by operators [42]. In extreme conditions, the risk is that the factors that determine
the ‘entry into resilience’ are ignored [43].
In their current state, the lessons that have been learned from the accident may
hide some key drivers for the planning and development of actions taken in the face
of devastation. The concept of the extreme situation invites us to supplement these
lessons and reintroduce factors related to the human body, emotions, and kinaesthetic, which create our initial relationship with the world, and constitute a
socio-sensual structure for behaviour. In order to understand behaviour in extreme
situations we must first understand the experience, which is marked by radical
changes that cannot be easily aggregated into logical arguments. Moreover, the
integration of a more sensitive approach to the behaviour of others into an otherwise
rational approach to decision making would appear to be a promising avenue for
better management [44].
On-site management problems were compounded by the injunctions of remote
decision makers. The conflict between the plant’s staff and the Japanese government cannot simply be reduced to a failure to share information or a lack of
awareness of each other’s problems. It is the result of different relationships with
danger, through social pressure, to moral issues. More generally, the management
of the accident demonstrates the intrinsic limit of an “optimization” type decision
making process. At the political level, there is a tendency to expect from rational
decision maker to base their decision on technical consideration, whereas it has
some necessary social and ethical implications which cannot be avoided. In any
event, the people rely on their own criteria in order to assess the rationality of an
evacuation for instance, based on the social meaning of their decision, personal
feelings, etc. A ‘resilient community’ is the result of these multiple nucleus of
action/decision which have to be coordinated with a full acknowledgement of their
specificities.
It is therefore necessary to establish an ethical framework that is appropriate to
extreme situations, which articulates different temporal and rational registers. The
intervention by the residents of Olympus offers a universal interpretation of
Odysseus’s decision. A contrario, due to the fact that all parties sought to make their
own sense of the situation, the Japanese population, its government and authorities
did not understand the magnitude of Yoshida’s actions or those of his colleagues.
References
1. I. Gilboa, M. Marinacci, Ambiguity and the bayesian paradigm, in Advances in Economics
and Econometrics. Tenth World Congress, ed. by D. Acemoglu, M. Arellano and E. Dekel,
vol. 1 (Cambridge University Press, 2013), p. 179–242
2. F. Guarnieri, S. Travadel, C. Martin, A. Portelli, A. Afrouss, L’accident de Fukushima
Daiichi: le récit du directeur de la centrale. vol. I, L’anéantissement, (Presses des Mines, Paris,
2015), p. 341
3. NAIIC, The Official Report of The Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation
Commission. Executive Summary, The National Diet of Japan (2012)
Decision-Making in Extreme Situations …
181
the ‘entry into resilience’ are ignored [43].
In their current state, the lessons that have been learned from the accident may
hide some key drivers for the planning and development of actions taken in the face
of devastation. The concept of the extreme situation invites us to supplement these
lessons and reintroduce factors related to the human body, emotions, and kinaesthetic, which create our initial relationship with the world, and constitute a
socio-sensual structure for behaviour. In order to understand behaviour in extreme
situations we must first understand the experience, which is marked by radical
changes that cannot be easily aggregated into logical arguments. Moreover, the
integration of a more sensitive approach to the behaviour of others into an otherwise
rational approach to decision making would appear to be a promising avenue for
better management [44].
On-site management problems were compounded by the injunctions of remote
decision makers. The conflict between the plant’s staff and the Japanese government cannot simply be reduced to a failure to share information or a lack of
awareness of each other’s problems. It is the result of different relationships with
danger, through social pressure, to moral issues. More generally, the management
of the accident demonstrates the intrinsic limit of an “optimization” type decision
making process. At the political level, there is a tendency to expect from rational
decision maker to base their decision on technical consideration, whereas it has
some necessary social and ethical implications which cannot be avoided. In any
event, the people rely on their own criteria in order to assess the rationality of an
evacuation for instance, based on the social meaning of their decision, personal
feelings, etc. A ‘resilient community’ is the result of these multiple nucleus of
action/decision which have to be coordinated with a full acknowledgement of their
specificities.
It is therefore necessary to establish an ethical framework that is appropriate to
extreme situations, which articulates different temporal and rational registers. The
intervention by the residents of Olympus offers a universal interpretation of
Odysseus’s decision. A contrario, due to the fact that all parties sought to make their
own sense of the situation, the Japanese population, its government and authorities
did not understand the magnitude of Yoshida’s actions or those of his colleagues.
References
1. I. Gilboa, M. Marinacci, Ambiguity and the bayesian paradigm, in Advances in Economics
and Econometrics. Tenth World Congress, ed. by D. Acemoglu, M. Arellano and E. Dekel,
vol. 1 (Cambridge University Press, 2013), p. 179–242
2. F. Guarnieri, S. Travadel, C. Martin, A. Portelli, A. Afrouss, L’accident de Fukushima
Daiichi: le récit du directeur de la centrale. vol. I, L’anéantissement, (Presses des Mines, Paris,
2015), p. 341
3. NAIIC, The Official Report of The Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation
Commission. Executive Summary, The National Diet of Japan (2012)
Decision-Making in Extreme Situations …
181