representations from the public sphere. In this case, public opinion of the
Fukushima Daiichi accident hinged on interference from the Prime Minister in the
management of the crisis and the incompetence of TEPCO [39]. The validity of the
actions taken by on-site operators was not acknowledged until long after the events
of 11 March, 2011. Three months after the accident, workers suffered from an
unusually high level of psychological problems, linked to the social discrimination
they were subject to [40].
The decisions of the plant’s superintendent were therefore influenced by the
need to protect the physical and mental wellbeing of his colleagues [2].
Nevertheless, when it became clear that the only way to vent Reactor 1 and prevent
its explosion was to manually open a valve located in a highly radioactive zone,
technicians reported for work. The superintendent stated, “We decided to do the
operation by hand, as a last resort. We decided to do this because we thought that it
could be done, if all it took was to accept being irradiated” (ibid., our translation).
It could have been the case that economic considerations dictated this decision: the
loss of a few employees could have brought a solution to the crisis as long as it
would not have jeopardized the remaining resources. However, such a decision can
only be seen as acceptable as a result of a personal and interpersonal journeys of the
decision maker and his colleagues, through an action process leading to a singular
system of values. In order to understand decision making in extreme situations, one
must first understand the development (mediated by physical experience of the
situation) of this value system in which individual and social representations play a
key role.
6 Conclusion
Investigations into the accident at Fukushima Daiichi highlighted failures in communication, and a lack of foresight and anticipation on the part of operators in some
of the decisions that were taken. These analyses implicitly suggest that there was a
range of options based on a known state, and they reduce decision making to an
optimization exercise. Consequently, the feedback from experience becomes
focused on the lack of coordination between the operator’s headquarters, the
Japanese government and the plant, obsolete instrumentation, or the effects of stress
on behaviour.
11 Of course it is clear that our understanding of the impact of stress or
emotions on behaviour or decision making is still preliminary [41], and merits
further examination. However, paradoxically, this type of ‘safety science’ approach
seeks to place behaviour in a theoretical context made up of bloodless social
mechanisms that take no account of the humanity of those who must act. Moreover,
in the nuclear context, executives are sometimes tempted to resort to formalisms to
demonstrate a high degree of control, even if it means negating the difficulties faced
11
See for example the conclusions of the Japanese Parliamentary Investigation Commission [3].
180
S. Travadel
Fukushima Daiichi accident hinged on interference from the Prime Minister in the
management of the crisis and the incompetence of TEPCO [39]. The validity of the
actions taken by on-site operators was not acknowledged until long after the events
of 11 March, 2011. Three months after the accident, workers suffered from an
unusually high level of psychological problems, linked to the social discrimination
they were subject to [40].
The decisions of the plant’s superintendent were therefore influenced by the
need to protect the physical and mental wellbeing of his colleagues [2].
Nevertheless, when it became clear that the only way to vent Reactor 1 and prevent
its explosion was to manually open a valve located in a highly radioactive zone,
technicians reported for work. The superintendent stated, “We decided to do the
operation by hand, as a last resort. We decided to do this because we thought that it
could be done, if all it took was to accept being irradiated” (ibid., our translation).
It could have been the case that economic considerations dictated this decision: the
loss of a few employees could have brought a solution to the crisis as long as it
would not have jeopardized the remaining resources. However, such a decision can
only be seen as acceptable as a result of a personal and interpersonal journeys of the
decision maker and his colleagues, through an action process leading to a singular
system of values. In order to understand decision making in extreme situations, one
must first understand the development (mediated by physical experience of the
situation) of this value system in which individual and social representations play a
key role.
6 Conclusion
Investigations into the accident at Fukushima Daiichi highlighted failures in communication, and a lack of foresight and anticipation on the part of operators in some
of the decisions that were taken. These analyses implicitly suggest that there was a
range of options based on a known state, and they reduce decision making to an
optimization exercise. Consequently, the feedback from experience becomes
focused on the lack of coordination between the operator’s headquarters, the
Japanese government and the plant, obsolete instrumentation, or the effects of stress
on behaviour.
11 Of course it is clear that our understanding of the impact of stress or
emotions on behaviour or decision making is still preliminary [41], and merits
further examination. However, paradoxically, this type of ‘safety science’ approach
seeks to place behaviour in a theoretical context made up of bloodless social
mechanisms that take no account of the humanity of those who must act. Moreover,
in the nuclear context, executives are sometimes tempted to resort to formalisms to
demonstrate a high degree of control, even if it means negating the difficulties faced
11
See for example the conclusions of the Japanese Parliamentary Investigation Commission [3].
180
S. Travadel