B. Glaeser
Hardin's theses in 1990 in the journal "Human Ecology". They called it "The tragedy of
the commons: twenty-two years later:' (Feeny et al. 1990; cf. Berkes 1989) Their main
assessment was: "Hardin's model is insightful but incomplete" (op. cit., 12). The model
should be amended in that the herdsmen or fishermen firstly control the access to the
commons, secondly agree on rules of conduct. In other words: Hardin missed institutional arrangements on the one hand and cultural factors on the other. Instead, viable
options according to the authors are shared governance or state regulation, including
user self-management.
These solutions apply to the global problems of the commons as well, to ozone depletion as well as to ocean depletion. The authors conclude: ''A new and more comprehensive theory for common property resources must be able to account for sustainable resource management under communal-property regimes" (op. cit., 14).
\ Presently, two strategies to manage the commons have been newly emerging themes:
fisheries co-management and participation in fisheries management (Jentoft et al. 1998;
Wilson and McCay 1997). Co-management is a tool in fisheries management that has received much attention (Jentoft et al. 1998). A recent perspective is how institutions are
embedded in human communities. Co-management "is a set of principles for institutional design that can assume various organizational forms" (op. cit., 5), depending on
circumstances. Co-management is related to communities: it is true, of course, that fishermen fish from individual boats but they also fish from communities (op. cit., 6).
Property rights constitute an important set of institutions, influencing the nature of a
resource regime in fishing communities. Fisheries management and co-management
are influenced by the prevailing property rights regime. "In the original 'Tragedy of
the Commons' model, open access is the root problem" (op. cit., 8). The conclusion is
that co-management is an alternative management strategy to deal with controversial
regulatory decisions and conflicts (op. cit., 10). It involves participation (for the participants' view, see Wilson and McCay 1997) and it may involve institution building.
One thing seems to be undoubted if comparative international experience is reviewed:
While co-management and participation "imbue the regulatory process with legitimacy"
there is "no single model for implementing such management principles" (Jentoft 1989).
Cooperative management regimes depend on the context of its introduction, and this
context varies from country to country as well as from fishery to fishery; whereas others advocate individual property rights to areas or species (cf. de Alessi 1998).
19.3.4
Governance
A model of and approach to governance for integrated coastal zone management was
assembled and introduced by McGlade (in McGlade et al. n.d.; cf. also Ostrom 1990).
According to McGlade, two approaches to coastal governance are commonly followed,
and may be termed (1) communicative and consensual action and (2) instrumental
action. Both facilitate to allocate resources equitably. Within the first approach, moral
rules or norms are established and form consensual actions. The importance of moral
values is recognized as a critical factor in governance. Within the second approach, a
technical rule leads to an instrumental action. An example from fisheries is the desirability of an exploitation level that will not harm the parent stock; the instrumental
action is to adopt net mesh sizes or to enforCe quotas. The two approaches treat com-
Hardin's theses in 1990 in the journal "Human Ecology". They called it "The tragedy of
the commons: twenty-two years later:' (Feeny et al. 1990; cf. Berkes 1989) Their main
assessment was: "Hardin's model is insightful but incomplete" (op. cit., 12). The model
should be amended in that the herdsmen or fishermen firstly control the access to the
commons, secondly agree on rules of conduct. In other words: Hardin missed institutional arrangements on the one hand and cultural factors on the other. Instead, viable
options according to the authors are shared governance or state regulation, including
user self-management.
These solutions apply to the global problems of the commons as well, to ozone depletion as well as to ocean depletion. The authors conclude: ''A new and more comprehensive theory for common property resources must be able to account for sustainable resource management under communal-property regimes" (op. cit., 14).
\ Presently, two strategies to manage the commons have been newly emerging themes:
fisheries co-management and participation in fisheries management (Jentoft et al. 1998;
Wilson and McCay 1997). Co-management is a tool in fisheries management that has received much attention (Jentoft et al. 1998). A recent perspective is how institutions are
embedded in human communities. Co-management "is a set of principles for institutional design that can assume various organizational forms" (op. cit., 5), depending on
circumstances. Co-management is related to communities: it is true, of course, that fishermen fish from individual boats but they also fish from communities (op. cit., 6).
Property rights constitute an important set of institutions, influencing the nature of a
resource regime in fishing communities. Fisheries management and co-management
are influenced by the prevailing property rights regime. "In the original 'Tragedy of
the Commons' model, open access is the root problem" (op. cit., 8). The conclusion is
that co-management is an alternative management strategy to deal with controversial
regulatory decisions and conflicts (op. cit., 10). It involves participation (for the participants' view, see Wilson and McCay 1997) and it may involve institution building.
One thing seems to be undoubted if comparative international experience is reviewed:
While co-management and participation "imbue the regulatory process with legitimacy"
there is "no single model for implementing such management principles" (Jentoft 1989).
Cooperative management regimes depend on the context of its introduction, and this
context varies from country to country as well as from fishery to fishery; whereas others advocate individual property rights to areas or species (cf. de Alessi 1998).
19.3.4
Governance
A model of and approach to governance for integrated coastal zone management was
assembled and introduced by McGlade (in McGlade et al. n.d.; cf. also Ostrom 1990).
According to McGlade, two approaches to coastal governance are commonly followed,
and may be termed (1) communicative and consensual action and (2) instrumental
action. Both facilitate to allocate resources equitably. Within the first approach, moral
rules or norms are established and form consensual actions. The importance of moral
values is recognized as a critical factor in governance. Within the second approach, a
technical rule leads to an instrumental action. An example from fisheries is the desirability of an exploitation level that will not harm the parent stock; the instrumental
action is to adopt net mesh sizes or to enforCe quotas. The two approaches treat com-