access to toilets and additional emergency rescue teams [8], which could have been
better solved locally.
However, in a nuclear crisis decentralized management is not sufficient for
success. The Chernobyl catastrophe was primarily managed in a decentralized way
and clearly ended in failure. “The accident analyzes give the impression that the
workers at the bottom of the ladder ran the system in their own way, trying to cope
with the facility, to gain time and to fix things, incredible acrobatics” [40].
Moreover, the arrival of engineers from Moscow proved ineffective as they were
highly specialized in electro-mechanics and not the operation of a nuclear reactor
(and knew even less about nuclear safety). Consequently, this failure of decentralized management at Chernobyl led operators and regulatory authorities to favor
a technical approach that limited the room for maneuver of operational staff.
However, the Fukushima Daiichi accident poses a challenge to this approach.
Beyond the issue of decentralization, entry into resilience also raises new
questions on the theoretical level, notably regarding the path of this “entry” and the
definition of a space dedicated to it. This requires a change in the formalization of
objectives, and consequently the trajectory of the socio-technical system [32]. The
approach differs from ecological definitions of the concept of resilience that tend to
focus on the capacity (or not) of a community or group to confront and overcome
adversity, and therefore to enter into resilience. A perspective framed in terms of
trajectory places the emphasis on essential and vital functions that must continue
after a crisis, something that seems more relevant in the framework of successful
entry into resilience. Moreover, this trajectory must move in the direction of a
“basin of attraction” in which systems tend to reach equilibrium [33]. This equilibrium must play the role of attractor in guiding the trajectory of entry into resilience and result in “stability landscapes” that are defined by clear boundaries.
Stabilization can be disrupted [67] by both external elements (for example,
conflicting orders from headquarters or the government) and internal elements (for
example, lack of data, or undue, and ultimately mistaken reliance on information
provided by a sensor).
In practice, the path is more like a rotary (roundabout) than it is linear [68], as
each actor can enter or leave at any point to enter into resilience, while a kind of
‘insider/outsider’ dynamic can be implemented in neighboring communities. The
trajectory can also be oriented in such a way as to fill the structural voids at the
borders of organizational units [69], which become strategic hubs. A risk related to
the orientation of this trajectory is ‘destinationism’ [41], which consists in having
an excessive focus on the target to be met. However, in the case of an extreme
situation that is highly unstable, it is sometimes necessary to adjust the target.
Finally, establishing a clear and limited objective presupposes that complex,
uncontrolled interactions can be understood.
The capacity to implement a “pivot strategy” is essential. This strategy can
increase “resilience capital” [70] and as a result facilitate entry into resilience. To
extend and improve resilience, organizations must also encourage heretical questions at operational levels [71].
10
F. Guarnieri
better solved locally.
However, in a nuclear crisis decentralized management is not sufficient for
success. The Chernobyl catastrophe was primarily managed in a decentralized way
and clearly ended in failure. “The accident analyzes give the impression that the
workers at the bottom of the ladder ran the system in their own way, trying to cope
with the facility, to gain time and to fix things, incredible acrobatics” [40].
Moreover, the arrival of engineers from Moscow proved ineffective as they were
highly specialized in electro-mechanics and not the operation of a nuclear reactor
(and knew even less about nuclear safety). Consequently, this failure of decentralized management at Chernobyl led operators and regulatory authorities to favor
a technical approach that limited the room for maneuver of operational staff.
However, the Fukushima Daiichi accident poses a challenge to this approach.
Beyond the issue of decentralization, entry into resilience also raises new
questions on the theoretical level, notably regarding the path of this “entry” and the
definition of a space dedicated to it. This requires a change in the formalization of
objectives, and consequently the trajectory of the socio-technical system [32]. The
approach differs from ecological definitions of the concept of resilience that tend to
focus on the capacity (or not) of a community or group to confront and overcome
adversity, and therefore to enter into resilience. A perspective framed in terms of
trajectory places the emphasis on essential and vital functions that must continue
after a crisis, something that seems more relevant in the framework of successful
entry into resilience. Moreover, this trajectory must move in the direction of a
“basin of attraction” in which systems tend to reach equilibrium [33]. This equilibrium must play the role of attractor in guiding the trajectory of entry into resilience and result in “stability landscapes” that are defined by clear boundaries.
Stabilization can be disrupted [67] by both external elements (for example,
conflicting orders from headquarters or the government) and internal elements (for
example, lack of data, or undue, and ultimately mistaken reliance on information
provided by a sensor).
In practice, the path is more like a rotary (roundabout) than it is linear [68], as
each actor can enter or leave at any point to enter into resilience, while a kind of
‘insider/outsider’ dynamic can be implemented in neighboring communities. The
trajectory can also be oriented in such a way as to fill the structural voids at the
borders of organizational units [69], which become strategic hubs. A risk related to
the orientation of this trajectory is ‘destinationism’ [41], which consists in having
an excessive focus on the target to be met. However, in the case of an extreme
situation that is highly unstable, it is sometimes necessary to adjust the target.
Finally, establishing a clear and limited objective presupposes that complex,
uncontrolled interactions can be understood.
The capacity to implement a “pivot strategy” is essential. This strategy can
increase “resilience capital” [70] and as a result facilitate entry into resilience. To
extend and improve resilience, organizations must also encourage heretical questions at operational levels [71].
10
F. Guarnieri