236
using their public positions in parliament and politics and links to the centre for
private gain – all with grave implications for the water sector.
15.2.2.1 Northern Highlands
In the Northern Highlands where Jordan’s population has historically been concentrated, farming pre-dates the state’s formation. Thus, from the 1920s, the political
exchanges around land were key to binding Highland farmers to Amir Abdullah and
to underpinning state consolidation. They laid the foundation for today’s patronage
state which would take on its own logic.
As noted earlier, Transjordanian landowners would increase their political infl uence and come to dominate land ownership and agricultural markets. Early on,
larger Highland landowners had benefi ted from British land reforms, and many still
today maintain the legal rights acquired then (Alterman and Dziuban 2010 ). With
land their main source of wealth, they cooperated with merchants in parliament to
infl uence government resource policy. Meanwhile, the Hashemites – in confronting
pan-Arabist and Palestinian nationalist challenges – extended generous privileges to
these key Highland constituents. They benefi ted from light regulation of their farming affairs, from government investment in agriculture to provide jobs and food for
the expanding population and from the establishment of well fi elds to exploit
groundwater aquifers (Hagan 2008 , p. 16). Agricultural expansion in the 1960s and
1970s paved the way for a huge increase in irrigated agriculture – in later decades
using groundwater pumped from depleting aquifers (Hagan 2008 , p. 32). As a
result, in 1997, when the government launched its groundwater strategy to protect
the sustainability of vital renewable resources, powerful landowners resisted.
By-Law No 85 was eventually passed in 2002, but its provision to close illegal wells
was not implemented – under a 2004 amendment, illegal wells could register for
inclusion in the MWI monitoring program. Quotas and bulk tariff rates to encourage
effi ciency were introduced, but these remained virtually unchanged thereafter, and,
until recently, fees, even for legal wells, were often not collected. Astonishingly,
farmers reportedly used groundwater for new plantings of low value olive trees (per
m
3 of irrigation water used) in order to enhance land values (USAID 2012 , p. 34).
15.2.2.2 Southern Highlands
In the 1980s, the government started large-scale farming around the Disi aquifer in the
south in an effort to make Jordan self-sustainable in wheat and barley. Private landowners and commercial elites would benefi t: the government soon sold its farm to the Al
Masri family and offered cheap land near the aquifer to private farm companies, whose
shareholders included former government offi cials (Yorke 2013 , pp. 69–70).
10
10 25-year contracts provided cheap land and allowance of 1,000 m
3
/dunum/year to the companies,
which in return would use 50 % of land to grow wheat and barley for government purchase
(1 dunum = 1,000 m
2 ).
V. Yorke
using their public positions in parliament and politics and links to the centre for
private gain – all with grave implications for the water sector.
15.2.2.1 Northern Highlands
In the Northern Highlands where Jordan’s population has historically been concentrated, farming pre-dates the state’s formation. Thus, from the 1920s, the political
exchanges around land were key to binding Highland farmers to Amir Abdullah and
to underpinning state consolidation. They laid the foundation for today’s patronage
state which would take on its own logic.
As noted earlier, Transjordanian landowners would increase their political infl uence and come to dominate land ownership and agricultural markets. Early on,
larger Highland landowners had benefi ted from British land reforms, and many still
today maintain the legal rights acquired then (Alterman and Dziuban 2010 ). With
land their main source of wealth, they cooperated with merchants in parliament to
infl uence government resource policy. Meanwhile, the Hashemites – in confronting
pan-Arabist and Palestinian nationalist challenges – extended generous privileges to
these key Highland constituents. They benefi ted from light regulation of their farming affairs, from government investment in agriculture to provide jobs and food for
the expanding population and from the establishment of well fi elds to exploit
groundwater aquifers (Hagan 2008 , p. 16). Agricultural expansion in the 1960s and
1970s paved the way for a huge increase in irrigated agriculture – in later decades
using groundwater pumped from depleting aquifers (Hagan 2008 , p. 32). As a
result, in 1997, when the government launched its groundwater strategy to protect
the sustainability of vital renewable resources, powerful landowners resisted.
By-Law No 85 was eventually passed in 2002, but its provision to close illegal wells
was not implemented – under a 2004 amendment, illegal wells could register for
inclusion in the MWI monitoring program. Quotas and bulk tariff rates to encourage
effi ciency were introduced, but these remained virtually unchanged thereafter, and,
until recently, fees, even for legal wells, were often not collected. Astonishingly,
farmers reportedly used groundwater for new plantings of low value olive trees (per
m
3 of irrigation water used) in order to enhance land values (USAID 2012 , p. 34).
15.2.2.2 Southern Highlands
In the 1980s, the government started large-scale farming around the Disi aquifer in the
south in an effort to make Jordan self-sustainable in wheat and barley. Private landowners and commercial elites would benefi t: the government soon sold its farm to the Al
Masri family and offered cheap land near the aquifer to private farm companies, whose
shareholders included former government offi cials (Yorke 2013 , pp. 69–70).
10
10 25-year contracts provided cheap land and allowance of 1,000 m
3
/dunum/year to the companies,
which in return would use 50 % of land to grow wheat and barley for government purchase
(1 dunum = 1,000 m
2 ).
V. Yorke