78
4 Institutional Frameworks for the Exchange and Utilization of PGRFA
transfer, are the specific problems hindering the development of a market system
with minimal transaction costs for PGRFA conservation and exchange.
With an understanding of why transaction costs play a vital part in the
conservation and exchange system of PGRFA, institutional arrangements must be
found which present the second-best solution. This solution should meet the
KaldorlHicks criterion, e.g., the overall PGRFA conservation and exchange
system is only then efficient when the additional costs (including the benefit
losses) of the establishment and enforcement of the system are less than the
additional benefits resulting from the new system.
An efficient system of conservation and exchange of PGRFA has to meet three
criteria:
• to provide sufficient incentives at the local, national and international level for
the safe conservation of PGRFA,
• to enable a sustainable utilization of PGRFA, mainly in agricultural breeding,
and
• to guarantee a "fair and equitable sharing of the benefits" according to CBD
and a similar sharing of the burdens of conservation and utilization.
When creating a new conservation and exchange system for PGRFA or improving
the existing informal system, one must keep in mind that a system will only be
enforced if the resulting benefits exceed the transaction costs of enforcement.
In summary of the discussion concerning the transaction costs for the
conservation and exchange of PGRFA, there is an obvious need for an
institutional framework with a legal system, guaranteeing property rights and their
exchange. Additionally, there is the need for measures to ensure the economic
competition as well as the protection of prior social interest on national and global
level especially in the form of supportive measures where individual property
rights are neither effective nor enforceable.
4.2
Actors in the Conservation and Exchange Activities of
Plant Genetic Resources
It is necessary for the institutional framework of an improved or new conservation
and exchange system to systematize the main actors in the conservation and
utilization process and in a qualitative approach to analyze the anticipated benefits
of PGRFA conservation for these actors.
A wide range of different players at a local, national, and international level are
maintaining PGRFA, and thereby trying to achieve one or more of the three
objectives (freezing for future utilization, intended adaptation, and good
accessibility - see Chap. 2.4), in addition to achieving their individual incentives
for conservation activities. Rhoades, 1996, groups these players according to their
position in regard to access, ownership and compensation (Rhoades, 1996). By
grouping the players according to their activities relating to conservation, one can
4 Institutional Frameworks for the Exchange and Utilization of PGRFA
transfer, are the specific problems hindering the development of a market system
with minimal transaction costs for PGRFA conservation and exchange.
With an understanding of why transaction costs play a vital part in the
conservation and exchange system of PGRFA, institutional arrangements must be
found which present the second-best solution. This solution should meet the
KaldorlHicks criterion, e.g., the overall PGRFA conservation and exchange
system is only then efficient when the additional costs (including the benefit
losses) of the establishment and enforcement of the system are less than the
additional benefits resulting from the new system.
An efficient system of conservation and exchange of PGRFA has to meet three
criteria:
• to provide sufficient incentives at the local, national and international level for
the safe conservation of PGRFA,
• to enable a sustainable utilization of PGRFA, mainly in agricultural breeding,
and
• to guarantee a "fair and equitable sharing of the benefits" according to CBD
and a similar sharing of the burdens of conservation and utilization.
When creating a new conservation and exchange system for PGRFA or improving
the existing informal system, one must keep in mind that a system will only be
enforced if the resulting benefits exceed the transaction costs of enforcement.
In summary of the discussion concerning the transaction costs for the
conservation and exchange of PGRFA, there is an obvious need for an
institutional framework with a legal system, guaranteeing property rights and their
exchange. Additionally, there is the need for measures to ensure the economic
competition as well as the protection of prior social interest on national and global
level especially in the form of supportive measures where individual property
rights are neither effective nor enforceable.
4.2
Actors in the Conservation and Exchange Activities of
Plant Genetic Resources
It is necessary for the institutional framework of an improved or new conservation
and exchange system to systematize the main actors in the conservation and
utilization process and in a qualitative approach to analyze the anticipated benefits
of PGRFA conservation for these actors.
A wide range of different players at a local, national, and international level are
maintaining PGRFA, and thereby trying to achieve one or more of the three
objectives (freezing for future utilization, intended adaptation, and good
accessibility - see Chap. 2.4), in addition to achieving their individual incentives
for conservation activities. Rhoades, 1996, groups these players according to their
position in regard to access, ownership and compensation (Rhoades, 1996). By
grouping the players according to their activities relating to conservation, one can