Notably, not only the general public, but also many activists against nuclear
power and weapons did not necessarily consider the two applications tightly connected. Even a great number of hibakusha and anti-nuclear weapons activists were
uncritical of nuclear energy production.
6 In a July 2011 interview, Terumi Tanaka,
Secretary General of Nihon Hidankyo (Japan Confederation of A- and H-Bomb
Sufferers Organizations), said: “I have been thinking since the nuclear accident,
perhaps we hibakusha may not have thought very much about nuclear power. These
days I think that we need to revisit and more thoroughly study the background of
the technology, the system of management, how the industry and government
addressed it, etc., and continue to debate about what we can say and do as hibakusha” (my translation).
7
In sum, in the pre-Fukushima dominant imaginaries, future Japan is ecological,
efficient, economically prosperous, and equipped with clean energy and strong
science and technology, and these objectives are facilitated by nuclear technology.
In this vision, technological prowess is an important part of the country’s national
identity (see Hecht [13] for the French case), and major social and economic
problems are solved by advances in science and technology, which are supported
by both the government and market forces.
Also implied in these imaginaries is the so-called “deficit model,” in which the
public’s skepticism toward and/or rejection of a specific scientific or technological
development is attributed to its ignorance and incomprehension. In this model,
knowledge is monopolized by experts, and solutions to the public objection consist
of educating them with more and better information about science and engineering
and raising their “literacy.” Scholars in the field of science and technology studies
(STS) have presented various critiques to this model, showing how sophisticated
and productive “lay” knowledge can be [9, 40, 41], how “local” and parochial—as
opposed to “universal”—expert knowledge can be [41], and how increased scientific “literacy” does not always lead to acceptance and appreciation of science and
technology [4]. These insights have problematized how decision-making about
science and technology—enormously consequential to the whole society—is left to
a small group of experts and the political and corporate elite, and challenged us to
explore more democratic approaches to science and technology. For instance, critics
of the deficit model have called for public engagement in various aspects of science
and engineering: not only final assessment of a given option for policymaking
objectives (e.g., public hearings, consensus conferences, deliberative polls), but also
6
One of them, Gensuikin (Japan Congress against A- and H-Bombs), has long been calling for
nuclear phase-out in energy production; it held its annual meeting in Fukushima in July 2013,
clearly signaling its opposition to the two related applications of nuclear technology. Another
group, Kakkin (National Council for Peace and against Nuclear Weapons), has long supported
“peaceful use” of nuclear technology, even after the 2011 disaster. The other group, Gensuikyo
(Japan Council against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs), has been cautiously against certain aspects
of nuclear power production, but has not opposed to the idea itself completely.
7
“Hoshasen to mukiai nagara ikiru: Fukushima Genpatsu jiko—Hibakusha to shite dou uketomeruka” Hidankyo Shimbun, August 2011 issue (No. 391).
Japan’s Nuclear Imaginaries Before and After Fukushima …
199
power and weapons did not necessarily consider the two applications tightly connected. Even a great number of hibakusha and anti-nuclear weapons activists were
uncritical of nuclear energy production.
6 In a July 2011 interview, Terumi Tanaka,
Secretary General of Nihon Hidankyo (Japan Confederation of A- and H-Bomb
Sufferers Organizations), said: “I have been thinking since the nuclear accident,
perhaps we hibakusha may not have thought very much about nuclear power. These
days I think that we need to revisit and more thoroughly study the background of
the technology, the system of management, how the industry and government
addressed it, etc., and continue to debate about what we can say and do as hibakusha” (my translation).
7
In sum, in the pre-Fukushima dominant imaginaries, future Japan is ecological,
efficient, economically prosperous, and equipped with clean energy and strong
science and technology, and these objectives are facilitated by nuclear technology.
In this vision, technological prowess is an important part of the country’s national
identity (see Hecht [13] for the French case), and major social and economic
problems are solved by advances in science and technology, which are supported
by both the government and market forces.
Also implied in these imaginaries is the so-called “deficit model,” in which the
public’s skepticism toward and/or rejection of a specific scientific or technological
development is attributed to its ignorance and incomprehension. In this model,
knowledge is monopolized by experts, and solutions to the public objection consist
of educating them with more and better information about science and engineering
and raising their “literacy.” Scholars in the field of science and technology studies
(STS) have presented various critiques to this model, showing how sophisticated
and productive “lay” knowledge can be [9, 40, 41], how “local” and parochial—as
opposed to “universal”—expert knowledge can be [41], and how increased scientific “literacy” does not always lead to acceptance and appreciation of science and
technology [4]. These insights have problematized how decision-making about
science and technology—enormously consequential to the whole society—is left to
a small group of experts and the political and corporate elite, and challenged us to
explore more democratic approaches to science and technology. For instance, critics
of the deficit model have called for public engagement in various aspects of science
and engineering: not only final assessment of a given option for policymaking
objectives (e.g., public hearings, consensus conferences, deliberative polls), but also
6
One of them, Gensuikin (Japan Congress against A- and H-Bombs), has long been calling for
nuclear phase-out in energy production; it held its annual meeting in Fukushima in July 2013,
clearly signaling its opposition to the two related applications of nuclear technology. Another
group, Kakkin (National Council for Peace and against Nuclear Weapons), has long supported
“peaceful use” of nuclear technology, even after the 2011 disaster. The other group, Gensuikyo
(Japan Council against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs), has been cautiously against certain aspects
of nuclear power production, but has not opposed to the idea itself completely.
7
“Hoshasen to mukiai nagara ikiru: Fukushima Genpatsu jiko—Hibakusha to shite dou uketomeruka” Hidankyo Shimbun, August 2011 issue (No. 391).
Japan’s Nuclear Imaginaries Before and After Fukushima …
199