negotiation of prescribed regulations, what de Terssac [1] describes as a consequence of social regulation [2].
The arguments used in this chapter are based on a reinterpretation of major
industrial accidents in terms of the sociology of organizations; in particular we aim
to establish bridges between knowledge of the organization’s operations, and the
restructuring of organizational ecosystems during the management of a crisis. We
argue that modes of social regulation that enable prescriptive orders to be adapted to
the daily work of organizations can play a positive role in the capacity of systems to
anticipate and adapt, which in turn creates resilience.
This paper begins with a brief review of some major industrial accidents in order
to highlight the main phases of research in the social sciences. It discusses the
contribution of the sociology of organizations, particularly the French school of
strategic analysis and social regulation, which examines in fine the role of social
regulation in understanding both operational systems and the post-accident period.
2 Major Industrial Accidents and Changing Paradigms
The major accidents that have occurred over the past four decades have changed the
research paradigms used in risk management. They have influenced industry
practice both in terms of analytical tools and management culture. The engineering
culture that dominated safety decisions opened a door to the humanities and led to
the development of cross-cutting approaches that could address system complexity.
This section presents a brief history of this evolution.
The industrial accident at Three Mile Island (TMI) was the origin for a profound
examination of the organizational dimension of accidents (although it did not lead
to work on prescriptive organizational design). Perrow [3] describes complex
systems with a high potential for disaster and highlights the systemic dimension of
accidents in tightly coupled systems where trivial errors can interact and lead to an
unwanted event. However, according to Perrow [3] these systems only concern the
‘normal’ accident. This unacceptable sociological approach, in a society where risk
management is a corollary to technology, was nevertheless, the starting point for the
growing interest of sociologists in at-risk organizations.
This appeal to the sociologists of organizations would be reiterated by Reason
[4]. Having observed the limits of engineering and cognitive science in understanding the Chernobyl accident, he used theories from sociology in order to
understand and track the latent errors that hide at all levels of the system and (using
the cancer model), interact with one last operator, resulting in disaster. Reason’s
well-known ‘Swiss Cheese’ model would lead to the development of many audit
methods that aimed to detect weaknesses in the system. The Tripod method [5] is
one example.
Moreover, the Chernobyl accident was the origin of the concept of safety culture
[6] and would lead to further work on its definition in both high-risk organizations
and industry in general. The importance of the safety culture concept would be
48
C. Martin
The arguments used in this chapter are based on a reinterpretation of major
industrial accidents in terms of the sociology of organizations; in particular we aim
to establish bridges between knowledge of the organization’s operations, and the
restructuring of organizational ecosystems during the management of a crisis. We
argue that modes of social regulation that enable prescriptive orders to be adapted to
the daily work of organizations can play a positive role in the capacity of systems to
anticipate and adapt, which in turn creates resilience.
This paper begins with a brief review of some major industrial accidents in order
to highlight the main phases of research in the social sciences. It discusses the
contribution of the sociology of organizations, particularly the French school of
strategic analysis and social regulation, which examines in fine the role of social
regulation in understanding both operational systems and the post-accident period.
2 Major Industrial Accidents and Changing Paradigms
The major accidents that have occurred over the past four decades have changed the
research paradigms used in risk management. They have influenced industry
practice both in terms of analytical tools and management culture. The engineering
culture that dominated safety decisions opened a door to the humanities and led to
the development of cross-cutting approaches that could address system complexity.
This section presents a brief history of this evolution.
The industrial accident at Three Mile Island (TMI) was the origin for a profound
examination of the organizational dimension of accidents (although it did not lead
to work on prescriptive organizational design). Perrow [3] describes complex
systems with a high potential for disaster and highlights the systemic dimension of
accidents in tightly coupled systems where trivial errors can interact and lead to an
unwanted event. However, according to Perrow [3] these systems only concern the
‘normal’ accident. This unacceptable sociological approach, in a society where risk
management is a corollary to technology, was nevertheless, the starting point for the
growing interest of sociologists in at-risk organizations.
This appeal to the sociologists of organizations would be reiterated by Reason
[4]. Having observed the limits of engineering and cognitive science in understanding the Chernobyl accident, he used theories from sociology in order to
understand and track the latent errors that hide at all levels of the system and (using
the cancer model), interact with one last operator, resulting in disaster. Reason’s
well-known ‘Swiss Cheese’ model would lead to the development of many audit
methods that aimed to detect weaknesses in the system. The Tripod method [5] is
one example.
Moreover, the Chernobyl accident was the origin of the concept of safety culture
[6] and would lead to further work on its definition in both high-risk organizations
and industry in general. The importance of the safety culture concept would be
48
C. Martin