The work of de Terssac [1], particularly following the explosion of the AZF factory
in France, refers to the negotiated dimension of safety in relation to social regulation theory. This theory argues that rules can be revisited and that they are the
result of negotiations between actors. They structure collective action, while
independent initiatives can create conflict with external controls. How the system is
regulated becomes the result of compromise and negotiations between these two
forms of regulation.
de Terssac [1] highlights the development of everyday safety in a factory,
beginning with negotiations between workers and supervisors. He clarifies what he
calls “safety manufacture”, which does not depend on prescriptive procedures that
explain what safe behaviour is, but is the result of rules that are supplemented and
negotiated by users. For the author, “safety in action” is the ability to decide
whether (or not) to apply a safety rule and adapt it to the context. Different actors in
the organization will have different ideas of safety that are linked to their role in the
company. Safety culture results from the comparison of these different ideas.
An at-risk organization is not therefore fundamentally different to a normal
organization, although it has its own characteristics. The study of such organizations simply considers that during normal operations, what is prescribed has been
negotiated and adapted to the situation on the ground, and that these adjustments are
part of the daily life of the organization.
It therefore seems appropriate to ask whether maintaining this shared safety
culture after a major accident is an element of system resilience. Specifically, do
negotiated rules make the organisation better able to anticipate and adapt or, on the
contrary, must the organization resort to extremely strict procedures to manage a
major disaster?
The Fukushima Daiichi accident required rules to be adapted to the realities of
the situation regardless of the procedures to be followed in an emergency. The next
section highlights the decisions taken by the plant’s Director in the application of
the venting procedure and cooling the reactors with seawater. We show that in a
post-accident situation, assessments of procedures are a function of the context,
notably with respect to the positions occupied by actors.
4 Following the Rules, Post-Accident
In a crisis, where nothing corresponds to any previous situation, it seems foolish to
guide behaviour with reference to known procedures. The management of the
Fukushima Daiichi crisis showed that certain actions taken by the plant’s crisis unit
and its Director were taken in the light of their knowledge of the status of the
system—and that their understanding was different to that of governmental
authorities and TEPCO [12]. During the hearings that followed the accident, the
plant’s Director stated that technical problems were encountered during the venting
procedure that even he was not able to grasp because the crisis unit was too far
away from where the action was happening. Therefore, he initially tried to follow
50
C. Martin
in France, refers to the negotiated dimension of safety in relation to social regulation theory. This theory argues that rules can be revisited and that they are the
result of negotiations between actors. They structure collective action, while
independent initiatives can create conflict with external controls. How the system is
regulated becomes the result of compromise and negotiations between these two
forms of regulation.
de Terssac [1] highlights the development of everyday safety in a factory,
beginning with negotiations between workers and supervisors. He clarifies what he
calls “safety manufacture”, which does not depend on prescriptive procedures that
explain what safe behaviour is, but is the result of rules that are supplemented and
negotiated by users. For the author, “safety in action” is the ability to decide
whether (or not) to apply a safety rule and adapt it to the context. Different actors in
the organization will have different ideas of safety that are linked to their role in the
company. Safety culture results from the comparison of these different ideas.
An at-risk organization is not therefore fundamentally different to a normal
organization, although it has its own characteristics. The study of such organizations simply considers that during normal operations, what is prescribed has been
negotiated and adapted to the situation on the ground, and that these adjustments are
part of the daily life of the organization.
It therefore seems appropriate to ask whether maintaining this shared safety
culture after a major accident is an element of system resilience. Specifically, do
negotiated rules make the organisation better able to anticipate and adapt or, on the
contrary, must the organization resort to extremely strict procedures to manage a
major disaster?
The Fukushima Daiichi accident required rules to be adapted to the realities of
the situation regardless of the procedures to be followed in an emergency. The next
section highlights the decisions taken by the plant’s Director in the application of
the venting procedure and cooling the reactors with seawater. We show that in a
post-accident situation, assessments of procedures are a function of the context,
notably with respect to the positions occupied by actors.
4 Following the Rules, Post-Accident
In a crisis, where nothing corresponds to any previous situation, it seems foolish to
guide behaviour with reference to known procedures. The management of the
Fukushima Daiichi crisis showed that certain actions taken by the plant’s crisis unit
and its Director were taken in the light of their knowledge of the status of the
system—and that their understanding was different to that of governmental
authorities and TEPCO [12]. During the hearings that followed the accident, the
plant’s Director stated that technical problems were encountered during the venting
procedure that even he was not able to grasp because the crisis unit was too far
away from where the action was happening. Therefore, he initially tried to follow
50
C. Martin