anti-nuclear movement. Importantly, such imaginaries are variable across groups
within society; they are durable yet changeable; and they are not only descriptive,
but also prescriptive—engaging with what kinds of future should be pursued and
how they should be achieved through science and technology. They also encompass
shared fears of harms that might result from invention and innovation.
These recent insights both suggest that social imaginaries are consequential to
the future of the collectivity, whether by affecting resilience of a social group and
society as a whole, or by positing what futures are desirable and how to attain them
using science and technology. This calls for an explicit examination of Japan’s
nuclear imaginaries, both before and after the 2011 disaster. What visions of society
were pursued through nuclear technology? Who were imagined as relevant actors in
the development and regulation of nuclear power? How did nuclear imaginaries
enable and constrain capabilities of different actors? What visions do current politics and policy approaches embody? Do they facilitate resilience of communities
affected by the disaster? In the following, I present a few findings from a larger
project that systematically traces such imaginaries.
2 To clarify, different groups in
society might harbor and advocate different, competing imaginaries, but some can
be more dominant than others. Policy is a particularly important site that presents
and institutionalizes certain imaginaries as authoritative and representative.
2 Nuclear Imaginaries in Japan: At the Time of the 2011
Disaster in Fukushima
Among the most striking aspects of the way nuclear technology was imagined by
the general public in Japan right before the 2011 disaster are: (1) how decoupled
and dissociated nuclear energy production was from nuclear weapons; and (2) how
rarely the former was imagined at all. The public was overwhelmingly indifferent,
and took it for granted that there were 17 nuclear power plants (NPPs), supplying
30 percent of the country’s electricity. As former-nuclear-engineer-turned-opponent
Tanaka [43] argued, nuclear energy solicited little public attention: “what supports
the national policy to promote nuclear power more than anything is the unrecognized indifference of people in big cities” (my translation). Pointing out that none of
Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO)’s 17 reactors existed within the areas
(including Tokyo) to which the company supplied electricity—all were located in
Fukushima and Niigata Prefectures—he said, “We have 55 reactors, but most of us
live our daily life as if they don’t exist” (my translation). This was the climate in
which any critiques or even reservations about nuclear power would have one
2
Together with work with Jasanoff and Lamont, I am part of a multi-year project, “The Fukushima
Disaster and the Cultural Politics of Nuclear Power in the United States and Japan,” which traces
the development of dominant nuclear imaginaries in Japan and the United States. Our data include
media coverage, policy documents, organizational documents, interviews, and ethnographic data.
Japan’s Nuclear Imaginaries Before and After Fukushima …
197
within society; they are durable yet changeable; and they are not only descriptive,
but also prescriptive—engaging with what kinds of future should be pursued and
how they should be achieved through science and technology. They also encompass
shared fears of harms that might result from invention and innovation.
These recent insights both suggest that social imaginaries are consequential to
the future of the collectivity, whether by affecting resilience of a social group and
society as a whole, or by positing what futures are desirable and how to attain them
using science and technology. This calls for an explicit examination of Japan’s
nuclear imaginaries, both before and after the 2011 disaster. What visions of society
were pursued through nuclear technology? Who were imagined as relevant actors in
the development and regulation of nuclear power? How did nuclear imaginaries
enable and constrain capabilities of different actors? What visions do current politics and policy approaches embody? Do they facilitate resilience of communities
affected by the disaster? In the following, I present a few findings from a larger
project that systematically traces such imaginaries.
2 To clarify, different groups in
society might harbor and advocate different, competing imaginaries, but some can
be more dominant than others. Policy is a particularly important site that presents
and institutionalizes certain imaginaries as authoritative and representative.
2 Nuclear Imaginaries in Japan: At the Time of the 2011
Disaster in Fukushima
Among the most striking aspects of the way nuclear technology was imagined by
the general public in Japan right before the 2011 disaster are: (1) how decoupled
and dissociated nuclear energy production was from nuclear weapons; and (2) how
rarely the former was imagined at all. The public was overwhelmingly indifferent,
and took it for granted that there were 17 nuclear power plants (NPPs), supplying
30 percent of the country’s electricity. As former-nuclear-engineer-turned-opponent
Tanaka [43] argued, nuclear energy solicited little public attention: “what supports
the national policy to promote nuclear power more than anything is the unrecognized indifference of people in big cities” (my translation). Pointing out that none of
Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO)’s 17 reactors existed within the areas
(including Tokyo) to which the company supplied electricity—all were located in
Fukushima and Niigata Prefectures—he said, “We have 55 reactors, but most of us
live our daily life as if they don’t exist” (my translation). This was the climate in
which any critiques or even reservations about nuclear power would have one
2
Together with work with Jasanoff and Lamont, I am part of a multi-year project, “The Fukushima
Disaster and the Cultural Politics of Nuclear Power in the United States and Japan,” which traces
the development of dominant nuclear imaginaries in Japan and the United States. Our data include
media coverage, policy documents, organizational documents, interviews, and ethnographic data.
Japan’s Nuclear Imaginaries Before and After Fukushima …
197