120
gained signifi cant momentum after 1930 when major economic reforms and social
transformations had been accomplished. The construction and maintenance of these
complex major irrigation systems were made possible at the highest level of planning and implementation (Fig. 9.4 ). The Soviet Ministry of Land Reclamation and
Water Resources ( minvodkhoz ) was the highest hydraulic authority with regional
water resources management departments ( oblvodkhoz ) with several name changes
over time: Turkvodkhoz (Turkestan Water Management Department of the People’s
Commissariat of Agriculture 1918–1924), Uzvodkhoz (Uzbekistan Water
Management Department of the People’s Commissariat of Agriculture 1925–1931),
Glavvodkhoz or TsJUPR (Chief Administration of Water Management 1931–1938),
Uzvodkhozi (Uzbekistan People’s Commissariat of Water Management, part of
Narkomvodkhoz (People’s Commissariat of Water Management 1938–1946)) and
Minvodkhoz (USSR Ministry of Water Management 1946–1991, containing
Uzminvodkhoz (Uzbekistan Ministry of Water Management, since 1946)). The
lower level was structured by district water resources management departments
( rayzemvodkhoz (1930–1938); rayvodkhoz , since 1938) and organised the supply
for the collective farms ( kolkhoz , sovkhoz ) (Thurman 1999 , p. 263). Within the agricultural sector the professional decision-making capacity of the farm worker
( dehqan ) continuously declined, a phenomenon that served the needs of superordinate administrators and made them powerful controllers. Generic bureaucrats made
“expert” decisions and instructed the farm workers what they should do on the
fi elds. This approach has persisted until today in the guise of water user
associations.
The principle of water management was governed by a hierarchical territorial
approach rather than by a hydraulic or catchment area-based one. The centralised
economic planning fulfi lled two objectives. First, it fi tted in the grand plan for the
Soviet Union, by attributing certain tasks to individual republics, and even districts,
by setting production standards and objectives for resource allocation and production; second, it took into consideration the specifi c needs of different republics and
created a certain degree of lower-level authority. Many statistics and accounts were
produced on the administrative level of republics although central rules and regulations were applied. In the case of Fergana, water management followed a holistic
approach by integrating territories from three neighbouring republics into one system, but attributing production fi gures to republics and recording on state levels
(Fig. 9.5 ). The success of Uzbekistan’s economy was solely judged upon cotton
production (Obertreis 2007 , p. 171). Indigenous knowledge and local expertise
were completely refuted; modernisation strategies based on science and technology
were expected to replace and surpass them. Jonathan Thurman is explicit in stating
about Fergana: “[…] the ‘cradle’ of irrigated cotton growing in Central Asia.
Indigenous modes of organisation that effectively fostered farmer participation here
were undermined by a colonising power, which transformed them into statedominated organisations incapable of effective management” (Thurman 1999 , p. iv).
The quest for modernisation was the same in Tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union.
Both regimes utilised Central Asia as supplier of raw materials needed for its
H. Kreutzmann
gained signifi cant momentum after 1930 when major economic reforms and social
transformations had been accomplished. The construction and maintenance of these
complex major irrigation systems were made possible at the highest level of planning and implementation (Fig. 9.4 ). The Soviet Ministry of Land Reclamation and
Water Resources ( minvodkhoz ) was the highest hydraulic authority with regional
water resources management departments ( oblvodkhoz ) with several name changes
over time: Turkvodkhoz (Turkestan Water Management Department of the People’s
Commissariat of Agriculture 1918–1924), Uzvodkhoz (Uzbekistan Water
Management Department of the People’s Commissariat of Agriculture 1925–1931),
Glavvodkhoz or TsJUPR (Chief Administration of Water Management 1931–1938),
Uzvodkhozi (Uzbekistan People’s Commissariat of Water Management, part of
Narkomvodkhoz (People’s Commissariat of Water Management 1938–1946)) and
Minvodkhoz (USSR Ministry of Water Management 1946–1991, containing
Uzminvodkhoz (Uzbekistan Ministry of Water Management, since 1946)). The
lower level was structured by district water resources management departments
( rayzemvodkhoz (1930–1938); rayvodkhoz , since 1938) and organised the supply
for the collective farms ( kolkhoz , sovkhoz ) (Thurman 1999 , p. 263). Within the agricultural sector the professional decision-making capacity of the farm worker
( dehqan ) continuously declined, a phenomenon that served the needs of superordinate administrators and made them powerful controllers. Generic bureaucrats made
“expert” decisions and instructed the farm workers what they should do on the
fi elds. This approach has persisted until today in the guise of water user
associations.
The principle of water management was governed by a hierarchical territorial
approach rather than by a hydraulic or catchment area-based one. The centralised
economic planning fulfi lled two objectives. First, it fi tted in the grand plan for the
Soviet Union, by attributing certain tasks to individual republics, and even districts,
by setting production standards and objectives for resource allocation and production; second, it took into consideration the specifi c needs of different republics and
created a certain degree of lower-level authority. Many statistics and accounts were
produced on the administrative level of republics although central rules and regulations were applied. In the case of Fergana, water management followed a holistic
approach by integrating territories from three neighbouring republics into one system, but attributing production fi gures to republics and recording on state levels
(Fig. 9.5 ). The success of Uzbekistan’s economy was solely judged upon cotton
production (Obertreis 2007 , p. 171). Indigenous knowledge and local expertise
were completely refuted; modernisation strategies based on science and technology
were expected to replace and surpass them. Jonathan Thurman is explicit in stating
about Fergana: “[…] the ‘cradle’ of irrigated cotton growing in Central Asia.
Indigenous modes of organisation that effectively fostered farmer participation here
were undermined by a colonising power, which transformed them into statedominated organisations incapable of effective management” (Thurman 1999 , p. iv).
The quest for modernisation was the same in Tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union.
Both regimes utilised Central Asia as supplier of raw materials needed for its
H. Kreutzmann