235
country. Stability of Hashemite rule was enhanced through crafting a social balance
where social groups offset each other’s infl uence. Cohesion appeared to prevail.
15.2.2 Politics of Water
It is in the context of these Hashemite regime maintenance policies and evolving
organisation of power to which they led that the role of water provision today – for
agricultural and domestic purposes – is best understood. With growing water scarcity, water has become a political matter – serving as a political instrument to maintain support, a source of personal wealth and infl uence for elites to be won and
protected, and a cheap service as part of the “social contract” with the people.
The critical importance to King Abdullah I and his successors of co-opting powerful traditional and merchant landowners would from the start put agriculture at the
centre of patronage politics, with forms of exchange around water in later years
becoming an integral part and benefi ting a widening constituency. An early indication came with British-designed land reforms that benefi ted Abdullah’s landowning
supporters – tribal leaders, peasants, and merchants (Fischbach 2000 , pp. 209–212).
In the process, they assisted many sheikhs to increase their holdings and infl uence
(Alon 2009 , pp. 127–128). By the turbulent 1950s, King Hussein was able to continue to fund privileges for tribal farmers whilst simultaneously fi nancing development, urbanisation and services for the population – hugely expanded as a result of
the 1948 war with Israel: US-funded water projects were key in settling Palestinian
refugees in the Jordan Valley, but land irrigation projects also benefi ted tribal favourites and their followers (Peters and Moore 2009 , p. 271). Landowners benefi ted
from political rewards, too, as Hussein sought to consolidate loyalties in the wake
of pan-Arabist pressures in the 1950s and the Palestinian rebellion in 1970/1971.
Members of landowning families were appointed to key army and government
posts – those of prime minister and defence minister, as well as in the agriculture,
water and planning ministries (Yorke 2013 , p. 67).
9 With this privileged access, traditional elite groups became entrenched. Embedded in politics and the administration, they were well-placed to advance their interests and preferred water policies in
the Jordan Valley and Highlands.
Later in the 1980s, when the Hashemites sought to compensate key constituencies for economic setbacks as a result of the faltering economic boom and the subsequent IMF-imposed structural adjustment program, political liberalisation
brought new kinds of pay-offs providing opportunity for these elites to consolidate
their stakes in farming and in access to renewable and fossil groundwater. Henceforth
infl uential landowners and farmers in the Northern Highlands and in Disi in the
south, for example, were able to lobby inter alia for access to water for their farms,
9 Hazza Al-Majali was twice prime minister (1955, 1959) and minister of agriculture (1950–1951)
and Field Marshall Habis Al-Majali, his cousin, was chief of staff (1958–1975), defence minister
(1967–1968), member of the Upper House 1967, 1984, 1989, 1993, and 1997. Adnan Badran was
prime minister in 1989.
15 Jordan’s Shadow State and Water Management: Prospects for Water Security…
country. Stability of Hashemite rule was enhanced through crafting a social balance
where social groups offset each other’s infl uence. Cohesion appeared to prevail.
15.2.2 Politics of Water
It is in the context of these Hashemite regime maintenance policies and evolving
organisation of power to which they led that the role of water provision today – for
agricultural and domestic purposes – is best understood. With growing water scarcity, water has become a political matter – serving as a political instrument to maintain support, a source of personal wealth and infl uence for elites to be won and
protected, and a cheap service as part of the “social contract” with the people.
The critical importance to King Abdullah I and his successors of co-opting powerful traditional and merchant landowners would from the start put agriculture at the
centre of patronage politics, with forms of exchange around water in later years
becoming an integral part and benefi ting a widening constituency. An early indication came with British-designed land reforms that benefi ted Abdullah’s landowning
supporters – tribal leaders, peasants, and merchants (Fischbach 2000 , pp. 209–212).
In the process, they assisted many sheikhs to increase their holdings and infl uence
(Alon 2009 , pp. 127–128). By the turbulent 1950s, King Hussein was able to continue to fund privileges for tribal farmers whilst simultaneously fi nancing development, urbanisation and services for the population – hugely expanded as a result of
the 1948 war with Israel: US-funded water projects were key in settling Palestinian
refugees in the Jordan Valley, but land irrigation projects also benefi ted tribal favourites and their followers (Peters and Moore 2009 , p. 271). Landowners benefi ted
from political rewards, too, as Hussein sought to consolidate loyalties in the wake
of pan-Arabist pressures in the 1950s and the Palestinian rebellion in 1970/1971.
Members of landowning families were appointed to key army and government
posts – those of prime minister and defence minister, as well as in the agriculture,
water and planning ministries (Yorke 2013 , p. 67).
9 With this privileged access, traditional elite groups became entrenched. Embedded in politics and the administration, they were well-placed to advance their interests and preferred water policies in
the Jordan Valley and Highlands.
Later in the 1980s, when the Hashemites sought to compensate key constituencies for economic setbacks as a result of the faltering economic boom and the subsequent IMF-imposed structural adjustment program, political liberalisation
brought new kinds of pay-offs providing opportunity for these elites to consolidate
their stakes in farming and in access to renewable and fossil groundwater. Henceforth
infl uential landowners and farmers in the Northern Highlands and in Disi in the
south, for example, were able to lobby inter alia for access to water for their farms,
9 Hazza Al-Majali was twice prime minister (1955, 1959) and minister of agriculture (1950–1951)
and Field Marshall Habis Al-Majali, his cousin, was chief of staff (1958–1975), defence minister
(1967–1968), member of the Upper House 1967, 1984, 1989, 1993, and 1997. Adnan Badran was
prime minister in 1989.
15 Jordan’s Shadow State and Water Management: Prospects for Water Security…