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M. Bavinck and J. Kooiman
build upon existing structures and policies, and frequently have little space for
independent action. In many coastal nations, forces outside of the fi sheries frequently
drive institutional change (Taylor et al. 2007 ) . A lack of institutional innovation may
re fl ect a general disinterest in the future of the industry and other governmental
priorities. Moreover, if institutional changes do take place, they may have other
inspirations, such as the need to cut budgets or a policy favoring coastal tourism or
industry over fi sheries. In all these instances, it is likely that governing structures and
processes do not match with the priorities of those engaged in the sector.
The rate, or speed, of institutional change is another concern. Rapid institutional
changes put high pressure not only on those who are involved in the governing process,
but also on people partaking in the system-to-be-governed. This, in turn, may lead
to confusion and resistance. Slow institutional change creates other problems, particularly if the fi sheries in question are highly dynamic and require quick action.
Scholars concerned with improving the governability of fi sheries currently champion the notion of ‘learning organizations’, because “ fi sh chains are by their very
nature unpredictable” (Mahon et al. 2005 , 369; also see Armitage et al. 2007 ; Berkes
2009 ) . Mahon et al. point out that “most organizations in the fi sheries sector can
improve the extent to which they ‘learn’ from experience as well as from their surroundings” ( 2005 , 370). The dynamics of a governing system includes the extent to
and rate at which institutions and institutional systems adapt to changing
circumstances.
Feature Effects on Governing Systems: Examples
from South Asia
Case 7: Lower institutional diversity (weak legal pluralism) . The government of
India rati fi ed the United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea in 1995. This law
delineated Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) with a width of 200 nautical miles
(NM) and transferred responsibility over large, hitherto unregulated ocean territories to the governments of coastal nations. The government of India is now formally
in charge of an EEZ encompassing 1.6 million km
2
. Although governmental prerogatives over territorial waters (up to 12 NM) are regularly challenged by non-state
actors (see Case 8 below), save for a number of border regions, its jurisdiction over
the EEZ is not in doubt.
The term ‘weak legal pluralism’ refers to a lack of legal contention and is equivalent
to hegemony. If legal prerogatives are not backed up by the exercise of power, however, the governability of fi sheries is dictated not by the governing system, but
instead by events and processes in the fi sheries. Although the Indian Navy and Coast
Guard patrol the borders of the EEZ, control efforts apparently do not dissuade
foreign fi shing vessels from regularly transgressing Indian waters (Pramod 2010 ) .
In this case, weak legal pluralism coincides with relatively weak enforcement of
existing rules and regulations.
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