well as collective representations and narratives about a society’s past, present, and
future—has become a common analytical tool in such fields as anthropology and
sociology.
Two recent insights regarding collective imaginaries are of particular relevance
in thinking about the Fukushima disaster and its aftermath. First, social imaginaries
are consequential for a group’s social resilience. Reviewing empirical works (including their own) on groups facing various adversities (e.g., poverty, health disparities, discrimination, marginalization), Hall and Lamont [11, 12] argue that
social imaginaries are constitutive of the collective capabilities of a community or
society, as they not only bind its members with narratives of its past accomplishments and a vision of what it means to belong to it, but also indicate how its
members understand what they are capable of doing together. Defining social resilience as “the capacity of groups of people bound together in organizations,
classes, racial groups, communities, or nations to sustain and advance their
well-being in the face of challenges” [11], they argue that imaginaries can provide
significant resources for such a capacity. For instance, social recognition and status
of a group—i.e., where it stands in collective imaginaries—shape capabilities of its
members by influencing how they can secure support from others, as well as how
they perceive their own efficacy [11]. Put another way, how collective imaginaries
specify and support group identities and define who qualify as valued members of
the collectivity can be direct sources of resilience for group members [12].
Conversely, when these imaginaries stigmatize a group, they constrain capabilities
of its members. At the same time, groups might turn to collective imaginaries for
tool to cope with difficulties: In coping with discrimination, members of
marginalized groups in the United States often rely on such cultural resources as
principles of equality as a key American creed (e.g., [26]), whereas a strong group
identity has been found to alleviate the impact of adverse experiences. In sum,
imaginaries serve as important resources—or constraints—for social resilience,
independently of and consequentially for a group’s access to material resources.
Second, imaginaries play a significant role in the way a society addresses science
and technology. Jasanoff ([17]; also see Jasanoff and Kim [18]) argues that visions
of future developments in science and technology are inevitably and intricately
connected to collective visions of good and attainable futures, positing a concept of
“sociotechnical imaginaries.” Defined as “collectively held, institutionally stabilized, and publicly performed visions of desirable futures, animated by shared
understandings of forms of social life and social order attainable through, and
supportive of, advances in science and technology” [17], this concept allows us to
explore and better understand the complex interplay between developments in
science, technology, and society. For instance, examining the development and
regulation of nuclear power in the United States and South Korea, Jasanoff and Kim
[18] identify different ways in which nationhood and nuclear power have been
imagined together in the two countries, as well as how such different imaginaries
illuminate their different responses to nuclear disasters and the spread of
196
K. Sato
future—has become a common analytical tool in such fields as anthropology and
sociology.
Two recent insights regarding collective imaginaries are of particular relevance
in thinking about the Fukushima disaster and its aftermath. First, social imaginaries
are consequential for a group’s social resilience. Reviewing empirical works (including their own) on groups facing various adversities (e.g., poverty, health disparities, discrimination, marginalization), Hall and Lamont [11, 12] argue that
social imaginaries are constitutive of the collective capabilities of a community or
society, as they not only bind its members with narratives of its past accomplishments and a vision of what it means to belong to it, but also indicate how its
members understand what they are capable of doing together. Defining social resilience as “the capacity of groups of people bound together in organizations,
classes, racial groups, communities, or nations to sustain and advance their
well-being in the face of challenges” [11], they argue that imaginaries can provide
significant resources for such a capacity. For instance, social recognition and status
of a group—i.e., where it stands in collective imaginaries—shape capabilities of its
members by influencing how they can secure support from others, as well as how
they perceive their own efficacy [11]. Put another way, how collective imaginaries
specify and support group identities and define who qualify as valued members of
the collectivity can be direct sources of resilience for group members [12].
Conversely, when these imaginaries stigmatize a group, they constrain capabilities
of its members. At the same time, groups might turn to collective imaginaries for
tool to cope with difficulties: In coping with discrimination, members of
marginalized groups in the United States often rely on such cultural resources as
principles of equality as a key American creed (e.g., [26]), whereas a strong group
identity has been found to alleviate the impact of adverse experiences. In sum,
imaginaries serve as important resources—or constraints—for social resilience,
independently of and consequentially for a group’s access to material resources.
Second, imaginaries play a significant role in the way a society addresses science
and technology. Jasanoff ([17]; also see Jasanoff and Kim [18]) argues that visions
of future developments in science and technology are inevitably and intricately
connected to collective visions of good and attainable futures, positing a concept of
“sociotechnical imaginaries.” Defined as “collectively held, institutionally stabilized, and publicly performed visions of desirable futures, animated by shared
understandings of forms of social life and social order attainable through, and
supportive of, advances in science and technology” [17], this concept allows us to
explore and better understand the complex interplay between developments in
science, technology, and society. For instance, examining the development and
regulation of nuclear power in the United States and South Korea, Jasanoff and Kim
[18] identify different ways in which nationhood and nuclear power have been
imagined together in the two countries, as well as how such different imaginaries
illuminate their different responses to nuclear disasters and the spread of
196
K. Sato