Consequences of Severe Nuclear Accidents
on Social Regulations in Socio-Technical
Organizations
Christophe Martin
Abstract Major nuclear accidents have generated an abundant literature in the
social sciences. They are the source of many key concepts that have led to studies of
the organization and its links to system safety. Social psychology and sociology
have shown that such bodies have their own modes of organization; while resilience
engineering has hypothesized that they have the capacity to learn from the past and
anticipate potential causes of serious damage. This paper revisits some major
contemporary accidents, notably the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear
power plant, through an analysis of the resilience capacity of systems in terms of
the sociology of organizations and especially, social regulation.
Keywords Industrial disaster Á Social regulation Á Resilience engineering Á
Negotiation Á Independence
1 Introduction
The major industrial accidents of the 20th and 21st centuries have been the source
of a variety of interpretations. Technological causes initially held the top spot.
However, it was subsequently agreed that human factors were a major cause of
disaster in these complex technological systems leading, ultimately, to the idea that
the causes of accidents could be found at the organizational level. Here, we do not
offer an exhaustive overview of work that has modernised performance factors at
the organizational level in at-risk industries; instead we present arguments from the
sociology of organizations in order to better understand how the day-to-day work of
organizations complements or substitutes what is prescribed, either to adapt to
operational necessities, or in an emergency. In other words, is post-accident management possible based on “safety in action”, which finds its foundations the
C. Martin (&)
Centre for Research on Risks and Crises (CRC), MINES ParisTech/PSL Research University,
Paris, France
e-mail: Christophe.martin@mines-paristech.fr
© The Author(s) 2017
J. Ahn et al. (eds.), Resilience: A New Paradigm of Nuclear Safety,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-58768-4_4
47
on Social Regulations in Socio-Technical
Organizations
Christophe Martin
Abstract Major nuclear accidents have generated an abundant literature in the
social sciences. They are the source of many key concepts that have led to studies of
the organization and its links to system safety. Social psychology and sociology
have shown that such bodies have their own modes of organization; while resilience
engineering has hypothesized that they have the capacity to learn from the past and
anticipate potential causes of serious damage. This paper revisits some major
contemporary accidents, notably the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear
power plant, through an analysis of the resilience capacity of systems in terms of
the sociology of organizations and especially, social regulation.
Keywords Industrial disaster Á Social regulation Á Resilience engineering Á
Negotiation Á Independence
1 Introduction
The major industrial accidents of the 20th and 21st centuries have been the source
of a variety of interpretations. Technological causes initially held the top spot.
However, it was subsequently agreed that human factors were a major cause of
disaster in these complex technological systems leading, ultimately, to the idea that
the causes of accidents could be found at the organizational level. Here, we do not
offer an exhaustive overview of work that has modernised performance factors at
the organizational level in at-risk industries; instead we present arguments from the
sociology of organizations in order to better understand how the day-to-day work of
organizations complements or substitutes what is prescribed, either to adapt to
operational necessities, or in an emergency. In other words, is post-accident management possible based on “safety in action”, which finds its foundations the
C. Martin (&)
Centre for Research on Risks and Crises (CRC), MINES ParisTech/PSL Research University,
Paris, France
e-mail: Christophe.martin@mines-paristech.fr
© The Author(s) 2017
J. Ahn et al. (eds.), Resilience: A New Paradigm of Nuclear Safety,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-58768-4_4
47