7 .2 Incentives of Moderation
179
The farmers will go on maintaining their production system as long as their
private marginal benefit is higher than their private marginal costs. They will
maintain a specific level of PGRF A diversity with their traditional production
system. By changing the production system to a "modem system", the diversity
level will decrease. This transformation is determined by other criteria than the
conservation of PGRF A. Hence, conservation of PGRF A is conducted at the farm
level only as side-effect of other decisions; as a positive external effect. That is to
say, no costs are associated with the conservation of PGRF A in farmers fields.
The de facto in situ conservation reflects the economic principle of efficient
resource allocation. Conservation takes place where diversity is high and
opportunity costs are low. In situ conservation per se has opportunity costs at the
national level however, which reflect the competition between utilized arable land
for a high level of agrobiodiversity and for the increasing need to secure food
demands. Consequently, in situ conservation of PGRF A should be promoted in a
rather restricted way. Incentives for the conservation of PGRF A should only be
applied, if the utilized arable land for a variety is falling below its specific areal
minimum safety standard.
The "controlled in situ conservation" (Chap. 3.4.2.2.) fits a potential market
solution in a clearly defined framework. This framework is determined by social
benefits which cannot be internalized into a complete market system, i.e., the
framework protects the non-market values of PGRF A against a market system A
further detailed concept of this restricted in situ conservation incentive may be
developed based on the outline introduced in this study.
The comparative advantage of the landraces is shown wherever a higher level
of agrobiodiversity exists without any additional incentives. It indicates that
private benefits of utilizing a specific production system with a high level of
agrobiodiversity are higher than with other production systems. It is important,
however, that a free and unrestricted competition between landraces and new
varieties exists, concerning the availability of seed, unbiased prices for inputs etc.
Concentrating on the national level, it can be stated that the social benefit of
conservation as assessed by the international community may be higher than that
of a specific country. This is the case in a country with a high level of
agrobiodiversity but with a low level of technology for processing genetic
resources. In other words, the standard of the country's public and private crop
improvement programs determine the social benefit of a country's access to
genetic resources. To promote ex situ conservation, incentives must be supplied to
a country, only if its social benefits are lower than those of the international
community.
Incentives are necessary for the continuation of PGRF A conservation, ex situ as
well as in situ. It has been suggested, however, to give incentives only where
necessary. The requirement of incentives depends on the adherence of a cropspecific areal minimum safety standard (for the in situ conservation) and of the
difference between national and international social benefit considerations (for the
ex situ conservation). Hence, further research is necessary to outline operational
ways of identifYing the specific areal minimum safety standard for the difforent
crop varieties as well as to estimate the social benefits at the different levels.
179
The farmers will go on maintaining their production system as long as their
private marginal benefit is higher than their private marginal costs. They will
maintain a specific level of PGRF A diversity with their traditional production
system. By changing the production system to a "modem system", the diversity
level will decrease. This transformation is determined by other criteria than the
conservation of PGRF A. Hence, conservation of PGRF A is conducted at the farm
level only as side-effect of other decisions; as a positive external effect. That is to
say, no costs are associated with the conservation of PGRF A in farmers fields.
The de facto in situ conservation reflects the economic principle of efficient
resource allocation. Conservation takes place where diversity is high and
opportunity costs are low. In situ conservation per se has opportunity costs at the
national level however, which reflect the competition between utilized arable land
for a high level of agrobiodiversity and for the increasing need to secure food
demands. Consequently, in situ conservation of PGRF A should be promoted in a
rather restricted way. Incentives for the conservation of PGRF A should only be
applied, if the utilized arable land for a variety is falling below its specific areal
minimum safety standard.
The "controlled in situ conservation" (Chap. 3.4.2.2.) fits a potential market
solution in a clearly defined framework. This framework is determined by social
benefits which cannot be internalized into a complete market system, i.e., the
framework protects the non-market values of PGRF A against a market system A
further detailed concept of this restricted in situ conservation incentive may be
developed based on the outline introduced in this study.
The comparative advantage of the landraces is shown wherever a higher level
of agrobiodiversity exists without any additional incentives. It indicates that
private benefits of utilizing a specific production system with a high level of
agrobiodiversity are higher than with other production systems. It is important,
however, that a free and unrestricted competition between landraces and new
varieties exists, concerning the availability of seed, unbiased prices for inputs etc.
Concentrating on the national level, it can be stated that the social benefit of
conservation as assessed by the international community may be higher than that
of a specific country. This is the case in a country with a high level of
agrobiodiversity but with a low level of technology for processing genetic
resources. In other words, the standard of the country's public and private crop
improvement programs determine the social benefit of a country's access to
genetic resources. To promote ex situ conservation, incentives must be supplied to
a country, only if its social benefits are lower than those of the international
community.
Incentives are necessary for the continuation of PGRF A conservation, ex situ as
well as in situ. It has been suggested, however, to give incentives only where
necessary. The requirement of incentives depends on the adherence of a cropspecific areal minimum safety standard (for the in situ conservation) and of the
difference between national and international social benefit considerations (for the
ex situ conservation). Hence, further research is necessary to outline operational
ways of identifYing the specific areal minimum safety standard for the difforent
crop varieties as well as to estimate the social benefits at the different levels.