143
8 Applying the Governability Concept in Fisheries…
Case 8: Higher institutional diversity (strong legal pluralism). In the context of the
so-called blue revolution, the government of Tamil Nadu introduced trawling as a
new fi sheries technique in the 1950s. The new class of trawler fi shermen, operating
from newly founded harbors, is safeguarded by the constitution of the Republic of
India, which not only gave every Indian the right to enter any occupation, but also
precluded any other law than that of the government from being applied to the
fi shery. However, the small-scale fi shers of the Coromandel, who inhabit villages
governed through traditional caste law, protested vociferously against trawlers
fi shing ‘their’ waters. After all, according to their law, each village controls adjacent
waters and decrees the technology that is to be applied. Government law thus juxtaposed caste law. The violent con fl icts between the two groups of fi shers that hit the
streets of Chennai in the late 1970s were arguably a result of the non-compatibility
of legal values (Bavinck 2001 ) . These con fl icts have continued to a lesser extent
until the present (Bavinck 2011b ) .
Strong divergences in a governing system have a negative impact on the governability of the societal system, which is being tugged in various directions. As long
as neither of the contesting legal systems gains the upper hand, or a suf fi cient body
of hybrid law has not developed, governability of the fi sheries is impaired and
fi shers suffer.
Case 9: Lower institutional complexity (nestedness). Fishers in the village of
Valinookkam, along the Gulf of Mannar in Ramnad District, have a long and successful history of beach seine fi shing. Although the number of beach seine companies has gone down in recent years, company owners still wield considerable power
at the village and regional levels. They have informed trawler fi shers in the region
that trawling is prohibited in village waters during the beach seine season (Hopewell
2004 ) . This local rule (it is unknown in other fi shing villages in the region) has no
basis in governmental law, which claims a monopoly on fi sheries regulation. In line
with current international opinion, of fi cers of the Fisheries Department also look on
the beach seine industry with disfavor, criticizing in particular the small mesh sizes
used, and are not inclined to offer it protection.
The village rule protecting beach seine fi shing in Valinookkam is not nested in
wider institutional frameworks – on the contrary, this industry has acquired a negative reputation with government and international organizations alike. Although
customary law in the region still provides beachseining with shelter, its long-term
governability prospectives are bleak.
Case 10: Higher institutional complexity (nestedness). With declining catches and
increasing evidence of over fi shing, the sizeable small-scale fi shing population of
India put pressure on governments of coastal states to start restricting the trawl
industry. The instrument deemed most suitable for this purpose was a closed season,
which would coincide with the spawning season of important species (Bavinck
et al. 2008 ) . As coastal fi sheries are a prerogative of state governments (and not the
national government), the fi rst closed seasons for trawling in India, which emerged
after 1988, were not coordinated with regard to time. The drawbacks of this lack of
8 Applying the Governability Concept in Fisheries…
Case 8: Higher institutional diversity (strong legal pluralism). In the context of the
so-called blue revolution, the government of Tamil Nadu introduced trawling as a
new fi sheries technique in the 1950s. The new class of trawler fi shermen, operating
from newly founded harbors, is safeguarded by the constitution of the Republic of
India, which not only gave every Indian the right to enter any occupation, but also
precluded any other law than that of the government from being applied to the
fi shery. However, the small-scale fi shers of the Coromandel, who inhabit villages
governed through traditional caste law, protested vociferously against trawlers
fi shing ‘their’ waters. After all, according to their law, each village controls adjacent
waters and decrees the technology that is to be applied. Government law thus juxtaposed caste law. The violent con fl icts between the two groups of fi shers that hit the
streets of Chennai in the late 1970s were arguably a result of the non-compatibility
of legal values (Bavinck 2001 ) . These con fl icts have continued to a lesser extent
until the present (Bavinck 2011b ) .
Strong divergences in a governing system have a negative impact on the governability of the societal system, which is being tugged in various directions. As long
as neither of the contesting legal systems gains the upper hand, or a suf fi cient body
of hybrid law has not developed, governability of the fi sheries is impaired and
fi shers suffer.
Case 9: Lower institutional complexity (nestedness). Fishers in the village of
Valinookkam, along the Gulf of Mannar in Ramnad District, have a long and successful history of beach seine fi shing. Although the number of beach seine companies has gone down in recent years, company owners still wield considerable power
at the village and regional levels. They have informed trawler fi shers in the region
that trawling is prohibited in village waters during the beach seine season (Hopewell
2004 ) . This local rule (it is unknown in other fi shing villages in the region) has no
basis in governmental law, which claims a monopoly on fi sheries regulation. In line
with current international opinion, of fi cers of the Fisheries Department also look on
the beach seine industry with disfavor, criticizing in particular the small mesh sizes
used, and are not inclined to offer it protection.
The village rule protecting beach seine fi shing in Valinookkam is not nested in
wider institutional frameworks – on the contrary, this industry has acquired a negative reputation with government and international organizations alike. Although
customary law in the region still provides beachseining with shelter, its long-term
governability prospectives are bleak.
Case 10: Higher institutional complexity (nestedness). With declining catches and
increasing evidence of over fi shing, the sizeable small-scale fi shing population of
India put pressure on governments of coastal states to start restricting the trawl
industry. The instrument deemed most suitable for this purpose was a closed season,
which would coincide with the spawning season of important species (Bavinck
et al. 2008 ) . As coastal fi sheries are a prerogative of state governments (and not the
national government), the fi rst closed seasons for trawling in India, which emerged
after 1988, were not coordinated with regard to time. The drawbacks of this lack of