238
“one-man one-vote” system ensured over-representation of traditional elements at
the opposition’s expense. Moreover, reformists themselves representing the plurality of a fragmented society – sharing goals perhaps, but with distinct orientations –
have proven no match for anti-reformists of a centralised “shadow state”.
Meanwhile, U.S. and Arab Gulf allies have played a key role in shaping this reality through funding the security and patronage networks underpinning Hashemite
rule. In pursuit of their strategic goals, they provided fl ows of fi nancial and technical
assistance to underpin state largesse – permitting Jordan to develop without diffi cult
reforms and cushioning it from the adverse socio-economic impacts of overspending. Donors thus bear some responsibility for the adverse consequences, felt inter
alia in the water sector to which much aid has been directed but whose slow pace of
reform refl ects the workings of the patronage state.
However, the combined effects of the Arab Spring and global fi nancial crisis
provided a wake-up call – exposing weaknesses in the monarchy’s compact with the
people and the contradiction between centralised power and popular demands for
democratic reforms.
The Hashemites have historically taken dramatic steps to cope with security
threats to the monarchy and state: In 1988, King Hussein severed ties with the West
Bank and the next year in response to economic austerity reinstated parliamentary
life, both steps contributing to a restructuring of relations with his people. King
Abdullah has shown that he, too, is aware that politics cannot stand still if ongoing
socio-economic crises are to be dealt with, and that the current patronage state is
unsustainable.
15.3 Proposed Actions
15.3.1 Building Water Security Through Political Reforms
Jordan’s government, donors and water specialists publicly recognise that developing water security will be a pre-condition for generating the needed levels of economic growth to meet future energy, food and fi nancial challenges and that failure
risks domestic instability, a message strongly delivered in the government’s 2005
National Agenda (JMGP 2005 ). Commitment to water reforms is strong. Yet, despite
the fast-deteriorating water situation, Jordan’s leaders and their counterparts abroad
avoid publicly recognising “the elephant in the room”, namely that Jordan’s water
strategy is politically challenged:
What is missing is frank talk about how the Kingdom’s distinctive power dynamics (i)
contribute to distorted allocations and unsustainable use; (ii) foster a culture of competition
for, rather than conservation of, scarce water resources; and (iii) inhibit effi cient and democratic water governance necessary for economic growth, for putting in place adaptive
capacity to deal with climate change and for laying the foundation for regional cooperation
over shared water resources and new supplies (Yorke 2013 , p. 77).
V. Yorke
“one-man one-vote” system ensured over-representation of traditional elements at
the opposition’s expense. Moreover, reformists themselves representing the plurality of a fragmented society – sharing goals perhaps, but with distinct orientations –
have proven no match for anti-reformists of a centralised “shadow state”.
Meanwhile, U.S. and Arab Gulf allies have played a key role in shaping this reality through funding the security and patronage networks underpinning Hashemite
rule. In pursuit of their strategic goals, they provided fl ows of fi nancial and technical
assistance to underpin state largesse – permitting Jordan to develop without diffi cult
reforms and cushioning it from the adverse socio-economic impacts of overspending. Donors thus bear some responsibility for the adverse consequences, felt inter
alia in the water sector to which much aid has been directed but whose slow pace of
reform refl ects the workings of the patronage state.
However, the combined effects of the Arab Spring and global fi nancial crisis
provided a wake-up call – exposing weaknesses in the monarchy’s compact with the
people and the contradiction between centralised power and popular demands for
democratic reforms.
The Hashemites have historically taken dramatic steps to cope with security
threats to the monarchy and state: In 1988, King Hussein severed ties with the West
Bank and the next year in response to economic austerity reinstated parliamentary
life, both steps contributing to a restructuring of relations with his people. King
Abdullah has shown that he, too, is aware that politics cannot stand still if ongoing
socio-economic crises are to be dealt with, and that the current patronage state is
unsustainable.
15.3 Proposed Actions
15.3.1 Building Water Security Through Political Reforms
Jordan’s government, donors and water specialists publicly recognise that developing water security will be a pre-condition for generating the needed levels of economic growth to meet future energy, food and fi nancial challenges and that failure
risks domestic instability, a message strongly delivered in the government’s 2005
National Agenda (JMGP 2005 ). Commitment to water reforms is strong. Yet, despite
the fast-deteriorating water situation, Jordan’s leaders and their counterparts abroad
avoid publicly recognising “the elephant in the room”, namely that Jordan’s water
strategy is politically challenged:
What is missing is frank talk about how the Kingdom’s distinctive power dynamics (i)
contribute to distorted allocations and unsustainable use; (ii) foster a culture of competition
for, rather than conservation of, scarce water resources; and (iii) inhibit effi cient and democratic water governance necessary for economic growth, for putting in place adaptive
capacity to deal with climate change and for laying the foundation for regional cooperation
over shared water resources and new supplies (Yorke 2013 , p. 77).
V. Yorke