237
Twenty years later public controversy surrounded Disi farming over its ineffi cient
use of up to 65 × 10
6 m
3
/year (equivalent to almost a third of annual municipal supplies in 2007) of precious non-renewable drinking water.
11 But private criticism,
relayed by interviewees to the author in 2010, focused on the “shadow state”. Disi
farming was viewed as symptomatic of the political power wielded by vested interests and the government’s lack of political will to act in the state interest to curb
corrupt practice. Of special concern was rent-seeking by political and business
elites through securing policies to promote their farming interests and to provide
immunity from those that might undermine them.
12 Critics argued that government
failure to allow the companies’ licenses to expire in 2002 and to enforce its decision
not to renew the companies’ contracts in 2012 refl ected the infl uence of powerful
groups with ties to ruling circles and the ministries (Namrouqa 2012 ).
15.2.2.3 Resilience of the Shadow State
This analysis indicates that the water governance problem is part of a wider problem – the organisation of political power which the regime has shaped and altered
over time to maintain security, which has politicised water, today controls resource
allocation and inhibits regional cooperation, and in which anti-reformists are
entrenched. The water problem cannot therefore be addressed through technical
solutions alone. A pre-requisite will be political reforms that reduce the infl uence of
“shadow state” networks over institutions, the economy and policies.
The task will not be easy. The web of power emerging from carefully choreographed co-option to protect Hashemite longevity has proven remarkably resilient
(Yorke 2013 , pp. 71–75). Despite his signifi cant executive powers, King Abdullah
II’s reform initiatives after 1999 met resistance from conservative elites (Muasher
2011 , pp. 7–23). In the event, he chose to back down rather than risk forfeiting the
loyalty of a key constituency. Royal room for manoeuvre was constrained by an
absence of suffi cient “bottom-up” pressure for reform.
13 Post-1989 the Throne’s
new partnership with the people based on the National Charter permitted political
parties but constrained political activity,
14 whilst electoral gerrymandering and the
11 Water experts, Royal Water Committee members and donors shared criticisms: grains that the
farms were contracted to produce could be grown more effi ciently in the north using recycled
water; farms were violating contracts, employing expatriate rather than local workers, and producing water-intensive produce for export rather than cereals for home consumption.
12 Criticism focused on former government offi cials benefi ting from the companies, on one serving
prime minister using his public offi ce to freeze a government tax claim on a company of which he
was shareholder, and on the government for ignoring contract violations re growing water-thirsty
crops.
13 Since 1989 unrest has been frequent as a result of neo-liberal policies eating into the patronage
state, with quasi-privatisation benefi ting those linked to the palace but reducing state sector jobs
particularly unpopular.
14 The National Charter led to the legalisation of parties, but did so in return for acceptance of the
constitution and the powers of the monarchy, thus placing boundaries on political activity and
marginalising opposition.
15 Jordan’s Shadow State and Water Management: Prospects for Water Security…
Twenty years later public controversy surrounded Disi farming over its ineffi cient
use of up to 65 × 10
6 m
3
/year (equivalent to almost a third of annual municipal supplies in 2007) of precious non-renewable drinking water.
11 But private criticism,
relayed by interviewees to the author in 2010, focused on the “shadow state”. Disi
farming was viewed as symptomatic of the political power wielded by vested interests and the government’s lack of political will to act in the state interest to curb
corrupt practice. Of special concern was rent-seeking by political and business
elites through securing policies to promote their farming interests and to provide
immunity from those that might undermine them.
12 Critics argued that government
failure to allow the companies’ licenses to expire in 2002 and to enforce its decision
not to renew the companies’ contracts in 2012 refl ected the infl uence of powerful
groups with ties to ruling circles and the ministries (Namrouqa 2012 ).
15.2.2.3 Resilience of the Shadow State
This analysis indicates that the water governance problem is part of a wider problem – the organisation of political power which the regime has shaped and altered
over time to maintain security, which has politicised water, today controls resource
allocation and inhibits regional cooperation, and in which anti-reformists are
entrenched. The water problem cannot therefore be addressed through technical
solutions alone. A pre-requisite will be political reforms that reduce the infl uence of
“shadow state” networks over institutions, the economy and policies.
The task will not be easy. The web of power emerging from carefully choreographed co-option to protect Hashemite longevity has proven remarkably resilient
(Yorke 2013 , pp. 71–75). Despite his signifi cant executive powers, King Abdullah
II’s reform initiatives after 1999 met resistance from conservative elites (Muasher
2011 , pp. 7–23). In the event, he chose to back down rather than risk forfeiting the
loyalty of a key constituency. Royal room for manoeuvre was constrained by an
absence of suffi cient “bottom-up” pressure for reform.
13 Post-1989 the Throne’s
new partnership with the people based on the National Charter permitted political
parties but constrained political activity,
14 whilst electoral gerrymandering and the
11 Water experts, Royal Water Committee members and donors shared criticisms: grains that the
farms were contracted to produce could be grown more effi ciently in the north using recycled
water; farms were violating contracts, employing expatriate rather than local workers, and producing water-intensive produce for export rather than cereals for home consumption.
12 Criticism focused on former government offi cials benefi ting from the companies, on one serving
prime minister using his public offi ce to freeze a government tax claim on a company of which he
was shareholder, and on the government for ignoring contract violations re growing water-thirsty
crops.
13 Since 1989 unrest has been frequent as a result of neo-liberal policies eating into the patronage
state, with quasi-privatisation benefi ting those linked to the palace but reducing state sector jobs
particularly unpopular.
14 The National Charter led to the legalisation of parties, but did so in return for acceptance of the
constitution and the powers of the monarchy, thus placing boundaries on political activity and
marginalising opposition.
15 Jordan’s Shadow State and Water Management: Prospects for Water Security…