widely discussed and the source of many industrial initiatives. This was the case in
France, where the creation of the Institut pour une Culture de Sécurité Industrielle
[Institute for an Industrial Safety Culture] followed the AZF accident on 21
September 2001.
These wide-ranging conceptual developments, which attempted to limit major
disasters, are marked by the creation of methodologies for the observation of high
operational reliability in organizations, in order to understand their characteristics
and eventually design prescriptive operational principles. The emergence of High
Reliability Organizations (HRO) [7] in the 1990s was a major advance on Perrow’s
work and the fatalistic vision of the ‘normal’ accident. However, despite an
unprecedented observation methodology, researchers themselves were forced to
admit that it was not possible to develop a theory of HROs, although they constitute
an important set of case studies on high-risk, high reliability organizations.
Nevertheless, this work has served as the basis for many industrial studies by
organizations that want to change and improve their level of safety culture, for
example in the oil sector.
In the 2000s, resilience engineering would once again change perceptions of
safety systems. Hollnagel [8] argued for the understanding of the day-to-day
operation of systems, through the study of system successes rather than failures.
This understanding of the capacity of a system to anticipate an accident and to react
to adverse events constituted an important development in the management of
at-risk systems and major accidents.
The aim of these various currents of research was to provide a better understanding of at-risk systems during both routine operations and in times of crisis. The
work of sociologists would lead to the emergence of established concepts from the
sociology of organizations. The next section presents a summary of French
research, in particular the school of social regulation, which emphasizes the
negotiated dimension of safety systems.
3 The Sociology of Organizations and at-Risk Industries
In the late 1990s, Bourrier [9] carried out a study of American and French nuclear
plants. This study would conclude that, far from being HROs, nuclear power plants
were normal organizations, given what was known about the sociology of organizations. Specifically, normal organizations are the result of the negotiations and
strategies undertaken by their actors. Such organizations may be the source of
virtuous ecosystems, although their managers may not be aware of it.
We also found, in our study of the decommissioning of a nuclear plant, that the
plant’s informal organization may be relevant driver of safety [10].
In the French school of the sociology of organizations, this dimension of an
organization that does not fully meet the prescribed, formal requirements of managers is well-known. Crozier and Friedberg developed and demonstrated a theory concerning the strategies of actors and power relations in organizations [11].
Consequences of Severe Nuclear Accidents …
49
France, where the creation of the Institut pour une Culture de Sécurité Industrielle
[Institute for an Industrial Safety Culture] followed the AZF accident on 21
September 2001.
These wide-ranging conceptual developments, which attempted to limit major
disasters, are marked by the creation of methodologies for the observation of high
operational reliability in organizations, in order to understand their characteristics
and eventually design prescriptive operational principles. The emergence of High
Reliability Organizations (HRO) [7] in the 1990s was a major advance on Perrow’s
work and the fatalistic vision of the ‘normal’ accident. However, despite an
unprecedented observation methodology, researchers themselves were forced to
admit that it was not possible to develop a theory of HROs, although they constitute
an important set of case studies on high-risk, high reliability organizations.
Nevertheless, this work has served as the basis for many industrial studies by
organizations that want to change and improve their level of safety culture, for
example in the oil sector.
In the 2000s, resilience engineering would once again change perceptions of
safety systems. Hollnagel [8] argued for the understanding of the day-to-day
operation of systems, through the study of system successes rather than failures.
This understanding of the capacity of a system to anticipate an accident and to react
to adverse events constituted an important development in the management of
at-risk systems and major accidents.
The aim of these various currents of research was to provide a better understanding of at-risk systems during both routine operations and in times of crisis. The
work of sociologists would lead to the emergence of established concepts from the
sociology of organizations. The next section presents a summary of French
research, in particular the school of social regulation, which emphasizes the
negotiated dimension of safety systems.
3 The Sociology of Organizations and at-Risk Industries
In the late 1990s, Bourrier [9] carried out a study of American and French nuclear
plants. This study would conclude that, far from being HROs, nuclear power plants
were normal organizations, given what was known about the sociology of organizations. Specifically, normal organizations are the result of the negotiations and
strategies undertaken by their actors. Such organizations may be the source of
virtuous ecosystems, although their managers may not be aware of it.
We also found, in our study of the decommissioning of a nuclear plant, that the
plant’s informal organization may be relevant driver of safety [10].
In the French school of the sociology of organizations, this dimension of an
organization that does not fully meet the prescribed, formal requirements of managers is well-known. Crozier and Friedberg developed and demonstrated a theory concerning the strategies of actors and power relations in organizations [11].
Consequences of Severe Nuclear Accidents …
49