We now address the question of the formalization of a space dedicated to
resilience and entry into it.
“Scoping” [72] is designed to clarify the boundaries of the organization in
relation to a given area. In the case of a nuclear accident, although the management
of the organization is limited to certain target areas, it is important to maintain a
holistic view of the crisis. The Cynefin model [73], for example, distinguishes four
categories of context that can help in understanding an extreme situation:
• Chaotic context: there does not seem to be any link between causes and their
effects. The available concepts are useless. An open-minded approach, focused
on investigation and exploration is essential before taking decisive action and
analyzing its effects. Under time pressure, action must be both rapid and carefully considered.
• Complex context: there are multiple interactions between causes and their
consequences but it is impossible to precisely model or predict the impact of an
initiative on the system. In this context, an insightful and flexible exploratory
analysis should be carried out.
• Knowable context: the relation between cause and effect can be assessed but
there is not enough data to be able to evaluate the situation.
• Known context: the relation between cause and effect is predetermined.
From the perspective of trajectory, entry into resilience consists in moving from
a chaotic context to a complex context. The situation at Fukushima Daiichi will
only be fully brought under control when a known context is achieved. Current
conditions at the site are still complex and fragile: the return to a chaotic context
cannot be excluded if, for example, another major earthquake occurs. This shows
that entry into resilience does not guarantee a sustainable trajectory in the long term.
It is important to note that the transition from one context to another or, more
generally, entry into resilience implies a period of adaptive research. During this
period, actors establish trade-offs as a function of boundaries between acceptable
and non-acceptable performance [74]. If it proves impossible to avoid crossing a
boundary, an error or accident may occur. There is therefore a ‘dead point’, beyond
which entry into resilience reaches a point of no return and will fail. This point
represents a threshold where any system that “crosses this fine line of reversibility,
contradiction, questioning” will “enter, living, into its own frenzied contradiction…” [48] and ultimately perish.
Therefore, entry into resilience implies that the actors know how to delimit the
intervention space and can establish boundaries beyond which the situation is
irreversible. In an emergency, it is likely that in most cases the concept of entry into
resilience and its relation to boundaries is metaphoric, and cannot be quantified in
terms of risk [32]. Nevertheless, the understanding of risk must be communicated
internally to actors at all levels of managerial responsibility [75].
We should not overestimate aspects of local culture in the management of
resilience and thus the establishment of a resilient space. It is more important to
observe the influence that certain forms of culture have on an organization.
The Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Accident: Entering …
11
resilience and entry into it.
“Scoping” [72] is designed to clarify the boundaries of the organization in
relation to a given area. In the case of a nuclear accident, although the management
of the organization is limited to certain target areas, it is important to maintain a
holistic view of the crisis. The Cynefin model [73], for example, distinguishes four
categories of context that can help in understanding an extreme situation:
• Chaotic context: there does not seem to be any link between causes and their
effects. The available concepts are useless. An open-minded approach, focused
on investigation and exploration is essential before taking decisive action and
analyzing its effects. Under time pressure, action must be both rapid and carefully considered.
• Complex context: there are multiple interactions between causes and their
consequences but it is impossible to precisely model or predict the impact of an
initiative on the system. In this context, an insightful and flexible exploratory
analysis should be carried out.
• Knowable context: the relation between cause and effect can be assessed but
there is not enough data to be able to evaluate the situation.
• Known context: the relation between cause and effect is predetermined.
From the perspective of trajectory, entry into resilience consists in moving from
a chaotic context to a complex context. The situation at Fukushima Daiichi will
only be fully brought under control when a known context is achieved. Current
conditions at the site are still complex and fragile: the return to a chaotic context
cannot be excluded if, for example, another major earthquake occurs. This shows
that entry into resilience does not guarantee a sustainable trajectory in the long term.
It is important to note that the transition from one context to another or, more
generally, entry into resilience implies a period of adaptive research. During this
period, actors establish trade-offs as a function of boundaries between acceptable
and non-acceptable performance [74]. If it proves impossible to avoid crossing a
boundary, an error or accident may occur. There is therefore a ‘dead point’, beyond
which entry into resilience reaches a point of no return and will fail. This point
represents a threshold where any system that “crosses this fine line of reversibility,
contradiction, questioning” will “enter, living, into its own frenzied contradiction…” [48] and ultimately perish.
Therefore, entry into resilience implies that the actors know how to delimit the
intervention space and can establish boundaries beyond which the situation is
irreversible. In an emergency, it is likely that in most cases the concept of entry into
resilience and its relation to boundaries is metaphoric, and cannot be quantified in
terms of risk [32]. Nevertheless, the understanding of risk must be communicated
internally to actors at all levels of managerial responsibility [75].
We should not overestimate aspects of local culture in the management of
resilience and thus the establishment of a resilient space. It is more important to
observe the influence that certain forms of culture have on an organization.
The Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Accident: Entering …
11