labeled as “unrealistic dreamer,” as Murakami [28] described after the disaster.
3
Nuclear phase-out was unthinkable to many Japanese.
This paradigm was to continue: A month before the March 11 disaster, the
Japanese government decided to extend the operation of existing nuclear power
plants, partly as a measure to reduce greenhouse gas emission. At the time of the
disaster, TEPCO had plans to start constructing two additional reactors at the
Daiichi (or 1F, or ichiefu, as it has been locally called) site the following year. In
general, the predominant political discourse about nuclear energy centered on the
following ideas: (a) it is a source of stable supply; (b) it is economically efficient;
(c) it produces zero carbon emission; and (d) by ensuring safety and gaining public
understanding, we need to expand it. For instance, in the 2010 Basic Energy Plan,
long-term energy plans announced every several years, nuclear energy was categorized as “non-fossil” and “zero-emission sources” together with “renewable
energy,” and it was proposed that the ratio of these two types of energy be raised
from the then 34% to more than 50% by 2020, and about 70% by 2030.
4 The Plan
stipulated that more nuclear power stations (“at least 14 reactors”) be built and the
operating rate of the facilities be increased (to “about 90%”) by 2030, while gaining
public understanding and trust, especially of local residents, and on the condition of
ensuring safety.
At the time, for the government and other proponents of nuclear power production, it was linked to the nationhood both as an indispensable technology that
allowed the country with scarce natural resources to prosper and as a technological
domain in which Japan excelled. This is evident in the 2006 “Nuclear Power
Nation-Building Plan,” a report submitted by the Nuclear Energy Subcommittee in
the Advisory Committee for Natural Resources and Energy.
5 The plan urges Japan
to increase the share of nuclear power, spread its nuclear technology globally, and
contribute to nuclear non-proliferation. Similarly, in his ill-timed book, writer-critic
Toyota [37] argued that Japan’s nuclear technology was the safest in the world and
that the country should promote it both for the economic gains and for the good of
humanity, such as a solution to climate challenges.
Organized opponents existed throughout Japan, though marginalized as
Luddites, hippies, or “unrealistic dreamers.” They had called attention to various
issues of concern, such as unfounded “safety myth,” the insularity of the nuclear
community as “village,” and the industry “capture” of policy processes (e.g., [10,
23])—many of these have become accepted as shared understandings after the 2011
accident, even presented by major investigative reports put out in 2012 by the Diet,
the Cabinet, and a private foundation.
3
Murakami’s speech in Barcelona on June 9, 2011, upon receiving the International Catalunya
Prize.
4
http://www.enecho.meti.go.jp/topics/kihonkeikaku/100618honbun.pdf (Last accessed on May 28,
2015).
5
http://www.enecho.meti.go.jp/topics/images/060901-keikaku.pdf (Last accessed on May 28,
2015) Based on the Framework for Nuclear Energy Policy, approved by the Cabinet in October
2005.
198
K. Sato
3
Nuclear phase-out was unthinkable to many Japanese.
This paradigm was to continue: A month before the March 11 disaster, the
Japanese government decided to extend the operation of existing nuclear power
plants, partly as a measure to reduce greenhouse gas emission. At the time of the
disaster, TEPCO had plans to start constructing two additional reactors at the
Daiichi (or 1F, or ichiefu, as it has been locally called) site the following year. In
general, the predominant political discourse about nuclear energy centered on the
following ideas: (a) it is a source of stable supply; (b) it is economically efficient;
(c) it produces zero carbon emission; and (d) by ensuring safety and gaining public
understanding, we need to expand it. For instance, in the 2010 Basic Energy Plan,
long-term energy plans announced every several years, nuclear energy was categorized as “non-fossil” and “zero-emission sources” together with “renewable
energy,” and it was proposed that the ratio of these two types of energy be raised
from the then 34% to more than 50% by 2020, and about 70% by 2030.
4 The Plan
stipulated that more nuclear power stations (“at least 14 reactors”) be built and the
operating rate of the facilities be increased (to “about 90%”) by 2030, while gaining
public understanding and trust, especially of local residents, and on the condition of
ensuring safety.
At the time, for the government and other proponents of nuclear power production, it was linked to the nationhood both as an indispensable technology that
allowed the country with scarce natural resources to prosper and as a technological
domain in which Japan excelled. This is evident in the 2006 “Nuclear Power
Nation-Building Plan,” a report submitted by the Nuclear Energy Subcommittee in
the Advisory Committee for Natural Resources and Energy.
5 The plan urges Japan
to increase the share of nuclear power, spread its nuclear technology globally, and
contribute to nuclear non-proliferation. Similarly, in his ill-timed book, writer-critic
Toyota [37] argued that Japan’s nuclear technology was the safest in the world and
that the country should promote it both for the economic gains and for the good of
humanity, such as a solution to climate challenges.
Organized opponents existed throughout Japan, though marginalized as
Luddites, hippies, or “unrealistic dreamers.” They had called attention to various
issues of concern, such as unfounded “safety myth,” the insularity of the nuclear
community as “village,” and the industry “capture” of policy processes (e.g., [10,
23])—many of these have become accepted as shared understandings after the 2011
accident, even presented by major investigative reports put out in 2012 by the Diet,
the Cabinet, and a private foundation.
3
Murakami’s speech in Barcelona on June 9, 2011, upon receiving the International Catalunya
Prize.
4
http://www.enecho.meti.go.jp/topics/kihonkeikaku/100618honbun.pdf (Last accessed on May 28,
2015).
5
http://www.enecho.meti.go.jp/topics/images/060901-keikaku.pdf (Last accessed on May 28,
2015) Based on the Framework for Nuclear Energy Policy, approved by the Cabinet in October
2005.
198
K. Sato