193
Today, discussions on these management issues appear to mainly take place in
rather closed settings, among IMO offi cials, IMO member countries and representatives from the shipping industry with limited participation from environmental
NGOs (Hassler et al. 2010 ; Hassler 2016 ).
Finally, the ecological sensitivity of different areas and ‘marine crossroads’
where incidents are more likely to occur can be comparably easily identifi ed and
located. It is, however, more complex to relate these parameters to what we know
about the likelihood of human errors. Although clear distinctions between human
error on the one hand and technical malfunction on the other can seldom be made,
available statistics show that the former tend to still be the most common cause of
incidents and accidents (Knudsen and Hassler 2011 ).
8.4 Summarising Discussion
Using the ‘uncertainty matrix’ presented in Sect. 8.2 with its four idealised states of
incomplete knowledge (Fig. 8.2 ), we can categorise our fi ve cases as belonging to
the categories of risk, uncertainty, ambiguity or ignorance (Table 8.1 ).
Our analysis focused on two main aspects of science-policy interfaces in the fi ve
cases: ( 1 ) the organisational structures of science-policy interfaces and ( 2 ) the
management of scientifi c uncertainties and stakeholder disagreements . This investigation revealed substantial differences in terms of institutional design of assessment -management interactions, as well as in terms of how scientifi c uncertainty and
sociopolitical ambiguity , stakeholder confl icts and controversies are addressed.
Whereas, for example, chemical risks are associated with paramount uncertainty, oil
discharges are not. Fisheries management on the other hand involves a high degree
of sociopolitical ambiguity, whereas in the case of IAS the opposite is true. Finally,
oil transportation fi ts with the more traditional (‘technical’) risk type. Our analysis
also reveals a great deal of variation in societal responses to the cases and that these
responses are often motivated by factors other than the actual risk characteristics.
Regarding the organisational structures of science-policy interfaces, we can
conclude that different forms of institutions and institutional arrangements
have evolved over time. We fi nd these structures relatively well-formalised in the
fi sheries case (via the EU’s CFP system); rather informal and bilaterally developed
for combating eutrophication (through the interaction of the ‘NEST-HELCOM
nexus’); largely underdeveloped in the IAS case, split into different spheres in the
chemicals area (environment versus market); and seemingly straightforward in the
case of oil transportation (through country surveillance and monitoring ). We also
see a clear trend in terms of an intensifi ed role of EU cooperation over time as
countries are bound to a centralised EU policy in fi sheries management (CFP) and
various EU directives and strategies in the other cases. However, the role of the EU
varies in the fi ve issues. Furthermore, we can identify different forms of dependence
on experts across the cases. In fi sheries management, a highly institutionalised formal linkage exists between the science advice system ( ICES ) and the EU Commission
8 Science-Policy Interfaces in Baltic Sea Environmental Governance: Towards…
Today, discussions on these management issues appear to mainly take place in
rather closed settings, among IMO offi cials, IMO member countries and representatives from the shipping industry with limited participation from environmental
NGOs (Hassler et al. 2010 ; Hassler 2016 ).
Finally, the ecological sensitivity of different areas and ‘marine crossroads’
where incidents are more likely to occur can be comparably easily identifi ed and
located. It is, however, more complex to relate these parameters to what we know
about the likelihood of human errors. Although clear distinctions between human
error on the one hand and technical malfunction on the other can seldom be made,
available statistics show that the former tend to still be the most common cause of
incidents and accidents (Knudsen and Hassler 2011 ).
8.4 Summarising Discussion
Using the ‘uncertainty matrix’ presented in Sect. 8.2 with its four idealised states of
incomplete knowledge (Fig. 8.2 ), we can categorise our fi ve cases as belonging to
the categories of risk, uncertainty, ambiguity or ignorance (Table 8.1 ).
Our analysis focused on two main aspects of science-policy interfaces in the fi ve
cases: ( 1 ) the organisational structures of science-policy interfaces and ( 2 ) the
management of scientifi c uncertainties and stakeholder disagreements . This investigation revealed substantial differences in terms of institutional design of assessment -management interactions, as well as in terms of how scientifi c uncertainty and
sociopolitical ambiguity , stakeholder confl icts and controversies are addressed.
Whereas, for example, chemical risks are associated with paramount uncertainty, oil
discharges are not. Fisheries management on the other hand involves a high degree
of sociopolitical ambiguity, whereas in the case of IAS the opposite is true. Finally,
oil transportation fi ts with the more traditional (‘technical’) risk type. Our analysis
also reveals a great deal of variation in societal responses to the cases and that these
responses are often motivated by factors other than the actual risk characteristics.
Regarding the organisational structures of science-policy interfaces, we can
conclude that different forms of institutions and institutional arrangements
have evolved over time. We fi nd these structures relatively well-formalised in the
fi sheries case (via the EU’s CFP system); rather informal and bilaterally developed
for combating eutrophication (through the interaction of the ‘NEST-HELCOM
nexus’); largely underdeveloped in the IAS case, split into different spheres in the
chemicals area (environment versus market); and seemingly straightforward in the
case of oil transportation (through country surveillance and monitoring ). We also
see a clear trend in terms of an intensifi ed role of EU cooperation over time as
countries are bound to a centralised EU policy in fi sheries management (CFP) and
various EU directives and strategies in the other cases. However, the role of the EU
varies in the fi ve issues. Furthermore, we can identify different forms of dependence
on experts across the cases. In fi sheries management, a highly institutionalised formal linkage exists between the science advice system ( ICES ) and the EU Commission
8 Science-Policy Interfaces in Baltic Sea Environmental Governance: Towards…