180
7 Conclusions for PGRFA Conservation Polley and further Research Issues
7.3
Compensation or Internalization?
The present structure of the conservation and exchange system is changing,
because of the emerging awareness of the value of PGRF A and the changes in the
intellectual property rights. Countries with a high agrobiodiversity are calling for a
share of the benefits derived from the utilization of PGRF A. Two aspects must be
highlighted in this context:
"Benefit sharing" can be understood as an incentive for present and future
conservation efforts at the national level (for the ex situ conservation) as well as at
the farmer level (for the in situ conservation). Incentives for the conservation of
PGRF A are needed because of the constant decline in PGRF A in storage facilities
as well as in farmers' fields (Chap. 7.2.).
"Benefit sharing" can furthermore be understood as an equity issue in light of
the positive external effect produced by farmers and its utilization by private (and
public) breeders. The suppliers of PGRFA are attempting to use their property
rights and to derive benefits resulting from the supply of germplasm. Countries do
so by establishing a market power and threatening to close the access to their
national germplasm pools. This attempt is supported by the Convention on
Biological Diversity, which reaffirms the countries' sovereignty over their genetic
resources. The agrobiodiversity-rich countries encounter two major obstacles in
trying to enforce the exclusiveness of their PGRF A: first, most of the technologyrich and agrobiodiversity-poor countries hold important ex situ collections. Hence,
these countries can feel"self-sufficient" for a long time in regard to the supply of
PGRF A as raw material for their breeding programs. No agreement was reached
on the legal status of ex situ conserved germplasm collected before the
enforcement of CBD in 1993. Hence, all the accessions collected before 1993
(which constitute most of the conserved accessions), will be kept open to all users.
The second obstacle for the emerging market power of agrobiodiversity-rich
countries is the prohibitive transaction costs of controlling the export of
germplasm or of the legal action later on lOO . Additionally, some agrobiodiversityrich countries still depend on public or private breeding activities in other
countries (see Chap. 7.4). Hence, at present, countries - especially those with high
agrobiodiversity and low technological potential - are interested in supplying
germplasm to the breeding industries in order to receive new varieties.
All governments are challenged now to modify existing property rights
arrangements and build new arrangements for genetic resources so that the
benefits can also serve as an incentive for those conserving PGRF A on the one
hand, and the costs of the transactions between them and the users are not
prohibitive on the other. As long as property rights are not at all defined, poorly
100 It may be feasible at selective places, e.g., at the airport; but a control of all borders is
impossible, especially bearing in mind that germplasm crossing the border can always be
declared as food product.
7 Conclusions for PGRFA Conservation Polley and further Research Issues
7.3
Compensation or Internalization?
The present structure of the conservation and exchange system is changing,
because of the emerging awareness of the value of PGRF A and the changes in the
intellectual property rights. Countries with a high agrobiodiversity are calling for a
share of the benefits derived from the utilization of PGRF A. Two aspects must be
highlighted in this context:
"Benefit sharing" can be understood as an incentive for present and future
conservation efforts at the national level (for the ex situ conservation) as well as at
the farmer level (for the in situ conservation). Incentives for the conservation of
PGRF A are needed because of the constant decline in PGRF A in storage facilities
as well as in farmers' fields (Chap. 7.2.).
"Benefit sharing" can furthermore be understood as an equity issue in light of
the positive external effect produced by farmers and its utilization by private (and
public) breeders. The suppliers of PGRFA are attempting to use their property
rights and to derive benefits resulting from the supply of germplasm. Countries do
so by establishing a market power and threatening to close the access to their
national germplasm pools. This attempt is supported by the Convention on
Biological Diversity, which reaffirms the countries' sovereignty over their genetic
resources. The agrobiodiversity-rich countries encounter two major obstacles in
trying to enforce the exclusiveness of their PGRF A: first, most of the technologyrich and agrobiodiversity-poor countries hold important ex situ collections. Hence,
these countries can feel"self-sufficient" for a long time in regard to the supply of
PGRF A as raw material for their breeding programs. No agreement was reached
on the legal status of ex situ conserved germplasm collected before the
enforcement of CBD in 1993. Hence, all the accessions collected before 1993
(which constitute most of the conserved accessions), will be kept open to all users.
The second obstacle for the emerging market power of agrobiodiversity-rich
countries is the prohibitive transaction costs of controlling the export of
germplasm or of the legal action later on lOO . Additionally, some agrobiodiversityrich countries still depend on public or private breeding activities in other
countries (see Chap. 7.4). Hence, at present, countries - especially those with high
agrobiodiversity and low technological potential - are interested in supplying
germplasm to the breeding industries in order to receive new varieties.
All governments are challenged now to modify existing property rights
arrangements and build new arrangements for genetic resources so that the
benefits can also serve as an incentive for those conserving PGRF A on the one
hand, and the costs of the transactions between them and the users are not
prohibitive on the other. As long as property rights are not at all defined, poorly
100 It may be feasible at selective places, e.g., at the airport; but a control of all borders is
impossible, especially bearing in mind that germplasm crossing the border can always be
declared as food product.