[2, 3]. Nuclear advocates continue the discussion to restore public trust, to build the
consensus and to promote their program again. Critics persist in their counterarguments on the efficiency, risk, transparency and feasibility of “nuclear village’s”
theory. This landscape is almost the same to the scene BEFORE the Fukushima
nuclear disaster happened. Sandwiched in between those polarized discourses, the
rate of pro- and con-nuclear poll has been stabilized—at the point of a little bit
negative against nuclear—for these six years. General public gradually lost their
interest on nuclear dispute as well as trust towards the people relevant to nuclear
activities. On the other hand, nuclear power station restart program is still walking
randomly, not articulated well and the experts in nuclear field are pretty demoralized.
It is hard to say the learning process through accident investigation was successfully finished and we overcome the accident. It is really far from the oracle of
“learning from disaster through investigation” theory.
3 Untaken Responsibility: Unsuccessful Prosecution
and Alternative Sanction by Tightened Regulation
Then, a question comes up: what has the Japanese society been doing after the
accident investigation? The author’s answer is “unsettled discussion about the locus
of responsibility.” Not only the direct stakeholders, such as the Government,
TEPCO, and the investigation commissions, but also the whole society, of course
including general public, have experienced the difficulty in coping with the separation of the issues centering on social justice and practical improvement based on
the lessons learned from the accident since it happened.
Severe nuclear accident could be interpreted as one of the most extreme and
typical cases of organizational accident with serious consequences [4]. Needless to
say, the Fukushima case was the first experience of this kind for Japanese society. It
is well known that Japanese society (and perhaps other East Asian societies as well)
have relatively strong retributivism and martinetism (severe punishment policy) for
individuals involved in the cause of disaster even when the nature of accident is
organizational [5, 6]. There is a long history of controversy about separation of
criminal prosecution process and accident investigation activities in Japan, and it
has never been settled down. People, as well as the victims and their familiy
members, have pretty strong feeling of unjust without strict punishment for individual’s fault that cause and/or worsen the damages caused by accident.
In this respect, no one has been officially punished through criminal prosecution
process on the Fukushima accident so far. This fact should be very uncomfortable for
accident victims as well as for many members of Japanese society, thinking about
the strong tradition of socially embeded retributivism and martinetism. Of course,
damage compensation and life recovery assistance for suffering people have been
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K. Juraku
consensus and to promote their program again. Critics persist in their counterarguments on the efficiency, risk, transparency and feasibility of “nuclear village’s”
theory. This landscape is almost the same to the scene BEFORE the Fukushima
nuclear disaster happened. Sandwiched in between those polarized discourses, the
rate of pro- and con-nuclear poll has been stabilized—at the point of a little bit
negative against nuclear—for these six years. General public gradually lost their
interest on nuclear dispute as well as trust towards the people relevant to nuclear
activities. On the other hand, nuclear power station restart program is still walking
randomly, not articulated well and the experts in nuclear field are pretty demoralized.
It is hard to say the learning process through accident investigation was successfully finished and we overcome the accident. It is really far from the oracle of
“learning from disaster through investigation” theory.
3 Untaken Responsibility: Unsuccessful Prosecution
and Alternative Sanction by Tightened Regulation
Then, a question comes up: what has the Japanese society been doing after the
accident investigation? The author’s answer is “unsettled discussion about the locus
of responsibility.” Not only the direct stakeholders, such as the Government,
TEPCO, and the investigation commissions, but also the whole society, of course
including general public, have experienced the difficulty in coping with the separation of the issues centering on social justice and practical improvement based on
the lessons learned from the accident since it happened.
Severe nuclear accident could be interpreted as one of the most extreme and
typical cases of organizational accident with serious consequences [4]. Needless to
say, the Fukushima case was the first experience of this kind for Japanese society. It
is well known that Japanese society (and perhaps other East Asian societies as well)
have relatively strong retributivism and martinetism (severe punishment policy) for
individuals involved in the cause of disaster even when the nature of accident is
organizational [5, 6]. There is a long history of controversy about separation of
criminal prosecution process and accident investigation activities in Japan, and it
has never been settled down. People, as well as the victims and their familiy
members, have pretty strong feeling of unjust without strict punishment for individual’s fault that cause and/or worsen the damages caused by accident.
In this respect, no one has been officially punished through criminal prosecution
process on the Fukushima accident so far. This fact should be very uncomfortable for
accident victims as well as for many members of Japanese society, thinking about
the strong tradition of socially embeded retributivism and martinetism. Of course,
damage compensation and life recovery assistance for suffering people have been
160
K. Juraku