144
M. Bavinck and J. Kooiman
synchronization soon emerged: trawl fl eets started moving up and down the coast,
making use of the variable timings of the closed seasons. It was only when the
central government instigated a coordinated policy for east and west coasts in 1996
that closed seasons for trawling became adequately enforced.
Governability of the trawl fi sheries in this case clearly improved after the central
government brokered a national arrangement. The fact that small-scale fi shers were
in favor provided political backing. In time trawl fi shers too have come to perceive
the bene fi ts of a closed season, as catches have gone up in the post-closure period.
A long-drawn process of institutional nesting has thereby increased the effectiveness of the measure.
Case 11: Lower institutional dynamics (change). Trawler owners in Tamil Nadu
maintain strong, long-term connections with a range of middlemen, such as
export agents and female varattavechchis, or auctioneers (Bavinck 2001 ) .
Johnson ( 2010 ) analyzed the manifold dealings between such fi shers and traders
in terms of patron-client relations, whereby the latter provide services to the
former in exchange for a regular supply of produce. The ‘services’ provided by
middlemen in Tamil Nadu are mainly fi nancial in nature: trawler fi shers require
a fl exible and, frequently, immediate supply of credit for a variety of purposes.
As Johnson ( 2010 , 272) points out, “the patron-client institution at the heart of
the […] fi shery is an adaptive system with its own governance logic.” Its adaptiveness is evidenced by its response to changing economic circumstances and
needs. Johnson’s conclusion that patron-client relations have been non-responsive to urgent ecological realities, such as the evidence of over fi shing, and tend
to “reinforce the fi shery’s path dependency” (Johnson 2010 , 273), appears to be
valid for Tamil Nadu as well. Consumer campaigns for responsible fi sheries have
not reached this part of the world, and middlemen experience no incentives to
green their image.
This case illustrates the paradoxical nature of governance perspectives. A very
successful governing arrangement may, from a different perspective, be analyzed as
playing an obstructing role. While patron-client relations provide the proverbial
grease to keep the trawl fi shery going, they do not provide an answer to the emergence of larger governance challenges. From a governability viewpoint, their role
therefore retains an ambivalent characteristic.
Case 12: Higher institutional dynamics (change). As India exports much of its
marine produce, including shrimp, to markets in Europe, Japan and North America,
its fortunes depend on the conditions imposed by institutions in those regions. Since
the mid-1990s, an array of demands, varying from the use of turtle-excluder devices
to measures for food safety, has been in fl icted on Indian exporters, forcing many
changes in the structure of the marine industry. Contrary to governments in other
coastal states, Thailand for example, the Indian government has left the industry to
essentially fend for itself. In the eyes of those that perform governing roles in the
value chain, such as the export companies, the indifference of the state with regard
to rapidly changing international regulations has resulted in numerous bankruptcies
(Van der Pijl 2010 ) .
M. Bavinck and J. Kooiman
synchronization soon emerged: trawl fl eets started moving up and down the coast,
making use of the variable timings of the closed seasons. It was only when the
central government instigated a coordinated policy for east and west coasts in 1996
that closed seasons for trawling became adequately enforced.
Governability of the trawl fi sheries in this case clearly improved after the central
government brokered a national arrangement. The fact that small-scale fi shers were
in favor provided political backing. In time trawl fi shers too have come to perceive
the bene fi ts of a closed season, as catches have gone up in the post-closure period.
A long-drawn process of institutional nesting has thereby increased the effectiveness of the measure.
Case 11: Lower institutional dynamics (change). Trawler owners in Tamil Nadu
maintain strong, long-term connections with a range of middlemen, such as
export agents and female varattavechchis, or auctioneers (Bavinck 2001 ) .
Johnson ( 2010 ) analyzed the manifold dealings between such fi shers and traders
in terms of patron-client relations, whereby the latter provide services to the
former in exchange for a regular supply of produce. The ‘services’ provided by
middlemen in Tamil Nadu are mainly fi nancial in nature: trawler fi shers require
a fl exible and, frequently, immediate supply of credit for a variety of purposes.
As Johnson ( 2010 , 272) points out, “the patron-client institution at the heart of
the […] fi shery is an adaptive system with its own governance logic.” Its adaptiveness is evidenced by its response to changing economic circumstances and
needs. Johnson’s conclusion that patron-client relations have been non-responsive to urgent ecological realities, such as the evidence of over fi shing, and tend
to “reinforce the fi shery’s path dependency” (Johnson 2010 , 273), appears to be
valid for Tamil Nadu as well. Consumer campaigns for responsible fi sheries have
not reached this part of the world, and middlemen experience no incentives to
green their image.
This case illustrates the paradoxical nature of governance perspectives. A very
successful governing arrangement may, from a different perspective, be analyzed as
playing an obstructing role. While patron-client relations provide the proverbial
grease to keep the trawl fi shery going, they do not provide an answer to the emergence of larger governance challenges. From a governability viewpoint, their role
therefore retains an ambivalent characteristic.
Case 12: Higher institutional dynamics (change). As India exports much of its
marine produce, including shrimp, to markets in Europe, Japan and North America,
its fortunes depend on the conditions imposed by institutions in those regions. Since
the mid-1990s, an array of demands, varying from the use of turtle-excluder devices
to measures for food safety, has been in fl icted on Indian exporters, forcing many
changes in the structure of the marine industry. Contrary to governments in other
coastal states, Thailand for example, the Indian government has left the industry to
essentially fend for itself. In the eyes of those that perform governing roles in the
value chain, such as the export companies, the indifference of the state with regard
to rapidly changing international regulations has resulted in numerous bankruptcies
(Van der Pijl 2010 ) .