investigation tradition in aviation field. Almost all countries now have their permanent accident investigation institution for aviation (and sometimes for public
transportation in general).
It was also quite natural that people took over and extended the paradigm from
aviation to space vehicle accident because these two fields are closely related each
other and have many similarities. The Presidential Commission on the Space
Shuttle Challenger Accident (Rodgers Commission) was chartered after space
shuttle Challenger crash in 1986. Also, the NASA (National Aeronautics and
Space Administration) convened the Columbia Accident Investigation Board
responding to the space shuttle Columbia accident as the official accident investigation body, although it was not presidential commission. Other than these symbolic cases, many official accident investigations have been conducted after serious
accidents in space development in many countries.
This was also the same story in the field of nuclear utilization. The President’s
Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island (so-called Kemeny Commission)
have often been acknowledged as the milestone in the history of post-accident
investigation and safety improvement in the nuclear field. Now many people
believe that we learnt and could learn from disaster through accident investigation
process.
This belief has seemed to be well-shared in Japan, too. Soon after the Fukushima
accident happened, public discussion about formal and comprehensive accident
investigation was begun. This belief was acknowledged and adopted by the
Japanese Government, the Japanese Diet, TEPCO (Tokyo Electric Power Co.)
themselves and a non-profit organization (NPO) established for an independent
investigation. All of these four major committees (or commissions) published their
final reports by the mid of 2012. We can now have them on the web and/or as
printed matter, and some of them have already been translated into English, for
non-Japanese readers. Post-Fukushima formal accident investigation seems to be
concluded.
This fact creates an expectation that many lessons have already been learned
well, next Fukushima will be prevented by the measures responding to those lessons and the society as a whole should have become more resilient to similar (and
even other) type of disaster. Also, some people have believed and even still believe
that such changes should have positive effects on public opinion/sentiment about
Japanese nuclear program.
However, the reality in Japan now is pretty far from these expectations. It has
taken different trajectory than people’s belief of “learning from disaster through
investigation” theory.
As mentioned above, some deficits in Japanese nuclear governance have
remained, or even become worse than before the Fukushima accident. The majority
of public opinion is still negative on nuclear program as a whole, for relevant
organizations and on restart of safety upgraded nuclear power plants, while the Abe
Administration officially decided to maintain Japan’s nuclear power utilization
Why Is It so Difficult to Learn from Accidents?
159
transportation in general).
It was also quite natural that people took over and extended the paradigm from
aviation to space vehicle accident because these two fields are closely related each
other and have many similarities. The Presidential Commission on the Space
Shuttle Challenger Accident (Rodgers Commission) was chartered after space
shuttle Challenger crash in 1986. Also, the NASA (National Aeronautics and
Space Administration) convened the Columbia Accident Investigation Board
responding to the space shuttle Columbia accident as the official accident investigation body, although it was not presidential commission. Other than these symbolic cases, many official accident investigations have been conducted after serious
accidents in space development in many countries.
This was also the same story in the field of nuclear utilization. The President’s
Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island (so-called Kemeny Commission)
have often been acknowledged as the milestone in the history of post-accident
investigation and safety improvement in the nuclear field. Now many people
believe that we learnt and could learn from disaster through accident investigation
process.
This belief has seemed to be well-shared in Japan, too. Soon after the Fukushima
accident happened, public discussion about formal and comprehensive accident
investigation was begun. This belief was acknowledged and adopted by the
Japanese Government, the Japanese Diet, TEPCO (Tokyo Electric Power Co.)
themselves and a non-profit organization (NPO) established for an independent
investigation. All of these four major committees (or commissions) published their
final reports by the mid of 2012. We can now have them on the web and/or as
printed matter, and some of them have already been translated into English, for
non-Japanese readers. Post-Fukushima formal accident investigation seems to be
concluded.
This fact creates an expectation that many lessons have already been learned
well, next Fukushima will be prevented by the measures responding to those lessons and the society as a whole should have become more resilient to similar (and
even other) type of disaster. Also, some people have believed and even still believe
that such changes should have positive effects on public opinion/sentiment about
Japanese nuclear program.
However, the reality in Japan now is pretty far from these expectations. It has
taken different trajectory than people’s belief of “learning from disaster through
investigation” theory.
As mentioned above, some deficits in Japanese nuclear governance have
remained, or even become worse than before the Fukushima accident. The majority
of public opinion is still negative on nuclear program as a whole, for relevant
organizations and on restart of safety upgraded nuclear power plants, while the Abe
Administration officially decided to maintain Japan’s nuclear power utilization
Why Is It so Difficult to Learn from Accidents?
159