The second eye-catching narrative suggested by the NAIIC report was “regulatory capture” criticism against the corruption of the nuclear regulation in Japan. It
strictly pointed out the deficits of past nuclear regulatory system, then proposed the
fascinating keyword—“regulatory capture.” Shuya Nomura, a member of the
NAIIC, a jurist and the proponent of this concept described its outline precisely:
“Regulatory capture is a theory posited by George Stigler in The Theory of
Economic Regulation. It refers to a condition in which regulators are “taken over”
by the operators due to their lack of expertise and information, which results in the
regulations becoming ineffective” [10].
However, this Nobel Prize awarded concept was never used as an analytical
framework in the report. It just exemplified the historical process of collusive
regulatory practices as a case of “regulatory capture.” This was interpreted as just a
strict criticism against the corruption and became very popular. But, causal relationship between any particular factors and the result (= corruption) has never been
demonstrated by using this concept in the NAIIC report.
These NAIIC’s narratives inspire us an approach to punish victimizers: sanction
through regulation.
People’s unsettled outrage has seemed to result in unlimited and never-ending
efforts to reduce the risk from hazard created by any nuclear activities. New regulatory authority (NRA, Nuclear Regulatory Authority) adopted decisively strict
approach that calls for further measures to increase and to demonstrate plant safety
in bit-by-bit manner (i.e. additional safety measures against similar scenario to the
Fukushima case, safety review with “new regulatory standards,” earthquake resistance retrofit, on-site active fault survey, and so on). This sequential regulatory
actions has made operators and manufacturers impoverished by never-ending
review process while public trust has not been effectively recovered in proportion to
their efforts. It could be interpreted that regulation fulfills the public will to punish
“evil” nuclear industry instead of legal prosecution process.
Additionally, it should be noted that the final conclusion of the investigation
reports and the actual design of nuclear regulatory reform did not have causal
relationships as a matter of fact. The discussion about the reform of regulatory
system was carried out at the Government and the National Diet before NAIIC and
other major final reports were published. Japanese Government established the
NRA in September 19, 2012, three months after the Act was approved on June 20,
2012. The sessions about the change in law was held during spring of the year. At
that moment, only the report of so-called “Independent Commission” (established
by an NPO) and the interim report of the Governmental Commission (ICANPS,
Investigation Committee on the Accident at the Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations)
were released. It was chronologically impossible to reflect the final recommendation
of NAIIC report on this institutional reformation in formal and traceable manner.
Actually, NRA themselves do not admit that the recommendations of NAIIC
report was a part of the background of their establishment, according to their
website [11]. It seems to be quite unreasonable that the National Diet did not wait
for their own commission’s conclusion and recommendation, as well as other major
committees’, though their final reports had almost been finished.
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K. Juraku
strictly pointed out the deficits of past nuclear regulatory system, then proposed the
fascinating keyword—“regulatory capture.” Shuya Nomura, a member of the
NAIIC, a jurist and the proponent of this concept described its outline precisely:
“Regulatory capture is a theory posited by George Stigler in The Theory of
Economic Regulation. It refers to a condition in which regulators are “taken over”
by the operators due to their lack of expertise and information, which results in the
regulations becoming ineffective” [10].
However, this Nobel Prize awarded concept was never used as an analytical
framework in the report. It just exemplified the historical process of collusive
regulatory practices as a case of “regulatory capture.” This was interpreted as just a
strict criticism against the corruption and became very popular. But, causal relationship between any particular factors and the result (= corruption) has never been
demonstrated by using this concept in the NAIIC report.
These NAIIC’s narratives inspire us an approach to punish victimizers: sanction
through regulation.
People’s unsettled outrage has seemed to result in unlimited and never-ending
efforts to reduce the risk from hazard created by any nuclear activities. New regulatory authority (NRA, Nuclear Regulatory Authority) adopted decisively strict
approach that calls for further measures to increase and to demonstrate plant safety
in bit-by-bit manner (i.e. additional safety measures against similar scenario to the
Fukushima case, safety review with “new regulatory standards,” earthquake resistance retrofit, on-site active fault survey, and so on). This sequential regulatory
actions has made operators and manufacturers impoverished by never-ending
review process while public trust has not been effectively recovered in proportion to
their efforts. It could be interpreted that regulation fulfills the public will to punish
“evil” nuclear industry instead of legal prosecution process.
Additionally, it should be noted that the final conclusion of the investigation
reports and the actual design of nuclear regulatory reform did not have causal
relationships as a matter of fact. The discussion about the reform of regulatory
system was carried out at the Government and the National Diet before NAIIC and
other major final reports were published. Japanese Government established the
NRA in September 19, 2012, three months after the Act was approved on June 20,
2012. The sessions about the change in law was held during spring of the year. At
that moment, only the report of so-called “Independent Commission” (established
by an NPO) and the interim report of the Governmental Commission (ICANPS,
Investigation Committee on the Accident at the Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations)
were released. It was chronologically impossible to reflect the final recommendation
of NAIIC report on this institutional reformation in formal and traceable manner.
Actually, NRA themselves do not admit that the recommendations of NAIIC
report was a part of the background of their establishment, according to their
website [11]. It seems to be quite unreasonable that the National Diet did not wait
for their own commission’s conclusion and recommendation, as well as other major
committees’, though their final reports had almost been finished.
162
K. Juraku