple. Chief among them is the fact that the fi shercum-governor has an immediate, albeit localized, knowledge of the fi shery.