from headquarters. The notable example is when he decided to continue (after
checking with his subordinate) operations to inject seawater to cool Reactor 2 [62].
However, most of the local initiatives taken by Masao Yoshida only proved relevant in a posteriori debates and controversies. An example is his decision to move
skilled workers from Reactor 1 to a more secure building further away for their own
protection. Paradoxically, some of these workers criticized the decision, which they
perceived as demeaning [61].
It can be difficult to identify the perimeter of the local zone, and a fortiori that of
the zone for entry into resilience. Nevertheless, it seems very likely that it should be
as close as possible to where the accident took place. Thus, for example, the support
of the United States (which is also indicative of an ambiguous state of dependency)
was not always very useful. An example is that American authorities initiated the
assembly of four water pumping systems for each of the plant’s ponds. However, on
March 18, 2011, when the parts had already been assembled in Australia and were
waiting to be transferred by plane to Japan, the Americans learned that the Tokyo
Fire Department had been able to build a pump that was similar to the equipment
already used at the site [63]. This failure can be explained by the argument that the
nuclear industry is “essentially a centralized energy” [59]. A crisis of the magnitude
of Fukushima Daiichi requires a level of decentralization that is not found in its
culture. The extent of this centralization is most clearly seen at the time when the
crisis began (between Friday, March 11 and March 12 at 10 am), when TEPCO’s
most senior managers, Tsunehisa Katsumata (Chairman) and Masataka Shimizu
(President), were respectively on business trips to China and Nara (an historical
Japanese city) [64]. Their absence meant that TEPCO was unable to make quick
decisions. This trend towards centralization often results from an exaggerated fear
of panic, which must be avoided at all costs, but that actually occurs very rarely
[65].
The importance of the local management of the crisis at Fukushima Daiichi has
been highlighted in numerous analyzes and reports [9]. Following the catastrophe,
some countries re-evaluated the size and nature of their emergency evacuation zone,
according to the country and the geographical context of its nuclear plants.
Developing cooperation with neighboring countries in the case of emergencies has
become a new priority, in particular joint maneuvers and exercises.
Local solutions must therefore be established to facilitate and accelerate entry
into resilience. These solutions can, for example, be based on the pertinent criterion
of “concentration” [65] (of energy, populations and decision-making powers).
In this context, the concept of Community Building Recovery Corporations
(CBRC) [66] seems to be relevant. It is based on three levers: change, community
and leadership. Economic reconstruction (i.e. post-accident) is established on a
local level with the support of citizens in a combined public-private approach. The
resources that are mobilized are primarily local, guided by the principle of a high
level of creativity in their implementation. The Fukushima accident demonstrates
the usefulness of the CBRC concept, as the main challenges concerned not only
electricity and information, but also the more basic problems of a lack of food,
The Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Accident: Entering …
9
checking with his subordinate) operations to inject seawater to cool Reactor 2 [62].
However, most of the local initiatives taken by Masao Yoshida only proved relevant in a posteriori debates and controversies. An example is his decision to move
skilled workers from Reactor 1 to a more secure building further away for their own
protection. Paradoxically, some of these workers criticized the decision, which they
perceived as demeaning [61].
It can be difficult to identify the perimeter of the local zone, and a fortiori that of
the zone for entry into resilience. Nevertheless, it seems very likely that it should be
as close as possible to where the accident took place. Thus, for example, the support
of the United States (which is also indicative of an ambiguous state of dependency)
was not always very useful. An example is that American authorities initiated the
assembly of four water pumping systems for each of the plant’s ponds. However, on
March 18, 2011, when the parts had already been assembled in Australia and were
waiting to be transferred by plane to Japan, the Americans learned that the Tokyo
Fire Department had been able to build a pump that was similar to the equipment
already used at the site [63]. This failure can be explained by the argument that the
nuclear industry is “essentially a centralized energy” [59]. A crisis of the magnitude
of Fukushima Daiichi requires a level of decentralization that is not found in its
culture. The extent of this centralization is most clearly seen at the time when the
crisis began (between Friday, March 11 and March 12 at 10 am), when TEPCO’s
most senior managers, Tsunehisa Katsumata (Chairman) and Masataka Shimizu
(President), were respectively on business trips to China and Nara (an historical
Japanese city) [64]. Their absence meant that TEPCO was unable to make quick
decisions. This trend towards centralization often results from an exaggerated fear
of panic, which must be avoided at all costs, but that actually occurs very rarely
[65].
The importance of the local management of the crisis at Fukushima Daiichi has
been highlighted in numerous analyzes and reports [9]. Following the catastrophe,
some countries re-evaluated the size and nature of their emergency evacuation zone,
according to the country and the geographical context of its nuclear plants.
Developing cooperation with neighboring countries in the case of emergencies has
become a new priority, in particular joint maneuvers and exercises.
Local solutions must therefore be established to facilitate and accelerate entry
into resilience. These solutions can, for example, be based on the pertinent criterion
of “concentration” [65] (of energy, populations and decision-making powers).
In this context, the concept of Community Building Recovery Corporations
(CBRC) [66] seems to be relevant. It is based on three levers: change, community
and leadership. Economic reconstruction (i.e. post-accident) is established on a
local level with the support of citizens in a combined public-private approach. The
resources that are mobilized are primarily local, guided by the principle of a high
level of creativity in their implementation. The Fukushima accident demonstrates
the usefulness of the CBRC concept, as the main challenges concerned not only
electricity and information, but also the more basic problems of a lack of food,
The Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Accident: Entering …
9