412
11 Manganese: Predominant Role of Nodules and Crusts
site was questioned by Glasby (1983). The feasibility
of developing a reliable mining system was also cast
into doubt when the testing of deep-sea nodule mining
at the pilot-plant stage in 1978 ended abruptly with
the loss of the entire mining system over the stern of
the ship after about 800 t of nodules had been
recovered from the seafloor. False expectations were
also raised by the development of a deep-sea mining
system by the Lockhead/OMCO consortium using the
Hughes Glomar Explorer as the mother ship. The
system developed was considered to be one of the
greatest innovations in ship design and deep-sea
technology in the twentieth century. Only later was it
revealed that the Hughes Glomar Explorer had been
built specifically to recover the K-129, a sunken Soviet
nuclear submarine, and that the building of this ship
had been funded entirely by the CIA at a cost of about
$500 million in current dollars.
Nonetheless, the key problem was undoubtedly
the provisions of the Third United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) which lasted from
1973 until 1982 and was the largest ever forum for
international diplomacy (Anon 1982). These provisions were considered so onerous that several countries with an interest in deep-sea mining (including
the U.S.A., U.K. and Germany) refused to sign the
initial Law of the Sea Treaty in 1982. One provision
that the United States, in particular, found unacceptable
was the requirement to transfer technology to the
Enterpise (representing Third World countries). Nonetheless, these countries eventually signed the convention in 1994 after a new agreement on deep-seabed
mining was reached. This led to the International
Seabed Authority (ISA) being set up in Kingston,
Jamaica, to mangage the mineral resources of the
International Seabed Area (http//:www.isa.org.jm).
However, it was the marked drop in the price of Ni and
Cu from 1979 to 1982 (Fig. 11.25) which essentially
ended all commercial and almost all scientific interest
in deep-sea manganese nodules in these countries in
1982.
Concurrently, there was a marked surge in the world
price of Co in 1979 and 1980 (Fig. 11.25) following the
invasion of the Shaba Province of Zaire by insurgents
in 1978 (Manheim 1986). Cobalt is essential for the
production of the superalloys used in jet aircraft
engines. As a result, President Reagan created a
strategic materials task force in 1980 to evaluate the
availability of strategic minerals such as Co, Mn and
the Pt metals. This stimulated interest in marine
resources of cobalt, manganese and platinum.
Although the cost of mining these deposits was
considered to be too high to be practical, it was thought
that an increase in demand (and therefore in price) for
these minerals or technological innovations which would
reduce the cost of mining could make these deposits an
economically viable source of these minerals. In 1983,
President Reagan proclaimed a 200 n.m. Exclusive
Economic Zone (EEZ) around the United States and
the US-controlled islands in the Pacific and Caribbean.
This paved the way for research on Co-rich manganese
crusts around Johnson Island and the Hawaian Archipelago in the U.S. EEZ as well as within the EEZ’s of
the Federated States of Micronesia, Marshall Islands,
Kiribati and from international waters in the Mid-Pacific
Mountains. Hein (2004) has listed 36 cruises dedicated
to the study of Co-rich crusts in the Pacific between
1981 and 1999 undertaken by groups from the USA,
Japan, Korea, Germany, Russia, Australia, France and
New Zealand. Since then, China has become a major
player in Co-rich crust investigations. One of the
advantages of mining Co-rich Mn crusts compared to
deep-sea manganese nodules is that they mostly lie
within the EEZ’s of island nations and therefore
outside the juridiction of the ISA. Mining rights could
therefore be negotiated with the host government.
However, the price of Co in 1998 was less than 30% of
its peak value in 1979 in real terms (Fig. 11.25) and
there is no serious talk of mining these deposits yet.
Following the adoption of the Law of the Sea
Treaty in 1982, a new phase was initiated to assess
the commercial potential of manganese nodules and a
number of countries registered claims to deep-sea
mining areas as „pioneer investors“ through the United
Nations on the basis of UNCLOS. These countries
committed themselves to long-term programmes to
establish the viability of nodule mining including
nodule surveys, the development of mining systems,
nodule processing and environmental surveys. So far,
the following countries have registered, France,
Russia, India and Japan (1987), People’s Republic of
China (1991), InterOceanMetal (1992) and Republic of
Korea (1994). Fig 11.26 shows the locations of the mine
site areas allocated to each of these countries within
the C-C F.Z. India has registered its claim to an area
within the Central Indian Ocean Basin (CIOB) south
of India (Juahari and Pattan 2000; Mukhopadhyay et
al. 2002). However, the commercial viability of nodules
mining is by no means assured and no consortium is
building a nodule mining system at present. This
reflects the fact that world metal prices are too low for
nodule mining to be profitable. As can be seen in Fig.
11.25, the price of both Ni and Cu in 1998 was less
than 40% of their peak values in the 1970s in real terms.
It would therefore appear that those countries still
interested in the possibility of exploiting nodules are
11 Manganese: Predominant Role of Nodules and Crusts
site was questioned by Glasby (1983). The feasibility
of developing a reliable mining system was also cast
into doubt when the testing of deep-sea nodule mining
at the pilot-plant stage in 1978 ended abruptly with
the loss of the entire mining system over the stern of
the ship after about 800 t of nodules had been
recovered from the seafloor. False expectations were
also raised by the development of a deep-sea mining
system by the Lockhead/OMCO consortium using the
Hughes Glomar Explorer as the mother ship. The
system developed was considered to be one of the
greatest innovations in ship design and deep-sea
technology in the twentieth century. Only later was it
revealed that the Hughes Glomar Explorer had been
built specifically to recover the K-129, a sunken Soviet
nuclear submarine, and that the building of this ship
had been funded entirely by the CIA at a cost of about
$500 million in current dollars.
Nonetheless, the key problem was undoubtedly
the provisions of the Third United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) which lasted from
1973 until 1982 and was the largest ever forum for
international diplomacy (Anon 1982). These provisions were considered so onerous that several countries with an interest in deep-sea mining (including
the U.S.A., U.K. and Germany) refused to sign the
initial Law of the Sea Treaty in 1982. One provision
that the United States, in particular, found unacceptable
was the requirement to transfer technology to the
Enterpise (representing Third World countries). Nonetheless, these countries eventually signed the convention in 1994 after a new agreement on deep-seabed
mining was reached. This led to the International
Seabed Authority (ISA) being set up in Kingston,
Jamaica, to mangage the mineral resources of the
International Seabed Area (http//:www.isa.org.jm).
However, it was the marked drop in the price of Ni and
Cu from 1979 to 1982 (Fig. 11.25) which essentially
ended all commercial and almost all scientific interest
in deep-sea manganese nodules in these countries in
1982.
Concurrently, there was a marked surge in the world
price of Co in 1979 and 1980 (Fig. 11.25) following the
invasion of the Shaba Province of Zaire by insurgents
in 1978 (Manheim 1986). Cobalt is essential for the
production of the superalloys used in jet aircraft
engines. As a result, President Reagan created a
strategic materials task force in 1980 to evaluate the
availability of strategic minerals such as Co, Mn and
the Pt metals. This stimulated interest in marine
resources of cobalt, manganese and platinum.
Although the cost of mining these deposits was
considered to be too high to be practical, it was thought
that an increase in demand (and therefore in price) for
these minerals or technological innovations which would
reduce the cost of mining could make these deposits an
economically viable source of these minerals. In 1983,
President Reagan proclaimed a 200 n.m. Exclusive
Economic Zone (EEZ) around the United States and
the US-controlled islands in the Pacific and Caribbean.
This paved the way for research on Co-rich manganese
crusts around Johnson Island and the Hawaian Archipelago in the U.S. EEZ as well as within the EEZ’s of
the Federated States of Micronesia, Marshall Islands,
Kiribati and from international waters in the Mid-Pacific
Mountains. Hein (2004) has listed 36 cruises dedicated
to the study of Co-rich crusts in the Pacific between
1981 and 1999 undertaken by groups from the USA,
Japan, Korea, Germany, Russia, Australia, France and
New Zealand. Since then, China has become a major
player in Co-rich crust investigations. One of the
advantages of mining Co-rich Mn crusts compared to
deep-sea manganese nodules is that they mostly lie
within the EEZ’s of island nations and therefore
outside the juridiction of the ISA. Mining rights could
therefore be negotiated with the host government.
However, the price of Co in 1998 was less than 30% of
its peak value in 1979 in real terms (Fig. 11.25) and
there is no serious talk of mining these deposits yet.
Following the adoption of the Law of the Sea
Treaty in 1982, a new phase was initiated to assess
the commercial potential of manganese nodules and a
number of countries registered claims to deep-sea
mining areas as „pioneer investors“ through the United
Nations on the basis of UNCLOS. These countries
committed themselves to long-term programmes to
establish the viability of nodule mining including
nodule surveys, the development of mining systems,
nodule processing and environmental surveys. So far,
the following countries have registered, France,
Russia, India and Japan (1987), People’s Republic of
China (1991), InterOceanMetal (1992) and Republic of
Korea (1994). Fig 11.26 shows the locations of the mine
site areas allocated to each of these countries within
the C-C F.Z. India has registered its claim to an area
within the Central Indian Ocean Basin (CIOB) south
of India (Juahari and Pattan 2000; Mukhopadhyay et
al. 2002). However, the commercial viability of nodules
mining is by no means assured and no consortium is
building a nodule mining system at present. This
reflects the fact that world metal prices are too low for
nodule mining to be profitable. As can be seen in Fig.
11.25, the price of both Ni and Cu in 1998 was less
than 40% of their peak values in the 1970s in real terms.
It would therefore appear that those countries still
interested in the possibility of exploiting nodules are