carried out by incrementally improved official schemes. But it does not work instead
of the punishment of responsible person. The author would like to argue, the major
accident investigations and their reports did play another role in society than practical learning of lessons from the accident, to fulfill this unfocused public outrage.
It was the most authoritative one that the National Diet of Japan Fukushima Nuclear
Accident Independent Investigation Commission (NAIIC) among four major accident
investigation committees (or commissions) established after the Fukushima accident.
NAIIC was established on December 8, 2011, with the legal basis by a special act.
Their report was published on July 5, 2012 and some of its statements attracted the
strongest public attention and even encouraged public anger. The author would take
two examples from their provocative theories here: (1) “manmade” and “Made in
Japan” disaster theories on the root cause of the accident and (2) “regulatory capture”
criticism against the corruption of the past nuclear regulation [3].
The first case, “manmade” and “Made in Japan” disaster theory was suggested in
the “Message from the Chairman” page of the Executive Summery written by
Chairman Kurokawa, not in the body text of full report [7]. That page was
exclusively for its English version and no counterpart in the original Japanese
report. However, this expression was broadly cited in its media coverage. The word
“manmade” attracted rapid and positive attention mainly in Japanese domestic
public opinion because this interpretation was consistent with the tradition described above: it legitimated the lay theory accusing the relevant persons and their
faults. It seemed to even encourage the legal criminal prosecution process for the
relevant officials in the Government, TEPCO and other institutions.
1 The process
was virtually started on August 2, 2012, after the NAIIC’s report published,
although no one was finally indicted after prosecutor’s investigation.
Kurokawa also suggested another message at the same time in his letter—the theory
of “Made in Japan” disaster with “Japanese Culture” explanation. It was spread all over
the world very quickly, as wells as in Japan. This could obscure our analytical understanding on the root cause of the accident and there were negative responses on this point
from foreign major journalism [8, 9]. It also seemed to be odd because this was
something contradictive to individual prosecution approach supported by his own
“manmade” theory (because everyone could be dismissed their responsibility if the root
cause was the “culture”). But, these keywords are often cited simultaneously without any
inconvenience, and considered those as the most important messages of the NAIIC
report.
1
In Japan, the result of accident investigation could be used as the evidences in criminal case. For
example, the Aichi Prefectural Police, the Nagoya District Public Prosecutors Office adopted the
materials and final reports of then Aircraft Accident Investigation Committee (AAIC, transformed
into Japan Transportation Safety Board (JTSB) in 2008) as their evidences to prosecute the captain
in the case of the JL706 accident happened in 1997. In this case, the Nagoya District Court and
Nagoya High Court formally admitted those materials as evidence. Then AAIC commissioner was
summoned by the courts as the witness. These practices fallen foul of the Convention of
International Civil Aviation (Chicago Convention), but the Japanese Government formally issues
the difference notification on the separation of accident investigation and criminal prosecution to
the council of International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).
Why Is It so Difficult to Learn from Accidents?
161
of the punishment of responsible person. The author would like to argue, the major
accident investigations and their reports did play another role in society than practical learning of lessons from the accident, to fulfill this unfocused public outrage.
It was the most authoritative one that the National Diet of Japan Fukushima Nuclear
Accident Independent Investigation Commission (NAIIC) among four major accident
investigation committees (or commissions) established after the Fukushima accident.
NAIIC was established on December 8, 2011, with the legal basis by a special act.
Their report was published on July 5, 2012 and some of its statements attracted the
strongest public attention and even encouraged public anger. The author would take
two examples from their provocative theories here: (1) “manmade” and “Made in
Japan” disaster theories on the root cause of the accident and (2) “regulatory capture”
criticism against the corruption of the past nuclear regulation [3].
The first case, “manmade” and “Made in Japan” disaster theory was suggested in
the “Message from the Chairman” page of the Executive Summery written by
Chairman Kurokawa, not in the body text of full report [7]. That page was
exclusively for its English version and no counterpart in the original Japanese
report. However, this expression was broadly cited in its media coverage. The word
“manmade” attracted rapid and positive attention mainly in Japanese domestic
public opinion because this interpretation was consistent with the tradition described above: it legitimated the lay theory accusing the relevant persons and their
faults. It seemed to even encourage the legal criminal prosecution process for the
relevant officials in the Government, TEPCO and other institutions.
1 The process
was virtually started on August 2, 2012, after the NAIIC’s report published,
although no one was finally indicted after prosecutor’s investigation.
Kurokawa also suggested another message at the same time in his letter—the theory
of “Made in Japan” disaster with “Japanese Culture” explanation. It was spread all over
the world very quickly, as wells as in Japan. This could obscure our analytical understanding on the root cause of the accident and there were negative responses on this point
from foreign major journalism [8, 9]. It also seemed to be odd because this was
something contradictive to individual prosecution approach supported by his own
“manmade” theory (because everyone could be dismissed their responsibility if the root
cause was the “culture”). But, these keywords are often cited simultaneously without any
inconvenience, and considered those as the most important messages of the NAIIC
report.
1
In Japan, the result of accident investigation could be used as the evidences in criminal case. For
example, the Aichi Prefectural Police, the Nagoya District Public Prosecutors Office adopted the
materials and final reports of then Aircraft Accident Investigation Committee (AAIC, transformed
into Japan Transportation Safety Board (JTSB) in 2008) as their evidences to prosecute the captain
in the case of the JL706 accident happened in 1997. In this case, the Nagoya District Court and
Nagoya High Court formally admitted those materials as evidence. Then AAIC commissioner was
summoned by the courts as the witness. These practices fallen foul of the Convention of
International Civil Aviation (Chicago Convention), but the Japanese Government formally issues
the difference notification on the separation of accident investigation and criminal prosecution to
the council of International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).
Why Is It so Difficult to Learn from Accidents?
161