4.1 Institutional Aspects of Exchange of PGRFA 77
As suppliers of genetically coded information or of the raw material for such
information, i.e., germplasm, agrobiodiversity-rich countries are in need for newly
developed seed and are therefore interested in its technology36. This technology is
supplied by countries which are mainly characterized as diversity-poor.
Consequently, each side has negotiation resources which are of interest to the
other side and the solutions should be feasible (Svarstad, 1994). The negotiation
resources are, however, not equally distributed at present, because the
industrialized countries (defined as OECD countries for this purpose) have
approximately 40% of all conserved accessions at their disposal. Additionally, the
accessions of the CGIAR centers are also available for all users. This situation
strengthens the negotiation position of the industrialized countries. The exclusion
of conserved germplasm collected before the adoption of CBD may serve as an
indication for the importance of this fact.
It is, however, not only a dispute between the industrialized countries as
agrobiodiversity-poor countries and the developing countries as agrobiodiversityrich countries, but rather a debate between the suppliers themselves. On the one
side the supply of and demand for political lobbying for internalization are
determined by existing or expected market power of some countries through
property rights solutions, while the prospects of compensation solutions trigger
rent-seeking initiatives on the other side (von Braun and Virchow, 1997). Hence,
the discussion over the best exchange system is not only driven by the search for
the most efficient solution, but also fuelled by country-specific interests.
Furthermore, the system of conservation and exchange of PGRFA which must
be created is influenced by other international and national negotiations, treaties,
and laws. The network of national and international agreements complicates the
negotiations and the potential solutions.
Markets and other exchange mechanism cannot evolve without any
international and national framework; or they may evolve only into an informal
system without any long-term planning and investment potential. Missing markets
and the deficit of other regulation mechanisms are, however, a threat for the
conservation and allocation of PGRFA. Hence, markets for the exchange of
genetic resources, as part of the internalization mechanism, as well as other
regulations to compensate farmers and countries for maintaining a specific level of
agrobiodiversity have to be developed.
The present situation is characterized by an imperfect market, causing some
specific transaction costs. So far, the whole PGRFA conservation system is based
on non-market, i.e., public interactions. The demand side for PGRFA, especially
the breeders, the biotechnology industry, and the farmers, has been benefiting
from the present system, participating only partially in the costs of conservation
and exchange, and above all sharing only a minor part of the existing transaction
costs of running the conservation and exchange system. Asymmetric and
rudimental information as well as an institutional framework lacking a legal
system which defines the individual property rights for PGRFA as well as their
,. See Chap. 3.1 for the concept of agrobiodiversity-rich and -poor countries.
As suppliers of genetically coded information or of the raw material for such
information, i.e., germplasm, agrobiodiversity-rich countries are in need for newly
developed seed and are therefore interested in its technology36. This technology is
supplied by countries which are mainly characterized as diversity-poor.
Consequently, each side has negotiation resources which are of interest to the
other side and the solutions should be feasible (Svarstad, 1994). The negotiation
resources are, however, not equally distributed at present, because the
industrialized countries (defined as OECD countries for this purpose) have
approximately 40% of all conserved accessions at their disposal. Additionally, the
accessions of the CGIAR centers are also available for all users. This situation
strengthens the negotiation position of the industrialized countries. The exclusion
of conserved germplasm collected before the adoption of CBD may serve as an
indication for the importance of this fact.
It is, however, not only a dispute between the industrialized countries as
agrobiodiversity-poor countries and the developing countries as agrobiodiversityrich countries, but rather a debate between the suppliers themselves. On the one
side the supply of and demand for political lobbying for internalization are
determined by existing or expected market power of some countries through
property rights solutions, while the prospects of compensation solutions trigger
rent-seeking initiatives on the other side (von Braun and Virchow, 1997). Hence,
the discussion over the best exchange system is not only driven by the search for
the most efficient solution, but also fuelled by country-specific interests.
Furthermore, the system of conservation and exchange of PGRFA which must
be created is influenced by other international and national negotiations, treaties,
and laws. The network of national and international agreements complicates the
negotiations and the potential solutions.
Markets and other exchange mechanism cannot evolve without any
international and national framework; or they may evolve only into an informal
system without any long-term planning and investment potential. Missing markets
and the deficit of other regulation mechanisms are, however, a threat for the
conservation and allocation of PGRFA. Hence, markets for the exchange of
genetic resources, as part of the internalization mechanism, as well as other
regulations to compensate farmers and countries for maintaining a specific level of
agrobiodiversity have to be developed.
The present situation is characterized by an imperfect market, causing some
specific transaction costs. So far, the whole PGRFA conservation system is based
on non-market, i.e., public interactions. The demand side for PGRFA, especially
the breeders, the biotechnology industry, and the farmers, has been benefiting
from the present system, participating only partially in the costs of conservation
and exchange, and above all sharing only a minor part of the existing transaction
costs of running the conservation and exchange system. Asymmetric and
rudimental information as well as an institutional framework lacking a legal
system which defines the individual property rights for PGRFA as well as their
,. See Chap. 3.1 for the concept of agrobiodiversity-rich and -poor countries.